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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# Political Affairs

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5 September 1990

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### **Poll on Party Crisis, Measures For Restoring Confidence**

90UN2265A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 1 Jul 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report on opinion poll conducted among RSFSR party conference participants under rubric "In the Mirror of Sociology": "On the Party and Party Spirit"]

[Text] Many readers have already had the opportunity to take a fairly good look at the variant of the Program Statement proposed by the working party of the 28th CPSU Congress Preparatory Commission. One can hardly fail to note that the variant of the political document published in PRAVDA a few days ago contains quite a few new provisions as compared with the first draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform and takes into account many of the comments voiced during the discussion of the draft, including at the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party.

But the main debate over the draft of the Program Statement is still to come and will take place at the Party Congress itself. As the Congress debate approaches, we continue to offer our readers the findings of sociological studies. Our previous account examined the overall findings of a joint poll by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the Center for Public Opinion Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology. Today, in addition to the findings of that study, we have the opportunity to analyze the results of another mass poll conducted among participants in the Russian Party Conference by the "Congress" Sociological Service.

#### **What is the Cause of the Crisis?**

The draft of the 28th CPSU Congress's Program Statement devotes quite a lot of space to assessing the present situation in our society and determining the causes of the profound crisis in the material and spiritual spheres. The general consensus is that the crisis is rooted not in inadequacies of the socialist idea itself, but in the deformations it sustained during the initial stages of the new system. Perestroika marked a sharp turn towards renovation, but there have been quite a few mistakes, miscalculations and faults in the implementation of its plans, in political strategy, which cannot fail to concern and worry us all. What, then, judging by the responses of those polled, are the problems of greatest concern? Here is how they were rated, in percentage points:

Situation in the party—65;

Ways of implementing the economic reform—63;

Course of perestroika in general—53;

Inter-ethnic relations and conflicts—44;

Living standards—39;

Political instability—38;

Social security—35;

Crime—34;

Public morals—32;

Education of young people—32;

Ecological situation—24;

Cultural standards of the people—24;

International affairs—6.

We see that the range of acute problems is very wide and embraces virtually the entire spectrum of socio-economic relations. There are many reasons for such a situation. But the organizers of the study attempted to identify those which are directly linked in the public mind with failures of perestroika policy. The respondents identified the following as negative factors (percentage of total polled):

Absence of clear theoretical guidelines for the development of society—48;

Half-hearted nature of economic reforms—43;

Procrastination in decision making—42;

Failure to take account of people's personal interests—37;

Inconsistencies in political reform—35;

People's disillusionment with perestroika—34;

The crisis in the party—34;

Underestimation of the acuteness of the problems of inter-ethnic relations—20.

The polls clearly indicate that the grave situation in the country is causing disillusionment with the party as a political leader, that its prestige among the masses is increasingly declining. It is known that lately thousands of former members have left the party. The sociologists asked the poll respondents to name the main cause which, in their view, has given impetus to this process. The responses are highly indicative: 41.9 percent said that the people leaving the party had lost faith in the possibility of its radical renovation and sought to participate in political life as members of new socio-political organizations; 44.2 percent thought that the people resigning from the party were usually those who had joined it in the first place to promote their careers or achieve other personal goals; 31.1 percent said that many, in their view, were leaving because they did not want to have anything to do with a party responsible for repressions and for the economic and social crisis of our society; 14.5 percent stated that they had other opinions, which they did not clarify.

The proportions, to tell the truth, are truly alarming. It is apparent from the cited figures that the great majority



(73.2 percent) associate the process with the state of the party itself and are concerned with its slow restructuring.

### How to Regain Trust?

One of the most acute problems right now is that of the place and role of the party in the renovation of society. The difficult, crucial times through which it is passing are punctuated with the aggravation of internal contradictions, polarization of opinions and positions and, as a consequence, the declining activity of party organizations. In essence, at issue is whether the party will be able to carry out far-reaching internal reforms and maintain its role as a political leader or, failing to cope with its ailments, will be forced to the sidelines of political life. Despite the complexity of the situation, the majority of the polled communists (both in primary party organizations and at the Russian Party Conference and Constituent Congress) remain optimistic about the party's future, though they associate it with resolute steps aimed at renovating both its political organization and the forms and methods of its activity. The "Congress" Sociological Service asked delegates to answer the question, how they viewed the future of the CPSU. Their views, and hence positions, are fairly definite: 83 percent of the respondents stated that they saw the CPSU as a party for consolidating all segments of society supporting the ideas of socialism; 13 percent saw it as a political organization of the working class, and only one percent said they were uncertain.

Confidence that, despite all difficulties, the party would be able to overcome the crisis and once again occupy a vanguard position was manifest in the attitudes displayed towards proposals to rename the party which, as is known, have lately been voiced rather frequently. The position of participants in the Russian Party Conference who responded to the poll on this question is, one could say, unambiguous: 80 percent of them declared that the present name should be retained.

Of interest are the views of respondents on what is at present most important for consolidating the party. Here is how the responses were distributed, in percentage points:

Consolidation of all trends existing within it—59;

Purging those who don't believe in the ideals of socialism—29;

Purging conservatives—17.

The poll results were, of course, affected by differences in views. For example, there is a quite significant group of communists who see the way of consolidating the CPSU by purging it, though they attach different meanings to the word. Most of the respondents, however, nevertheless favored consolidation of all factions within the party.

However, whereas there is an apparent majority with regard to the basic, fundamental question, things are

rather different in assessments of the specific renovation programs proposed by different factions. The "Congress" Sociological Service surveyed public opinion with regard to three platforms: the CPSU Central Committee Platform, the Democratic Platform in the CPSU, and the Marxist Platform. The results yielded the following picture (in percentage points):

	Fully support	Partially support	Do not support
CPSU Central Committee Platform	45	44	2
Democratic Platform Within CPSU	5	48	12
Marxist Platform	3	44	12

Thus, more than half the delegates fully support one platform or another, with 21 percent of them supporting all three platforms at once.

The poll conducted by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA together with the Center for Public Opinion Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology was aimed at a more detailed investigation of specific provisions of the platforms. In particular, one of the most important elements of the Democratic Platform is the transformation of the CPSU from a vanguard party determining the country's economic and social development into a parliamentary party which would have to gain its right to political leadership solely through elections in the conditions of a multiparty system. The sociologists asked, "What do you think of this provision of the Democratic Platform?" The positions were formulated as follows (in percentage points):

I agree with this provision and think that the CPSU's political leadership must be ensured only by authoritative parliamentary representation—67.3;

I reject this provision: the CPSU must retain its determinant role in the country's economic and social development regardless of its parliamentary representation—27.8.

But in speaking of the political platforms of different factions it is worth establishing what motivated the formulation of alternative documents. Differences in opinions concerning the party's ways out of the crisis? Yes, undoubtedly that was one of the main reasons. But one should also note that the assessments of the CPSU Central Committee Platform were often critical, which, incidentally, was the main reason for drawing up the variant of the political statement, "Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism." What caused such a reaction? The joint poll by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the Public Opinion Center received answers to the question, "How do you assess the overall content of the draft Platform?" (percentage points):

On the whole the Platform contains a specific action program, but individual important problems have been dealt with superficially or not at all—37.6;

The draft abounds in general statements, with very few specific proposals—43.6;

The entire draft consists of general statements and contains no specific CPSU action program—11.7.

Such are some of the conclusions drawn from recent sociological polls. However, the main debate, we repeat, is still ahead. There is hope that, however acute the debates at the coming congress, ultimately correct solutions will be found that will clear the road to social progress and civic concord.

### **Models, Principles for Future USSR State Structure Examined**

90UN2265B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 1 Jul 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Chichkanov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Living Together, In a Common Home. Subjective Notes on the Structure and Principles of Our State System"]

[Text] It seems that at this explosive, unpredictable juncture our Union, too, has been unambiguously confronted with the eternal Hamletian question. Will it withstand the onslaught of centrifugal forces or will the great country created by the colossal efforts and tremendous sacrifices of many generations cease to exist as a unified, powerful state?

So what is it: To be or not to be?

No, I certainly do not suggest viewing the Soviet Union as a "sacred cow." Any model of a state system has its faults and, if it comes into contradiction with life, must be changed. But this question requires serious study. Because separatist slogans are being used as the main argument in electoral struggles. When they are translated into the language of programs of government and quasi-government organizations, when they divide or unite millions of people, then a serious analysis and comprehension of the proposed courses is probably in order.

Thus, the first variant: the dismantling of the Soviet Union and its breakup into several separate and independent states. The immediate question is: Into how many, precisely? If we are consistent and, at the same time, seek to ensure the equality of peoples, we will ultimately have some 150 independent states beset by territorial and other differences. And if one also keeps in mind the rights of ethnic minorities and the historical right of, for example, Russia to vast territories, the situation will simply become unresolvable.

But suppose we nevertheless manage to resolve these problems by restricting the separation process to the framework of the Union Republics. In that case most of them will turn into economically second-rate countries

interacting with the more developed nations of Western Europe. The result is easily predictable: the rich will get richer and the poor poorer. It should not be forgotten that the Soviet Union has a real economic basis, an industrial complex with a powerful economic potential, and its destruction would lead to the inevitable economic collapse of all the republics, perhaps with the exception of the largest one. But even in the Russian Federation the worsening economic situation could lead to unpredictable political consequences.

Some might object that they have no intention of destroying economic links: they just want to get out of the USSR, but commerce would continue as before. That is the position of the Lithuanian leadership, and at first glance it seems plausible. But firstly, this point of view is actually based on recognition of the fact that economic independence is lacking, hence, there is a close interdependence of all the republics, and secondly, the question is not of dismantling the USSR but of replacing its current system, usually called federative, with a different permanent union of nations formed to promote specific objectives, that is, a confederation.

Sometimes attempts are made to justify the need for national separation by introducing the concept of "ethnic renaissance," which proceeds from a very real aggravation of problems of ethnic development virtually all over the world, including in some of the most economically well-off countries. Thus, many state entities in countries of the European continent today oppose ethnic unification, seeking revival of their ethnic identities: Brittany or Provence in France, Wales in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Basque Country or Catalonia in Spain, etc.

But there are two poles to "ethnic renaissance": at one is nationalism, with its arrogant claims of national superiority and desire to disassociate from "less developed nations"—if they can't be conquered—while at the other is total unification. But the required goal here is the golden mean: assertion of ethnic identity without slipping into either extreme. Only then will the word "renaissance" be justified.

But I would like to stress that preservation of ethnic identity does not necessarily mean the total political independence of a nation or people. Today "nation" is an extraterritorial concept, while sovereignty can only be granted on a territory where, in addition to the ethnic majority, there are always also ethnic minorities. Political duress (inevitable in an act of secession) will lead to the formation of distorted ethnic entities. Representatives of a minority denied ethnic self-assertion will never be loyal towards the majority pressuring it. And if they have powerful outside support the situation may evolve along familiar lines.

The existence of any modern state is a balancing act between ethnic entities, a subtle psychological balance between them. It is the stronger's sacred duty to guarantee the minority's right to ethnic cultural autonomy,

while the minority, in turn, must respect the ethnic majority, as long as it conducts a correct policy in the interests of both sides.

But in this context it is appropriate to point out that the Soviet Union, as a federated (some would say unitarian) state, has proved incapable of balancing the interests of large and small peoples and should therefore be transformed into some other kind of entity. What can be said on this score?

Firstly, the interests of the ethnic minorities in the republics that have opted to secede from the USSR will be violated to a much greater degree than the interests of any ethnic group in the present-day Soviet Union. But can one gain freedom while oppressing others?

Secondly, it is true that little concern was given to the interests of the large and small peoples of the Soviet Union, but this was due, in my view, not to the state system but to the political structure of power. During the stagnation period it combined the seemingly incompatible: super-centralism and local authoritarianism. The center could also rely on the support of the provincial organs of power which, in turn, enjoyed complete freedom of action within their republics and therefore lived in harmony with the all-union bureaucracy. Their total power was reasserted by the authority of the center, while the center, if necessary, was held responsible (justly or unjustly) for all economic and social failures. It was precisely these kinds of relations that developed between the center and those union republics which lagged behind in their social development and lacked traditions of political culture and democratic socio-political thought. And it was in those republics that total corruption, overbearing officialdom and violations of the law were the greatest, coupled also with acute ethnic problems caused by unspoken policies of discrimination and assimilation of ethnic minorities.

In conditions of apparat absolutism the type of state system—federation, unitarian state or union—didn't matter. Unitarianism would probably have been even better than confederation, since a local princeling can cause greater harm than a bureaucrat fully subordinate to the central apparat. It is not super-centralism, but apparat absolutism that is ultimately responsible for the aggravation of ethnic problems.

Concerning federation or confederation. In Late Latin both words have the same meaning—union—and indeed, the differences between them were considered secondary, more of a formal nature. Thus, the transition from confederation to federation went all but unnoticed in both the USA and Switzerland and was not accompanied by any significant social upheavals. This is not surprising, since both these forms of state government are forms of a union of states, an association the specific mechanisms of which change with internal (formation of an integrated economic system) and external conditions (for example, a military threat).

In our era of universal interconnections the differences between these forms of state government have largely dissipated and most of the differentiating criteria "no longer work." Judge for yourself: The EEC countries that belong to NATO have all the formal features of a federation: a combined allied army, budget and, in a certain sense, an alliance-wide citizenship. Even such an amorphous organization as the UN possesses some traits of a federation (a system of international treaties, the Security Council, armed forces, etc.). On the other hand, some members of our federation are UN members, that is, they operate as independent subjects of international legal communication, while lately several republics have assumed the right to ratify all-union legislative acts, a right which the members of many a confederation never possessed. So what are the rules of the house in which we live?

Any union of states presumes mutual obligations and, consequently, limitations on the sovereignty of its members. The 1st Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the RSFSR "rebelled" against this tradition and proclaimed the preeminence of Russian laws and the Russian Constitution over those of the Union. The Declaration of State Sovereignty was, however, passed after a bitter clash of opinions. The Peoples' Deputies "crossed swords" over Article 5 of the draft declaration. Some felt that without the preeminence of the republican Constitution and laws over those of the Union sovereignty would be partial or simply nonexistent. Others, who represented autonomous units, justifiably declared that the separatist forces striving to leave the Soviet Union would be grateful to the Peoples' Deputies of Russia for strong arguments in support of their years-old desire to pull the Union Republics apart into their ethnic cubicles. The Russian Congress's attempt to assert itself over the All-Union parliament was, in the deputies' view, doubly dangerous because such an approach could gain prominence in the autonomous units of the RSFSR itself with respect to the republican government. Couldn't that lead to general anarchy and the passing of legislation infringing on the rights of others?

But, in the final analysis, the nature of a union is determined not by limiting the sovereignty of its members but by the level of real power of the Union government. If its agencies can make the allied states comply with adopted commitments it is a federation, if not, it is a confederation.

Unions of states have existed and will continue to exist, the differentiation of the economic and military potentials of the component states will also continue in the foreseeable future, hence their relations represent a general political process, not a problem of formal treaties between them. What is the proclamation of Lithuanian sovereignty worth if suspending the operation of the paternalistic model of economic relations can paralyze its entire economic system in a matter of days? The real sovereignty of large and small states is guaranteed by the democratization of public life in both individual states and the world community as a whole, and the essential

prerequisites of this process are the non-use of force, on the one hand, and compliance with all assumed obligations, on the other. Of course, earlier commitments can be revised, but only by political, democratic means. Resorting to other means and aggravating the situation can result only in reducing the real sovereignty of small nations.

And, finally, one last consideration. The Brokgauz Encyclopedia states that all currently existing federated states are made up of separate states with well-defined territories. The main task of the federation is to protect the identity of the states, but the preservation of independent identity is claimed by ethnic groups even more insistently than by states. However, the boundaries between ethnic groups not only almost never coincide with national frontiers or provincial boundaries, they are not of a territorial nature at all, therefore in a normal federated state the ethnic principle cannot be implemented.

History has confirmed the correctness of these statements. All stable federal formations are of a territorial nature. Imagine for a moment that the federal organization of, say, the United States was based on ethnic principles, that is, would be similar to our "federation of peoples." What would it be like today? Tens of ethnic groups claiming territorial entities, a complex electoral system designed to ensure (but not ensuring) equal representation for all peoples in the organs of power, ever increasing confrontation between the "black" and "white" populations, aggravation of old sores, and so on, and so forth. Doesn't this look like a mirror reflection of our own existence?

I think we made a tremendous mistake at the very beginning of our road: we governmentalized the ethnic structure of the USSR's population by dividing not territories, but people, and dividing them according to ethnic characteristics, which are beyond their control. As a consequence the Soviet Union has developed an extremely complex, multitiered hierarchic system of ethnic-state and ethnic-territorial units which, combined with the principle of ethnic statehood, meant a de-facto arrangement of peoples according to the status of their respective ethnic territories. This created the basis for all subsequent conflicts and even predetermined the forms they would take.

Indeed, having combined the concepts "ethnic" and "state," it became inevitable that in any aggravation of economic, political or inter-ethnic contradictions detrimental to the conditions of a certain people, separatism would become the means of resolving the conflict, even though it does not and cannot resolve any problems: on the contrary, it aggravates them. Separatist sentiments are most frequently fanned for political purposes, to achieve a temporary unity of all social groups, including those with no interest in achieving those goals. In the process the rights of other ethnic groups are violated: already now draft legislation is appearing in one Union Republic after another which, directly or in thinly veiled

form, declares the given republic a state of a specific ethnic group and consolidates its dominant position with respect to representatives of other ethnic groups.

The only acceptable solution of the accumulated problems is the "separation" of the ethnic problem from the state, rejection of the principle of national (ethnic) statehood. All socio-political and economic problems should be tackled by the citizens of the state, regardless of their ethnic affiliation. No one's rights can be curtailed because one belongs to a large or small people; any state system must be based on unconditional observation of universal human rights.

As for questions of ethnic cultural development, it is necessary to go over from state regulation to ethnic self-determination by placing self-government in the hands of local authorities. This will help to guarantee the interests of all ethnic groups and their choice of the best ways of development, to safeguard against all forms of arbitrary decision-making, and to localize possible inter-ethnic contradictions. The people of one village or district can always come to terms if there is no interference from outside.

I fully realize that such changes in the government system of the Soviet Union are hardly possible in the near future. There is the inertia of public opinion and ossified stereotypes. But I am convinced that the world community shares common roads of development and consider that the sooner we get into the mainstream of human development the sooner will we be able to advance. The structure, composition and principles of the state system of the USSR may change, but the principle on which it is based—integration of peoples coupled with the development of their ethnic identities—is a guideline for the development of all humanity.

#### **Official Views Effects of New Union Treaty on Internal Customs System**

90UN2633A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
14 Aug 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with Customs Main Administration Chief V. Boyarov by G. Alimov; date, place not given: "Customs and the Union Treaty"]

[Text] [Alimov] Consultations on forging a new union treaty have begun. In your opinion, what must the customs system of the union of sovereign socialist states be like?

[Boyarov] The very title of the new union reflects the fact that this will be a qualitatively new community. Therefore, it is quite clear that the customs system must also be built upon a new basis. It must respond to the interests of all and each of the union states individually. Is this possible? We feel that it is. Objective economic laws and broad global experience indicate that it would be most expedient and advantageous, I emphasize, advantageous, for all members of the future union to build mutual relations proceeding from the principle of a

single customs territory. Goods must circulate within the union without excising customs duty, issuing quotas, or any such limitations. It is important that a single customs legislation be in effect over the entire customs territory.

[Alimov] The union republics could perceive in this centralization, which everyone is racking their brains to get away from. It is perceived as an evil; all misfortunes are seen in it...

[Boyarov] Let's think about what is behind this. The customs system is firmly and inextricably linked with the economy, the growth of production, the expansion and deepening of economic integration, inter-supplementation and interdependence dictate the need to create a single market. The market is freedom. Freedom of transfer of goods and services in all this economic space. Any customs limitations within it are barriers that will lead to retarding the pace of the circulation of goods and services among regions. With the appearance of a customs border, what now gets from, let's say, Vladivostok to Lvov unhindered will come about quite differently. On the other hand, this economic space requires that a coordinated policy regarding third countries be conducted. This means that without a single customs policy, it is impossible to speak of the creation or the presence of a single market. A single customs policy and a single market are two sides of the same coin.

[Alimov] In that case, how do you assess the desire of a number of republics to create their own customs?

[Boyarov] Let's introduce clarity: It is one thing to speak about the creation of regional customs services operating on the principles of a single customs territory and legislation. It is something else when what they have in mind is the creation of customs borders. These are principally important aspects. Many authors of the second proposal are obviously basing it on reserving their goods for themselves and not letting them out of the territory, but goods from other areas will freely flow to them. Yet a customs border is a double-edged sword. After all, they can do the same thing on the other side of this border. And there is hardly anyone eager to trade on the principle of "giving away things you do not really want". The creation of customs borders will lead to a state in which the goods of one republic will be viewed as foreign in the territory of another republic, that is, they will be subject to customs duty and import taxes.

Nor, apparently, have the authors of this proposal taken into consideration another circumstance. In accordance with international requirements, particularly those of GATT, trading conditions with union republics automatically become equivalent for trade with third countries. And this means that it will be necessary to meet independently all the most stringent requirements of the world market with their production and defend their market, but already without relying upon the economic potential of the union.

[Alimov] Every sovereign republic can have its own specific interests. Apparently, therefore the striving to conduct their own customs policy seems to them not only attractive but necessary as well.

[Boyarov] Yet there are the objective demands of a single market. In the final analysis, we are not struggling for our departmental interests. As professionals, we assert that only the observance of two fundamental principles—unity of the customs territory and legislation—can work for the interests of the members of the future union of states.

[Alimov] But how is it to be with sovereignty?

[Boyarov] What do you think, why is it that a Canadian province so developed as Quebec, which did not sign the new constitution of the federation, did not even raise the issue of introducing customs borders? It's all very simple. In voluntarily recognizing the single customs policy of the Canadian State, the province understands that it is economically well protected from all the vicissitudes of the world market.

Take the European Economic Community, or, more accurately, simply the European Community, as it is already called, in which a single customs policy is conducted, but each of the community's member-states remains sovereign. Moreover, if we view this issue through the prism of the economy, then obviously, the more coordinated and centralized the customs affairs are, the greater the opportunities for the development of productive forces, economic maneuvering, meaning that sovereignty becomes all the more real and complete.

[Alimov] Are the examples of Quebec and the European Community fitting? We are poor. And each region is trying somehow to preserve what it has at its disposal, reckoning that the others are simply robbing them. Hence the protectionist measures, hence too the desire to shut themselves off, to stay aloof...

[Boyarov] Prosperous states seek further paths toward integration, but the ones with their foot in the grave are aloof? And this on the eve of the entry into market relations? A paradox! With the first ones, it's clear that they don't want to lose what they have achieved; they want more, and that can come only with integration. But what do the second ones want? To preserve their poverty? No, of course not; they want to prosper, too.

Yet is that the path being chosen? The desire to become rich in that way is just what leads to an even greater decline of the economic situation and will even create a real threat to sovereignty. After all, no one's going to feed anyone for free. Everything has to be paid for. Only by restructuring relationships within the union, uniting the potential protected by the single customs legislation can we hope for success. After all, the level of interrepublic relations today is such that we may already speak of a formed single market, even a distorted, monstrous one. The appearance of customs barriers between republics

will throw us back. It will be necessary to smash everything that the decades have created. The disintegration of the single customs territory will become a very strong factor of the opposition to the establishment of market relations. We will also lose our merit most attractive to foreign capital—the gargantuan scale and volume of the internal market.

If the members of the union want to rectify the situation with the fewest possible losses and in fairly short order, it is necessary to preserve the unity of the market (which is what the EC members have been proceeding toward since 1957), and the level of economic integration among republics achieved, having changed, of course, its current vertical structure for horizontal relations. The entire world is working on the removal of barriers in mutual trade. Could it be that we are going in the opposite direction? If that happens, where will this cast us and what tortuous path must we follow once again in order to achieve what we now have? We'll have it all, including the "customs wars" among republics so well known in Western experience.

[Alimov] They'll probably say to you that Comrade Boyarov is laying it on a little thick. Fine, in your opinion, under what circumstances could the conflicts you mention arise?

[Boyarov] If there is not a single customs legislation, single tariffs protecting the interests of all republics, then the practice of individual republics concluding foreign

economic contracts with foreign countries will lead to serious material claims on the part of others who have invested a share of their labor or production in this export article. Or take this situation. Let's say, several republics are producing textiles. Without a single customs policy, of them can go out into the foreign market with their own prices. What would be the result?

[Alimov] But excuse me, many republics have already begun to go into the foreign market independently. And by all appearances, this is not having negative consequences for them. And you're still talking about possible negative developments...

[Boyarov] That's just it, that it's possible to intrepidly conduct foreign economic affairs when they are safeguarded by the potential of the entire internal union market, when the foreign partner sees the entire union in you, and not just a republic taken individually. Just set up customs borders within the union, and the situation will change in an instant.

[Alimov] Are at least convincing that customs is really a serious instrument. Tell me, who is it that is going to formulate customs policy in the union? In doing so, how will the interests of each member of the union be preserved?

[Boyarov] When we speak of the unity of the customs system, we hold that it is the union states which will together formulate the customs-tariff policy. It seems to us that all the details must be discussed in the union organ—the customs-tariff council.

**Estonian Committee's Draft Citizenship Law**  
*90UN2415A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII*  
*in Russian 6 Jul 90 p 3*

[Draft of "Provisional Law on Citizenship"]

[Text] The draft was prepared by a working group on questions of citizenship of the Estonian Committee, for presentation at the 15 June 1990 session of the Estonian Committee.

The latest Law on Citizenship, adopted by the Estonian Republic, has been in effect since 1938 ("Riigi teataya" 1938, 39.357). It was made the basis of the present draft, and both the structure and the formulation of many of the articles has been preserved. New parts have been added, the requirement for which was conditioned by the present concrete circumstances—Chapter 2, Part 2, and Chapter 5. As a result of the lengthy occupation tens of thousands of citizens of Estonia live abroad, and at the very same time hundreds of thousands of foreigners have immigrated to Estonia. All people possess the equal rights of man; however, from a juridical point of view, at the present time two completely different population groups are living in Estonia: citizens, and persons who are not citizens of the republic.

The juridical content of the present draft law also provides for precise determination of an individual's legal membership in one of these groups and the legal method of transferring from one group to another. On this plane the draft law is divided into three basic parts. The first: a precise answer to everyone's question, whether or not he is a citizen of the Estonian Republic. With respect to a large group of people, it is not that easy to answer that question. The second: systematization of the conditions for naturalization when transferring to Estonian citizenship in such a way, that the rights of the indigenous population are guaranteed, and that the consequences of the occupation do not take root. The third: the creation of institutes for practical realization of the actions stipulated by the given draft law.

We request that suggestions and comments on the present draft be sent to the address: 200090, Tallinn, Main Post Office, PO Box 3425, the Estonian Committee.

**Chapter 1.**  
**General Provisions.**

**Article 1.** Persons shall become citizens of Estonia by birth or on the basis of subsequent juridical acts.

A citizen of Estonia cannot be at the same time a citizen of any other country whatsoever, except in instances in which this is in accord with the Law on Dual Citizenship<sup>1</sup>.

**Article 2.** A person becoming a citizen of Estonia by means of naturalization, or restoration of citizenship, shall be furnished a certificate of citizenship.

Only the person indicated in the certificate of citizenship shall be considered a citizen of Estonia.

Estonian citizenship shall commence from the moment indicated on the certificate.

**Article 3.** In accordance with the present law, an Estonian citizen shall be a person who possess the status of a citizen of the Estonian Republic, regardless of gender and nationality.

A foreigner under the given law is a person who does not possess Estonian Republic citizenship, regardless of gender and nationality.

**Chapter 2.**  
**Fundamentals of Possession of Estonian Citizenship**

**Part 1**  
**General Provisions**

**Article 4.** Citizens of the Estonian Republic are:

- 1) persons, acknowledged as citizens or receiving Estonian Republic citizenship prior to 16 June 1940;
- 2) persons born after 16 June 1940, if at the moment of their birth their father or mother were citizens of the Estonian Republic;
- 3) children born after the death of their father, if at the moment of death the father was a citizen of the Estonian Republic;
- 4) children born in Estonia, if at the moment of birth their parents were persons without citizenship;
- 5) children born out of wedlock, if at the moment of the birth of the child the mother did not possess citizenship;
- 6) children found in Estonia, if no proof exists of their possessing citizenship in any other country; and,
- 7) all persons who possess the rights of Estonian Republic citizenship in accordance with Article 10 of the present law, who present the corresponding information according to procedure established by law.

**Article 5.** Estonian Republic citizenship shall belong to:

- 1) children adopted by a citizen of the Estonian Republic;
- 2) children of a foreign citizen, who resides permanently in Estonia, who has entered into marriage with a citizen of the Estonian Republic, and who has received Estonian citizenship, if at that moment they have not reached age 18;
- 3) foreigners under age 18, adopted by a citizen of the Estonian Republic;
- 4) children of foreign female citizens, born outside of wedlock, but with the acknowledgment or establishment of their father, who is a citizen of the Estonian Republic;
- 5) persons becoming citizens of the Estonian Republic by means of naturalization procedure;

6) persons who have restored their Estonian Republic citizenship on the basis of Articles 39-40 of the present law, and their children who have not reached age 18.

#### Part 2

#### Occupation by the Soviet Union and Establishment of Estonian Citizenship

**Article 6.** A citizen of the Estonian Republic cannot be at the same time a citizen of the USSR.

The proclamation by the Soviet Union that citizens of the Estonian Republic are citizens of the USSR is illegal and invalid. It does not prevent their possessing Estonian Republic citizenship.

Living in Estonia or in other regions of the Soviet Union during the occupation period, and also the use of passports and other USSR documents, shall not be the basis for loss of Estonian Republic citizenship.

**Article 7.** All adult citizens of the Estonian Republic who dwell on its territory must receive a certificate of identity as a citizen from the Civil Department.

**Article 8.** Citizens of the Estonian Republic who wish to be citizens of the USSR have the right, within a year after restoration of legal state power in the Estonian Republic, to refuse citizenship in the Estonian Republic and receive USSR citizenship, after making the appropriate application at the Civil Department. Their children under 18 years of age also lose Estonian Republic citizenship if their citizenship is not retained by the line of the other parent. The children shall have the right to petition for restoration of Estonian Republic citizenship upon reaching the age of majority<sup>2</sup>.

**Article 9.** Citizens of the Estonian Republic, who after the restoration of legal power in the Estonian Republic decide to live in the USSR must inform the Civil Department of their desire to retain their Estonian Republic citizenship, within one year. Otherwise they will be considered to have lost their citizenship in the Estonian Republic.

**Article 10.** Citizens of the Estonian Republic and their offspring, who fled Estonia in connection with the Soviet occupation and who have received citizenship in any other state (with the exception of USSR citizenship) may have their Estonian Republic citizenship restored should they desire to return to live in Estonia. In order to do so they must present the appropriate request to the Civic Agency or to a diplomatic representative of the Estonian Republic.

The procedure for realizing this right, the provisional borders, and the possibility of dual citizenship shall be defined by a special law.

**Article 11.** All foreigners living on the territory of the Estonian Republic shall have the right to appeal in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, for a residence permit or application for Estonian Republic citizenship.

#### Part 3

#### Basis and Procedure for Naturalization

**Article 12.** A foreigner who wishes to apply for Estonian Republic citizenship by way of naturalization shall:

- 1) have reached age 18, or must have the consent of his parents or guardians;
- 2) have mastered the spoken and written Estonian language;
- 3) by the day of presenting the application-petition for receipt of citizenship, have lived in Estonia for at least: Variant 1—the last two years, or 18 years in all; Variant 2—for the last 18 years or 30 years in aggregate; Variant 3—for the past 45 years, or for 50 years<sup>3</sup> in aggregate, and for not less than a year from the day of presenting the application<sup>4</sup>;
- 4) be loyal to the Estonian Republic and to the restoration of its independence;
- 5) have the means to live or a specialty or profession which will permit him to support himself;
- 6) observe the moral-ethical norms of life and respect the laws<sup>5</sup>;
- 7) possess knowledge of the history and culture of Estonia.

**Article 13.** The requirements posed by Article 12 on conditions of naturalization may be removed with respect to:

- 1) persons of Estonian nationality;
- 2) persons possessing special merit in the struggle for restoration of the independence of the Estonian Republic, and also others who have performed other services to the Estonian Republic in the state, cultural or social fields; or those who have become well known through their talents, knowledge or labor.

**Article 14.** The requirements of point 2 of Article 12 may be mitigated for persons belonging to national minorities who have been living within the border regions continually for no less than 50 years.

**Article 15.** The requirements of point 3 of Article 12 may be mitigated with respect to the legal spouse of a citizen of the Estonian Republic who has permanent residence in the Estonian Republic, in cases in which the marriage lasts no less than three years, who prior to marriage had lived in Estonia no less than 7 years; or, if that person had lived in a state of marriage on Estonian territory no less than 5 years.

**Article 16.** The Civil Department shall issue the decision on offering Estonian Republic citizenship by way of the naturalization procedure.



**Article 17.** An application requesting receipt of Estonian Republic citizenship by way of naturalization of foreigners shall be presented in person, with the except of minor children and persons under wardship.

Upon submission of his application, the appellant shall be given a temporary residence permit.

The Civil Department shall examine each application individually, and shall issue a decision on each of them.

Refusal to offer citizenship does not signify loss of the right to appeal for receipt of a permanent residence permit.

The petitioner shall have the right to appeal the refusal in court.

**Article 18.** Children under age 18 shall receive Estonian Republic citizenship together with one of their parents.

**Article 19.** The application-petition shall indicate:

1) name and surname of the applicant; 2) age; 3) citizenship; 4) family status; 5) citizenship of spouse; 6) names and ages of children; 7) place of residence; 8) date permanent residence in Estonia began; 9) profession; 10) property situation; 11) information on convictions; and, 12) degree of mastery of the Estonian language.

**Article 20.** The following shall be attached to the application-petition:

- 1) documents required according to Article 19, or verified copies;
- 2) a signed statement by the applicant of rejection of his previous citizenship;
- 3) a signed statement by the applicant, that he was not a participant in the destruction of the independence of the Estonian Republic and that he will not oppose its restoration;
- 4) a receipt for payment of tax for naturalization or a request to be relieved of that tax.

**Article 21.** If presentation of documents indicated in Article 19, or copies of them, proves difficult or impossible, these circumstances may be verified by organs of local self-government on the basis of the verbal testimony of no less than two trustworthy witnesses.

**Article 22.** a foreigner desiring to submit an application-petition for Estonian Republic citizenship by means of naturalization, shall pay a naturalization tax, the amount of which shall be established individually.

If a person is unable to pay, the Civil Department may relieve him of liability for that tax.

The Civil Department may also relieve of liability for the naturalization tax persons who submit an application-petition for citizenship in accordance with the procedure stipulated in Article 13 of the present law.

**Article 23.** The naturalization tax shall not be refunded. However, in cases in which a petitioner receives an unfavorable decision, or if the application-petition is returned for the reasons indicated in Article 24, the tax shall not be collected a second time.

**Article 24.** An application-petition shall be returned if:

- 1) the applicant's term of residence does not correspond to the periods indicated in Article 12, point 3, and he has not submitted an application-petition according to procedure stipulated in Article 13;
- 2) the application-petition is not completed in accordance with the requirements indicated in Articles 19, 29 and 21 [sic], and the necessary corrections are not made in the period allowed.

**Article 25.** The Civil Department shall test the degree of mastery of the language, knowledge of the history and culture of Estonia, and also other necessary information.

**Article 26.** In case of a positive response, the Civil Department shall administer to the petitioner the oath of loyalty to the Estonian Republic and shall issue a certificate of Estonian Republic citizenship, on which are entered the names of the children of the petitioner who have not reached age 18. The certificate of Estonian Republic citizenship shall be the basis for receiving personal identification as a citizen of the Estonian Republic.

The certificate of Estonian Republic citizenship shall note the dates of receiving citizenship and taking the oath.

**Article 27.** The Civil Department shall present an unfavorable response in written form, indicating the reason for refusal to grant citizenship.

In case of an unfavorable response, the petitioner shall have the right, within a month's time, to enter a protest to the central administration of the Civil Department. An unfavorable response from the latter may be appealed in court.

A new application-petition for citizenship may be submitted no earlier than one year later.

**Article 28.** Until this law goes into effect, applications from foreigners desiring to become citizens of the Estonian Republic by means of naturalization, shall be examined in accordance with Articles 6 and 7 of the 1938 Law on Citizenship. At the same time, point 2 of Article 6 of the Law on Citizenship may be abolished. There shall be a one-year waiting period, if the petitioner has lived in Estonia for at least the last three years.

Before the present law goes into effect, registration of the appellant at the Estonian Citizens' Committee and a certificate of this shall be grounds for petitioning for citizenship.

The under-age-18 children of a person who has received Estonian Republic citizenship by means of the naturalization process, shall also receive citizenship.

### **Chapter 3.**

#### **Loss of Estonian Republic Citizenship**

**Article 29.** Estonian Republic Citizenship shall be lost in case of:

- 1) release from Estonian Republic citizenship;
- 2) cancellation of acceptance for Estonian Republic citizenship;
- 3) leaving Estonian Republic citizenship;

**Article 30.** The Civil Department shall make the decision on release from Estonian Republic citizenship.

The appropriate application-petition shall be submitted to the Civil Department; moreover, with respect to persons who have not reached age 18, consent of the parents or guardians must be presented as well.

**Article 31.** An applicant shall be released from Estonian Republic citizenship if he is not on active military service and has fulfilled other civic responsibilities. A male citizen who has not completed active service may be released from Estonian Republic citizenship if the non-fulfillment of his military obligation does not preclude his being released from citizenship<sup>7</sup>.

**Article 32.** The decision on loss of citizenship shall go into effect, and the person losing citizenship shall be given the appropriate documentation, at the moment when the person losing citizenship presents documentation on acceptance for citizenship in another state.

A decision on loss of citizenship shall no longer be valid if the person who has lost Estonian Republic citizenship continues to live in Estonia for a period of more than a year from the time of presentation of the documentation indicated in the first part of the given paragraph.

**Article 33.** The decision on loss of citizenship does not extend to the children of the one losing citizenship, who have reached 18 years of age; nor to the spouse, if the latter has not expressed the desire to halt Estonian Republic citizenship. Children who have not reached age 18 may lose Estonian Republic citizenship only with the consent of both parents.

**Article 34.** Estonian Republic citizenship acquired by a person by means of naturalization shall be lost, if it becomes clear that false information was consciously presented, or important information concealed, that is necessary for becoming a citizen.

**Article 35.** Along with the person referred to in the last paragraph, Estonian Republic citizenship shall also be lost to the children under age 18 who received their citizenship together with him, as well as children born later, if the other parent in their line does not retain Estonian Republic citizenship. The children shall retain

the ability to petition for restoration of citizenship after reaching the age of majority.

**Article 36.** Estonian Republic citizenship shall be lost to people who:

- 1) continue to live in the USSR after restoration of legal rule in the Estonian Republic, and do not inform of their desire to retain Estonian Republic citizenship within a year;
- 2) have taken up citizenship in a foreign country, without release from Estonian Republic citizenship according to procedures stipulated in Article 30 of the present law;
- 3) have entered into state or military service of a foreign state without the permission of agencies of the Estonian Republic;
- 4) belong to organizations abroad who act against the independence of the Estonian Republic, or who strive to annex Estonia to Russia;
- 5) do not return to their Motherland, thereby avoiding court examination, military service, or other civic obligations to the Estonian Republic;
- 6) themselves, or through their parents, have received citizenship by naturalization, but have permanent residence abroad and have not provided written notice to the Civil Department within a year, of their desire to retain Estonian Republic citizenship.

**Article 37.** Upon a person's loss of Estonian Republic citizenship, his children who have not reached age 18 who do not live in Estonia shall lose it as well, if they do not retain citizenship by the line of the other parent. The children shall have the possibility to petition for Estonian Republic citizenship when they reach the age of majority.

**Article 38.** Citizenship received by means of naturalization may be annulled by the Civil Department and the courts.

Loss of citizenship shall be registered by the Civil Department.

### **Chapter 4.**

#### **Restoration of Estonian Republic Citizenship**

**Article 39.** Former citizens of the Estonian Republic who have been deprived of or have lost Estonian Republic citizenship may petition for restoration of citizenship on the basis of Article 13, if they present the appropriate application, to which a statement on renunciation of their present citizenship is attached, to the Civil Department, or if located abroad, to the diplomatic representative of Estonia.

**Article 40.** Former citizens of the Estonian Republic who have been deprived of Estonian Republic citizenship or who have lost it together with their parents in connection with the age of minority, may petition for restoration of

citizenship, if they have lived in Estonia for at least one year and present to the Civil Department the appropriate application, to which is attached a statement on renunciation of their present citizenship.

#### **Chapter 5. Institutions Regulating and Granting Estonian Citizenship**

**Article 41.** A Civil Department shall be organized at the Estonian Committee for resolving questions associated with citizenship.

The Estonian Committee shall approve the chief and the regulations of the Civil Department.

**Article 42.** The Civil Department shall consist of a central administration, and branches situated in major cities and regions [uyezd]; the departments shall operate in cooperation with the organs of local self-government. The Estonian Committee shall approve the structure and manning table of the Civil Department in accordance with the proposals of the chief of the Civil Department.

Diplomatic representatives Estonia shall represent the Civil Department abroad.

**Article 43.** Tasks of the Civil Department:

- 1) Issuing permanent (indefinite) and temporary (fixed-period) residence and working permits to foreigners living in Estonia;
- 2) Regulating the possession of Estonian Republic citizenship and issuing Estonian Republic identity cards;
- 3) Deciding on the loss, annulment and restoration of Estonian Republic citizenship; and,
- 4) Accepting foreigners for Estonian Republic citizenship by naturalization procedure.

**Article 44.** Branches of the Civil Department shall:

- 1) regulate the possession of Estonian Republic citizenship; issue identity cards to citizens of the Estonian Republic, and shall organize the withdrawal of the personal identification of the occupation authorities;
- 2) accept applications:
  - for receipt of Estonian Republic citizenship by means of naturalization;
  - for restoration of Estonian Republic citizenship;
  - for renunciation of Estonian Republic citizenship;
- 3) examine applications received and on the basis of the present law, shall submit to the central administration recommendation for gratification or rejection, as well as for release of the naturalization tax. A branch shall have the right to demand of the applicant or independently gather the necessary additional data on the person petitioning for citizenship (or restoration thereof);

4) give the decision of the central administration to the person presenting the application;

5) take the oath of loyalty from the person petitioning for citizenship, and issue the certificate of award of citizenship;

6) resolve questions on issuing permanent or temporary residence permits in accordance with the application submitted. Persons who have submitted application for citizenship shall be given temporary residence permits until the decision is taken;

7) make records of the persons losing Estonian Republic citizenship, and transmit the appropriate data for approval to the central administration;

8) submit to the central administration proposals for annulment of citizenship, if it becomes clear that the person granted citizenship has consciously provided false information to the Civil Department.

**Article 45.** The Civil Department Central Administration shall:

- 1) examine proposals from the branches on applications received and take decisions;
- 2) examine and take decisions on protests received;
- 3) receive, examine and submit decisions on the applications of persons living in the Soviet Union, who wish to retain Estonian Republic citizenship;
- 4) receive and examine applications received at the Civil Department from abroad via the diplomatic representatives of Estonia; and,
- 5) coordinate the activities of the branches and provide instruction on carrying out the present law.

The Central Administration shall have the right to call those petitioning for citizenship (or restoration thereof) personally in order to receive additional explanations or additional information.

#### **Chapter 6. Concluding Provisions**

**Article 46.** The given law shall go into effect at the moment it is accepted by the Estonian Committee.

**Article 47.** The Estonian Committee shall issue decrees on the implementation of the present law.

#### **Footnotes**

1. The Estonian Republic Law on Citizenship adopted in 1938 did not permit holding dual citizenship. As a result of the Soviet occupation we were in a situation in which tens of thousands of Estonian citizens who fled from the occupation have settled throughout the entire world. Most of them have accepted new citizenship and will probably not be returning to Estonia, but wish to retain their ties with the Motherland. In this case they could be permitted to hold dual citizenship, which would permit

them to take part in the political life of the Motherland, and, as compared with foreigners, would have certain advantages in the sphere of economics, education and so forth.

2. In this and the following paragraphs, on the basis of and in the manner of the Peaceful Compact of Tartu, have the possibility to choose Estonian or Russian citizenship.

3. The occupation by a foreign state lasted for fifty years, and a state policy was conducted to change the national composition of the populace. Therefore we are forced to establish a stricter qualification for settlement than other European countries. The length of the occupation gives the right to establish the period of 50 years as qualification for settlement. Eighteen years in essence signifies the possibility of receiving citizenship by all persons born in Estonia upon observance of other qualification requirements. Two plus one year was the qualification for settlement according to the 1938 law. A short settlement qualification period would signify, on the one hand, approval of the consequences of the occupation and legalizing them; and, on the other hand, restricting the rights of the legitimate citizens of the Estonian Republic. Every state can establish qualification for settlement for granting citizenship by means of naturalization, on the basis of its own internal circumstances. In certain states foreigners may receive citizenship only in the third generation. In certain states, foreigners are not granted citizenship by way of naturalization at all.

4. Such a trial period should demonstrate the seriousness of the intentions of the person petitioning; it was also stipulated in the 1938 law on citizenship.

5. Not a single country in the world grants citizenship to foreign criminals or vagrants.

6. Citizenship Law of 1938, "Riigi teataya", 1938, 39.357.

Article 6. A foreigner wishing to receive Estonian Republic citizenship by way of naturalization must satisfy the following requirements:

- 1) reaching at least the age of 18, or have the consent of his parents or guardians;
- 2) live in Estonia continually for no less than two years prior to the date of submitting the application-petition and for one year after doing so; and,
- 3) must have mastered the Estonian language.

Article 7. The requirements stipulated in Article 6 points 2 and 3 on the period of residence in Estonia and the mastery of the Estonian language may be abrogated with respect to persons:

- 1) of Estonian nationality;

2) who have performed special services to the Estonian Republic in state or public professions, or who have become famous by virtue of their talents; and,

3) persons without citizenship, who until the date of submitting the application-petition have lived in Estonia no less than ten years.

7. Paragraph taken from the 1938 Law on Citizenship. Estonia does not have its own army, and therefore this paragraph may appear premature. However, even now one can try to see its necessity.

#### **Estonian Minister for Moscow Relations Interviewed**

*90UN2432A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian  
16 May 90 p 3*

[Interview with Endel Lippmaa, East-minister, delegate to the Estonian Congress, and also USSR people's deputy, by Anneli Rõigas: "When Should We Elect the State Council for the Republic of Estonia?"]

[Text] [Rõigas] For one week now we have lived under the name of the Republic of Estonia. It has been a month-and-a-half since the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet passed the resolution regarding Estonia's statehood and the beginning of the transition period. The highest state power of the Republic of Estonia is exercised by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia, whose work we have had an opportunity to follow with interest for several months. Today's leaders of Estonia have made several trips to Kremlin over the last few months. Just about the only result of these trips has been that Moscow has remained silent (if you discount the May 9 demonstration of force in Tallinn). Even a new minister for diplomatic relations with Moscow was appointed at the suggestion of the head of government of the Estonian SSR.

How permanent a phenomenon is the transition period? What if the elections for the State Council get put off into an unforeseeable future, what if the Supreme Soviet is simply in no hurry to call the elections, what if "the mandates of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia" last through the next five years to come?

Once we have declared the Republic of Estonia, should we not, and fairly soon, also elect the organs of power for that state? And, in case (assuming) the Supreme Soviet does not consent to have elections held for a State Council, could such an election be called—for example—by the Estonian Congress?

What does our East-minister, delegate to the Estonian Congress, and up until now also a USSR people's deputy, think of it?

[Endel Lippmaa] The need to elect the State Council for the Republic of Estonia is eminently clear. However, I'd like to go a little further back to briefly summarize our present situation.

Soviet Union's president M. Gorbachev made it very clear at our meeting with Rüütel, Savisaar and myself that the USSR constitution is **no longer in effect** within the territory of Estonia, adding that as long as we do not stop the resolution passed on March 30, 1990, negotiations cannot be started with us. It is therefore clear that Moscow admits to the USSR constitution not being in effect within the territory of Estonia.

Since the March 30 resolution voided the validity of the USSR constitution within the territory of the Republic of Estonia, it also challenged the validity of the constitution of the Estonian SSR. We don't have one, totally valid constitution for the transition period, all we have is something that could be summed up as follows: for this period, the constitution of the Estonian SSR will be valid insofar as it has not been modified by provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Estonia. In my opinion, there is no need for additional consultation between the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Congress for each step taken to re-establish some paragraph or other of the constitution of the Republic of Estonia. These have already been settled with the resolution passed March 30 that was approved by both the Supreme Soviet and the Estonian Congress.

However, under what circumstances would it be necessary to have this kind of cooperation, joint action, or even unilateral action on the part of the Estonian Congress? This would become necessary should structures be proposed that do not derive from the constitution of the Republic of Estonia, or when one side would suddenly start creating a third republic, that would also extend legal recognition to the interim government—the Estonian SSR.

[Rõigas] Only two months ago, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet's step to switch to the name of the Republic of Estonia, would have been considered as a step toward a third republic.

[Lippmaa] Had we not carried out the changes in the name and symbols of the state, we would not have been in alignment with the other Baltic states. And I don't believe, given today's complicated situation, that we could accomplish anything by ourselves. It is important, in the eyes of the world, and also of Moscow, that *north of the Republic of Latvia be the Republic of Estonia...*

[Rõigas] Considering the actual state of affairs one could, just as easily say that north of the Republic of Estonia ... is the Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic.

[Lippmaa] For the time being, yes. By the way, I would like to emphasize the significance of this resolution in connection with relations between us and the government of the Soviet Union. It was very difficult to explain to the leadership of the Soviet Union that, as the Estonian SSR, we are an occupied country. If, however, there is a Republic of Estonia, and the Soviet forces are still present, we are occupied for sure. And we are also annexed—this applies to the areas that were added to the

Russian federation (lands beyond Narva and Petserimaa). The change in state name and symbols clarified the concept of occupation—even for Moscow.

[Rõigas] What will happen if the Supreme Soviet does not want to have elections for the State Council, because it doesn't see any need for them over the next few years. On one hand, it has been repeated several times that elections for the Supreme Soviet were the first ones after the war in which people expressed their will; on the other hand, should elections be held for the State Council, quite a few of the present delegates would no longer have any business at Toompea. A seat of one's own, however, is a precious thing?

[Lippmaa] This danger does exist, indeed. But the key to that is that: **the Republic of Estonia does not even have a Supreme Soviet, as we well know.** What we are experiencing now is characteristic of the transition period, along with several other odd phenomena, and departments with strange-sounding names reporting to the Republic of Estonia.

The constitution of the Republic of Estonia does not call for a Supreme Soviet, and that is why the State Council of the Republic of Estonia should indeed be elected in the foreseeable future. However, hasty elections for the State Council have not been favored by either the Estonian Congress nor the Estonian Committee. The reasoning for this has been all along: **elections should be held when there are no more occupation forces in Estonia. That was a logical position as long as there was some reason to suppose that independence for the Baltic states was a matter that had been decided in Moscow, leaving only the questions of who should be formulating it and how ... Events in Lithuania have shown, however, that we are simply dealing with a dream ...**

[Rõigas] Yet, only a few weeks ago, some of the deputies in the Supreme Soviet maintained that the Baltic question has been settled in Moscow in a positive manner.

[Lippmaa] Anyone making such statements is either still caught up in dreams, or deliberately not telling the truth.

Since there have been no positive decisions made in Moscow, it is quite clear that a situation where the occupying forces "simply" cease to be in the Baltic states is not going to materialize by itself, it can only happen as the result of a long, and very difficult process.

If and when should the State Council for the Republic of Estonia be elected under these circumstances is not the question. The elections should be held, the only question is when. This decision should be made by both the Estonian Congress and the Supreme Soviet. And, should one of them be ready to concede, the other should help accommodate such concession. There will be opportunities for both to concede.

[Rõigas] Which election law should be followed, should it be the election law of the Republic of Estonia?

[Lippmaa] Naturally.

[Rõigas] Then we'll be facing the same question again: who are the citizens of the Republic of Estonia, and who will be given the right to vote for the republic's highest organ of power?

[Lippmaa] The citizenship issue is one of the key issues for the near future. The next major task for the Estonian Congress and the Supreme Soviet is the formulation of their attitudes toward citizenship. Who are the citizens of the republic, what are the requirements set for those applying for citizenship, and how all of this should be formulated. All of this is work yet to be done by both bodies. **Matters relating to citizenship should certainly be decided jointly (I don't mean that this should necessarily happen at a joint meeting, but rather that the result be acceptable to both the Estonian Congress and the Supreme Soviet).**

Stories claiming that one side is making decisions without letting the other one know are, in my opinion, greatly exaggerated. Many of the Estonian Committee deputies were also elected to the Supreme Soviet; besides, all issues don't always have to be discussed in advance.

I would like to emphasize, once again, that what is at stake here is not the internal bickering between the Estonian Congress and the Supreme Soviet, but the process of reaching independence as such. For this process to take place, and for us to actually arrive at something besides declarations, takes a strong, united front. The squabbles among ourselves in the current situation are not only ridiculous but also very dangerous.

[Rõigas] I would like to go back to the question of State Council elections, and the possibility that the Supreme Soviet will not consent to calling this election. It is not at all certain that a two thirds majority of votes can be obtained for passing such an important resolution.

[Lippmaa] First. Two thirds will no longer be necessary in any case. A two thirds majority is needed for constitutional changes. Since we don't have a legally valid *de jure* constitution, we also don't need the two thirds to change something that does not exist! Therefore: all resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet during the transition period need a simple majority vote only.

Second. Should the Supreme Soviet, suddenly, really renege on the implementation of the resolution passed March 30, then it would be natural that the initiative be assumed by the Estonian Congress. The reverse would also be valid: if, for any reason—the argument that elections cannot be held until the occupation army has left, for example—the Estonian Congress will not favor elections for the State Council, the initiative should be assumed by the Supreme Soviet.

### Latvia's 'Third Way' Faction Changes Name

90UN2270A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 25 May 90 p 1

["Communique of the 'Third Way' Coordinating Council"]

[Text] At its regular session on 22 May 1990 the Coordinating Council, taking into account the changes which have occurred recently in the left-wing movement and in the "Third Way" itself, adopted the following decision:

1. To change the name of the "Third Way" Democratic Platform of Latvian Communists. The change is connected with the fact that, after the split which took place at the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, the "Third Way" came to include members of the Latvian Communist Party advocating the platform of the CPSU, as well as members of Latvia's Independent Communist Party and non-party persons. This has posed new problems for the "Third Way." The following name was approved: the "Third Way" Democratic Movement of Latvian Communists, or, in its abbreviated variant: the "Third Way" Movement.

2. To support the initiative of that portion of the "Third Way's" followers, members of the Latvian Communist Party advocating the platform of the CPSU, with regard to creating a party club for promulgating the ideas of democratization within the Latvian Communist Party and preparing proposals for the 28th CPSU Congress. To render them the necessary moral and organizational support.

3. In connection with the numerous appeals by Latvian Communists and the desire to retain within the left-wing movement those of them who do not agree with the policy of the present-day leadership of the Latvian Communist Party and who could leave the party entirely, to address a proposal to the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau concerning the creation of a territorial party movement, based on the "Third Way" Movement. This is in line with the positions taken in the Draft CPSU Charter as proposed to the 28th CPSU Congress.

4. To approve Andrey Valeryevich Vorontsov, historian, as chairman of the Coordinating Council of the "Third Way" Movement.

*Coordinating Council of the "Third Way" Democratic Movement of Latvian Communists*

### Formation of Latvian Balto-Slavic Party Considered

90UN2270B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 23 May 90 p 1

[Article by Oleg Ilenkov: "More About the BSP"]

[Text] On 11 May 1990 SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH published my material in which I reported the intention of a group of members of the Balto-Slavic Society, in

conjunction with some non-members, to found a new sociopolitical organization, provisionally named the "Balto-Slavic Party" (BSP). The responses to this item testify that this idea has met with definite interest, and it is necessary here to provide a more detailed description of it.

**First.** The name of the organization being planned is still of a provisional nature. It is undoubtedly the case that the Balto-Slavic Society (BSO) should be retained. Both organizations will be completely independent with regard to each other and will solve different problems.

**Second.** Bring a knowledge of political life to the struggle is inherent to our metaphysical thinking. In our opinion, Harmony in nature and society is ensured not only and not so much by struggle as it is by cooperation. The BSP will key itself, first and foremost, on political cooperation.

**Third.** The new party's ideology can be said to be based on the following points: 1) the Christian doctrine in its Orthodox interpretation; 2) local patriotism. This does not mean at all that access to the party is closed for non-believers. In our opinion, there are a great many "natural Christians" among those persons who do not attend church services or who are even communists.

**Fourth.** It will hardly become a majority party, but it could and should become a party of a significant minority, without which the normal functioning of a society's political organism.

**Fifth.** The party could have a broad ethnic base. It would consist of Latvians and non-Latvians who have a tolerant attitude toward each other, but, first and foremost, it is obviously being formed by native inhabitants of Latvia who are of Slavic nationality, persons of mixed families and who are oriented toward Russian culture, persons who have recently moved to Latvia but who already sense an unbreakable tie with this land.

**Sixth.** It could combine within its ranks persons whose world view is commensurate or compatible with that of Christianity, allowing within this framework a definite pluralism of opinions which could be expressed organizationally in the establishment of factions ranging from monarchists to socialists.

Inclusion of monarchists in the political palette or spectrum of the BSP is motivated by the fact that the monarchistic idea fits fully into the framework of the Christian idea, in the first place, and, in the second place, under the Latvian conditions, this movement is more like something in the nature of a Romantic nostalgia of a Russian youth for the high cultural and moral potential of the First Empire than an expression of political views.

**Seventh.** In principle, the initiative group has a loyal attitude toward the idea of state independence for Latvia, but it recognizes that we are divided from the Latvian national movement by the following factors:

1. The problem of citizenship. We think that citizenship should be granted not only to those persons who have a permanent visa or registration on Latvia's territory, but also to those to whom it has been promised.

2. The problem of Daugavpils. For us it is not just the problem of a single city; we regard it as an inevitable reaction to the tendency of the "Latvianization" of the entire, historically evolved multiple diversity of Latvian culture. We are opposed to splitting up this republic's territory, but we are also categorically against attempts to make a second Yelgava or Liepaya out of Daugavpils, Ludza, Rezekne, and other cities like them, even including Riga.

3. The problem of the RGI [Riga Institute of the Humanities]. Also directly linked with the tendency of "Latvianization" is the attitude toward the RGI. The People's Front has never officially said anything about it, but the fact that it has a negative attitude not simply to the existing plan for this educational institution but also for the idea of it in general is purely one-sided and permits us to judge that the NFL [Latvian People's Front] is the same as a whole. We cannot agree with it.

**Eighth.** We consider that the lack of intelligent positions or viewpoints regarding the matters enumerated above (or the public, official expression of it) also caused the relatively high percentage of voters to vote in the last elections for the candidates of the KPL-IFT-TsDI [Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU)-International Worker's Front-Center for Democratic Initiative] Bloc (although trust in the brilliant minds of such deputies as Dimanis, Gavrillov, Zaletayev, Zhdanok, and two or three others likewise had an effect here). The non-Latvian population was compelled to vote in accordance with the principle of choosing the lesser evil.

*In the name of the Initiative Group for Creating the BSP*

#### **Writers' Union Protests Military Involvement in Latvian Politics**

90UN2270C Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 2 Jun 90 p 2

[Resolution of the Latvian Writers' Union 10th Congress: "In Defense of Democracy and Legality"]

[Text] By the Spring of 1990 Latvia had witnessed the conduct of its first democratic elections in 50 years. For the first time deputies not designated from "on high" but those who had won out in a difficult pre-election struggle are representing the people's interests in the Soviets at all levels. But it is precisely the people's power which does not suit those forces from whose hands the former unlimited power is slipping away. An alliance of reactionary forces has been formed, which is openly speaking out against this republic's Supreme Soviet and government, instigating disobedience, strikes, and violence, and threatening—in no uncertain terms—to remove from power those deputies elected by the people. In other words, they want to carry out a coup d'état.

The Latvian Writers' 10th Congress declares that the organs of legislative power or authority can be changed in only one way: by the freely manifested will of the voters, by means of elections conducted in the established time periods and by following the legal procedure. Any and all attempts to overthrow, subvert, or undermine the existing organs of power or to oppose them by self-appointed, alternative structures are **ILLEGAL**. Any violent actions along these lines would compel the population of this republic to have recourse to self-defense. And this would blacken the peaceful development of the democratic processes not only in Latvia, but also throughout the entire Soviet Union; it would cast doubt upon the issue of European security.

The Congress expresses its own condemnation of those political leaders who are calling for disobedience to the lawfully elected government of the Latvian Republic and who are slandering the representatives of the state power.

Extreme concern is also caused by the attempts to utilize the armed forces and their representatives in one way or another in the political struggle. Generals, officers, and soldiers—during the brief period of their service—as everybody knows, do not grow grain or sew clothing; they do not write books nor engage in peaceful science. The people, the creator of all material and spiritual goods, give them—the military—everything necessary, including expensive weapons—so that the army can protect and defend peace, freedom, and the people's security. But nowadays it is beginning to seem as if the threat to democracy, peace, and freedom is proceeding not from some sort of external, foreign foes, but rather from a certain portion of those very forces to which our security has been entrusted.

A person wearing shoulder-straps enjoys the very same political rights as his fellow-citizens: he can vote and be elected, thereby taking part in solving all the problems. However, nobody has the right to turn the weapons entrusted to him by the people and the state against those or other participants in the democratic process. No troops can nor should take any side in political disputes. Their duty is to serve the law by subordinating themselves to the decisions of the organs of power. Because, you know, it is impossible to imagine, that, for example, the British Army and police would "go over to the side" of the Laborites and categorically refuse to carry out the decisions of the government headed by the Tories!

The Latvian Writers' Union calls upon this republic's Supreme Soviet to affirm the urgent necessity of political neutrality on the part of the leaders of all the armed forces and formations: the Army and Navy, the organs for maintaining law and order, the KGB, the boarder guards and internal troops—and the personal responsibility of the top leaders in this matter.

The Congress protests against the politicization of the Armed Forces on the territory of the Latvian Republic, which consciously imposes the CPSU on the Latvian

territorial organization. The Congress deems such tactics to be dangerous and criminal.

Any interference by the military leadership in the current social processes, any policy of force must be regarded as an abuse of the service position and must be intercepted by all the means which a civilized society has at its disposal.

#### **Rubiks Comments on Latvian Newspaper Reorganization**

90UN2275A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
1 Jun 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with A. Rubiks, first secretary, Latvian CP Central Committee, by I. Geyman: "When the Crew Abandons Ship"]

[Text] The decisions of the Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum, which was held last Thursay, made quite some noise in this republic. Such noise was caused by the Central Committee's intention to reorganize its own principal political newspapers, TSINIYA and SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, to bring their contents up to that ideological level which is required by the present day. At our editors' request, A. RUBIKS, first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee, agreed to comment upon this step and other urgent problems of these times.

[I. Geyman] With regard to the problem of reorganizing TSINIYA and SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, many persons have by stating their opinions in the last few days: it has become Topic Number One for television, radio, and several publications. We would also like to hear and understand your views on this genuinely acute matter.

[A. Rubiks] My viewpoint does not differ from that which was set forth in the decree of the Central Committee Plenum. The newspaper TSINIYA, whose headline signifies that its publisher—the Latvian CP Central Committee—has, over the course of time, been departing from party positions, has lately taken a stance attacked by the so-called Independent Communist Party and, in essence, has begun to act against its own publisher. What kind of conclusion should be drawn under such conditions? Logic prompts the one which the Central Committee found: to dismiss the newspaper's editors, to provide its employees with the chance to think over what path they wish to follow, and to immediately renovate this oldest communist publication on an ideological footing which would be natural for the newspaper of the Latvian CP Central Committee.

Such is the aspect of the matter reflected in the plenum's decree, and no right-thinking, commensal person would dispute such a posing of the question. But this story also has another, unseen aspect; it cannot be pinpointed in such a restrained document as the Central Committee's decision, but it is extremely useful and instructive to know it.



In order to fix the sequence of events in your readers' memory, let me repeat the following: the Central Committee Plenum was held at the end of the day, last Thursday, 24 May.

But two days prior to the Plenum, on last Tuesday, at a time when the above-mentioned decision did not even exist, an application was submitted, money was counted out, and on Wednesday, 23 May, a license was obtained for the right to publish a new newspaper to be entitled NEATKARIGA TSINIYA [INDEPENDENT TSINIYA]. Despite the fact that TSINIYA had Editor Ya. Britans, who had been approved by the Central Committee Plenum, on that same day, 23 May, the collective elected a new editor—an active leader of the beaten wing of the Latvian Communist Party. And it was only after this that our plenum met, on Thursday, 24 May, and adopted its own decree.

Such is the chronological chain of events. If an attempt is made to comprehend these events in their complex, such a picture as the following can be seen. It seemed to the ship's crew that their vessel had sprung a leak and was about to plunge to the bottom. In a panic the crew hastily knocked a life raft together, climbed into it, and set out in it onto the stormy sea, leaving behind to the whims of fate their tried-and-tested ship and its old captain. But then the first few hours passed, the panic died down, and those persons who had fled discovered that the ship had not only remained afloat but had also returned to its assigned course, intending to continue the journey that had been interrupted by the storm. And then shouts were raised from the life raft which even now reach us from the television screens, radio sets, and pages of the periodical press. Amid these shouts we can frequently discern hypocritical assertions that we have supposedly liquidated the oldest communist publication.

But, perhaps, the TSINIYA collective and its instigators from the NKPL [Independent Communist Party of Latvia], had abandoned their own newspaper precisely because it is not only the oldest communist newspaper but also the oldest bolshevik one.

[I. Geyman] I've already had occasion to hear at the Press House that the "reborn" TSINIYA is something that nobody needs, and that Latvians will not read it....

[A. Rubiks] That's a familiar song. Today TSINIYA is used for making insinuations; yesterday it was something else, and tomorrow something still different will appear. It's an attempt to exert moral pressure on the readers, to continue the psychological pressure which has been well-developed in our republic. There is an ongoing, open, and forced shaping of public awareness. Nowadays it is being suggested to people and even being pounded into their heads that TSINIYA will cease to be read. That is untrue; it is a deceit.

[I. Gayman] Consequently, if the situation regarding TSINIYA had not arisen, something similar would have thought up instead?

[A. Rubiks] Of course. But here there is also a special nuance of its own. TSINIYA not only provides the excuse for the next wave of anti-communist hysteria. The present-day, furious campaign against our decision was unleashed because its organizers fear the following: this newspaper could become that organ which would bring the true word to the masses of readers, to the masses of Latvians, the true word, as distinct from the prevailing viewpoint on the events which are occurring among us here; it might open the common people's eyes to the invalidity of the policy being conducted by the upper echelons now governing Latvia.

By the way, the same kind of pressure is being exerted against the collecting of signatures of a referendum on the issue of Latvia's independence and against those communists who have remained in our party's ranks. It is being exerted particularly against those who have remained in the minority, or even in solitary isolation within their own collectives. They are confronted with the genuine threat of being fired, transferred to lower-paying or less-prestigious jobs. As an example, I can cite a very recent instance which occurred in an organization well-known to me and with persons whom I know well.

At a party meeting of the Riga Gorispolkom about 20 persons suddenly submitted their statements of resignation from the party. Moreover, most of them had been in the ranks of the CPSU for 10 or more years. They included such respected persons as, for example, I. Ulmanis, the deputy chairman of the ispolkom. With his party card in his pocket he had occupied more than one quite high position, including the post of minister of construction during the height of the stagnant period. Or A. Barkans, another deputy chairman of the gorispolkom, who had previously worked as secretary for propaganda in the Kirovsk Party Raykom. I understand that they want to work at the posts which they have now been given, but it turns out that, they had to "pay" for these posts by resigning from the CPSU. And there are many such persons. If it is still possible for them to defend their viewpoints in Riga, people are fearful in the rural areas, where it is next to impossible to find a new job. And it is possible to understand them.

I'd like to encourage these persons, to tell them that nothing can be done to the party—though it can be reduced numerically or even declared to be outlawed, it cannot be eliminated. It is necessary to believe in this, and then the forced pressure will lose its own force.

[I. Gayman] One group of problems is connected with the party. They bother communists above all. But broad strata of the population are disturbed by the future of the republic as a whole. What will tomorrow be like? Will there be stability in the foreseeable future? Will Latvia be cast to the arbitrary whims of fate, or will it remain within the body of the USSR? Should people move away from Latvia or not? Should they seek an inter-urban exchange of apartments or can they wait a little while? What would you say in response to these people?

[A. Rubiks] I can add that the anxiety of many persons is being exacerbated by the fact that formations of vigilante-type guards are being formed in this republic. The events which occurred at this republic's Supreme Soviet building on 15 May are being used as a pretext for this. Nothing would have happened there if the persons who were walking toward the parliament in order to present their demands had not been stopped by militants from the People's Front, the DNNL [Latvian National Independence Movement], and other similar such organizations. Now this incident is being presented as an attempt to seize the building, and calls to arms are resounding, to create various types of militant detachments, even three regiments of aizsargs. To some persons this might seem like an innocent or harmless game, but we must recall the role played by the aizsargs during the years of the bourgeois regime and during the years of the Great Patriotic War, as well as under the fascist regime in Latvia. The numerous monuments over our fraternal graves testify eloquently to what they were doing in the years of the German occupation.

Or let's take, for example, the desire to create a group of special detachments for guarding the building which houses this republic's Supreme Soviet and other facilities. Why do this inasmuch as we already have the police and other state organs for the purpose of safeguarding public order? In response to such actions, the workers have declared that they would also create their own guard units. And so two forces are emerging which would confront each other. We should think very carefully before allowing ourselves to engage in such "games."

This is the kind of thing that creates a lack of confidence and security among people and which gives rise to fear.

[I. Geyman] Let's recall the history of the beginning of this century, the period of the First Revolution in Russia. At that time the workers created their own, very strong, military guards.... It must be thought that nowadays they would be able to create guards units which would be no less weak than those, nor any weaker than the units to be formed by the People's Front, DNNL, aizsargs, or any other such group. Then this republic would witness the emergence of two such opposing forces for whom neither the army, nor the police, nor the KGB, nor anyone would have any meaning or importance. They would be strong, armed, and would seek out pretenses for clashes. Perhaps nowadays, before things get to such a stage, we should raise the question of parliament passing a law banning any kinds of militarized formations except for the official ones which are recognized on the territory of the entire country?

[A. Rubiks] Such a law could only be welcomed. All the more so in that our reality provides us with quite a few frightening examples. I have in mind the events in Dushanbe, when thousands of extremists became disorderly and rioted in the city. Something similar is now happening in Moldavia and Armenia. It has obviously seemed to certain persons that it's also time for us here to proceed to a similar kind of actions. That's the only way

that we can evaluate the poorly thought-out, extremist calls for creating "guards" detachments.

[I. Geyman] Are matters being instigated toward a Transcaucasian type of situation?

[A. Rubiks] Yes, to a Transcaucasian type of situation.

[I. Geyman] Nevertheless, let's return now to the demands of our fellow-countrymen. How are they to understand their own immediate future?

[A. Rubiks] Time is working for us. With each passing day, more and more people are coming to understand that it is unrealistic for this republic to secede from the USSR. From neither a political, economic, nor strategic-geographical viewpoint. This path leads to a dead end. People's eyes are being opened, and they are beginning to change their attitude toward events. Herein lies the pledge and prologue to an imminent stabilization of the situation here. It is indicative that even during these alarming days quite a few persons, including Latvians, are joining the Latvian Communist Party. Likewise indicative is the fact that persons who, not so long ago, handed in their party cards are now requesting that they be returned, explaining that they had made a mistake. Others are manifesting an interest in where their party documents are—evidently, they are thinking it over. It is noteworthy that nowadays Latvians in cities and rural areas have begun to sign up en masse in response to the call by the Committee for the Defense of Civil Rights regarding the holding of a referendum. During the first few days the Latvian population had regard this call with extreme hesitancy, with a wait-and-see attitude.

When we comprehend and interpret all these circumstance in a complex, we can draw the following, firm conclusion: Political passions are becoming less noisy in our republic, and the Soviet Union will remain unified and inviolable. We will live together.

[I. Geyman] You were recently elected chairman of the Committee for Defense of the Constitution and Civil Rights of the USSR and the Latvian SSR. What is this committee engaged in doing?

[A. Rubiks] During the initial period we have set ourselves two tasks. The first is to collect information about instances where human rights have been infringed upon. With great regret I must tell you that the initial incursions on human rights in our republic were manifested with regard to older people—they have had taken away from their meager privileges in stores, in obtaining a tiny amount of dacha space, and in medical services. Their little orchards and garden plots have been taken from them. No matter how you twist it, this cannot be called anything other than a series of uncivilized actions toward our own fellow-citizens. A country which does not respect its own old people cannot lay claim to the title of a civilized, cultured society.

Hundreds of letters concerning such insults and abuses come into our Defense Committee. We will continue to

provide information on such cases to the higher organs of authority in this republic, the country as a whole, and the international community, right up to the UN.

[I. Geyman] Where can people turn whose civil rights are being violated? Where is your Defense Committee located?

[A. Rubiks] It is located in the House of Political Enlightenment at the following address: 5 K. Valdemar Street.

The second task which we have set ourselves is to collect signatures for the demand to hold a referendum on the question of Latvia's independence.

[I. Geyman] Let's return to the beginning of our conversation—to the matter of TSINIYA, about the hullabaloo raised about the decree of the Central Committee Plenum....

[A. Rubiks] In addition to what I have said already, I can explain this hullabaloo by saying that the leaders of the People's Front and even the government itself regarded the matter of returning TSINIYA to the party platform as some kind of threat to themselves. It was not by chance that Dainis Ivans, the first deputy chairman of this republic's Supreme Soviet personally came to the Press House in order to help in stirring up passions. I see in this a very great fear regarding the appearance of a communist newspaper which would reach the Latvian reader, especially in the rural area.

However, whether certain people like this or not, the newspaper will be published. Of course, certain difficulties will be inevitable at first. It's a pity that most of TSINIYA's employees quit during their "ship's" difficult moment. This editorial office had a strong, highly skilled collective of capable persons. However, the path back to their own newspaper is not barred to any of them. Well, the vacancies will be filled in time by other journalists—no less capable but, perhaps, more consistent in their choice of a life style. During the initial period, obviously, a great deal of the materials will have to be translated. Later, as the editors learn to stand on their own, original articles will begin to appear. Their proportion will increase until the editors are able to publish the newspaper completely from their own materials. At that time the Plenum's extraordinary decision will lose force.

Such is the course which the Central Committee has to take.

Certain complications will also arise in the interrelationships with readers. Those who wish to continue receiving TSINIYA in the future—a newspaper which, I am confident, will be a sharp, militant newspaper, boldly defending the interests of working people—we will gladly cooperate with. As to those persons who cancel their subscriptions, we will excuse ourselves and return their money. I think that, after a certain time, many of them will return to being subscribers to TSINIYA.

[I. Geyman] Thank you for the interview.

### Latvian 'Equal Rights' Faction Explains Position on Independence

90UN2275B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
1 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by P. Shapovalov, Latvian SSR people's deputy: "Why We Did Not Vote"]

[Text] On 25 May a majority of deputies voted for and thereby adopted the "Statement of the Latvian Republic's Supreme Soviet in Connection with the Ukase of USSR President M. Gorbachev, Dated 14 May 1990 and Entitled 'On the Declaration of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Entitled "On Restoring the Latvian Republic's Independence," "" as prepared by the followers of the NFL [Latvian People's Front]. The "Equal Rights" Faction refused to vote for the above-mentioned "Statement," and here's why.

Let me begin with Paragraph 1 of the Statement. Reference is made here to the fact that the Supreme Soviet is legally empowered to abrogate those acts passed by the Seym of the Latvian Republic which were in contradiction to the Constitution that was in effect in 1940. This assertion is invalid inasmuch as it is commonly known that in 1934 K. Ulmanis established an authoritarian regime, dissolved the Seym, introduced martial law, and, in fact, abrogated the 1922 Constitution. And the reference made by the authors of the Statement to the fact that, with the restoration of the Soviet power or regime in Latvia in 1940, the 1922 Constitution was also restored does not stand up to criticism. Because, of course, Soviet Latvia's first Constitution was adopted back in January 1919, and, therefore, it may be considered that when the Soviet regime was restored in Latvia in 1940, it was the 1919 Constitution which was re-established, rather than the 1922 Constitution of Bourgeois Latvia.

Further on, Paragraph 2 of the Statement contains a reference to the fact that in 1940 Latvia's annexation by the USSR occurred as a result of the use of force. This assertion is also invalid in connection with the fact that the decision to merge with or be included in the USSR was adopted by the Seym of the Latvian Republic, which was mentioned in Paragraph 1 of the Statement. The elections to the Seym were conducted in accordance with the previously adopted electoral law. The notes made in voters' passports were also done on the basis of Article 37 of the Seym's Electoral Law and were not some kind of invention by the "occupation regime."

Paragraph 3 of the Statement points out that, in accordance with Paragraph 5, Article 97 of the Latvian SSR Constitution, the laws of the USSR must be ratified. In connection with this, let me say that if the authors of the Statement wish to cite the Latvian SSR Constitution, they should know that, in accordance with Article 74 of the USSR Constitution, in case there is a discrepancy between a Union republic law and an All-Union law, the

USSR law is valid. There is a further reference to the fact that the USSR Law, dated 3 April 1990 and entitled "On the Procedure for Solving Problems Connected with a Union Republic Seceding from the USSR." But this too does not correspond to the reality involved. On the contrary, according to Article 1 of the above-indicated USSR Law, the procedure for solving problems connected with a Union republic seceding from the USSR is specified in accordance with Article 72 of the USSR Constitution.

Further along in Paragraph 4 of the Statement it is asserted that holding a referendum is not justified either politically or juridically. Is that really so? Because, after all, it is right here that the authors of the Statement write that in 1940 Latvia merged with the USSR without a referendum, and reference is made to Article 77 of the 1922 Constitution, although, as already indicated, this Constitution was not in effect.

Now the republic's Supreme Soviet by its own Declaration dated 4 May 1990 has restored the 1922 Constitution. Therefore, it itself is bound and obligated, in accordance with that same Article 77 of the 1922 Constitution, to hold a referendum. Otherwise, the Declaration, as indicated in Article 77, will not obtain the force of law. Up to the present time the referendum has not been conducted, and so the Declaration does not have the force of law.

At the same time, in accordance with Article 78 of the 1922 Constitution, one-tenth of the voters shall have the power to propose any draft law, i.e., a bill, to the Sejm. Therefore, the appeal by the "Equal Rights" Faction regarding the collection of signatures advocating a referendum is legal not only with regard to USSR legislation, but even relative to Latvia's 1922 Constitution.

In Section 3, Paragraph 4 the authors of the Statement assert that Articles 5 and 108 of the Latvian SSR Constitution do not require a mandatory referendum. This can be evaluated as a premeditated deceit. The fact of the matter is that Art. 108 of the Constitution sets forth an alternative, whereas Article 5 sets forth only a referendum. The latter declares the following: "The most important questions of state life shall be brought up for nationwide discussion, and they shall also be put to nationwide voting (a referendum)."

Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Paragraph 4 of the Statement contains references to the fact that a nationwide discussion was conducted on the matter of Latvia's independence. But everybody knows well how "nationwide" discussions are conducted nowadays in our republic.

As to the deputies of the "Equal Rights" Faction, they are not speaking out in opposition to Latvia's independence, but rather against those methods and ways by which the deputies of the NFL Faction are attempting to accomplish this. The "Equal Rights" Faction considers that the republic's independence is achievable solely on the basis of the USSR Law on Secession from the Union, by means of negotiations with the USSR, rather than by

adopting a unilateral act, from which Latvia can only suffer, as may be seen from the example of Lithuania.

In Section 7, Paragraph 4 of the Statement its authors speak about the fact that only 8,798 persons spoke out against the Statement; but this too does not correspond to the reality of the situation. At the present time more than 130,000 persons have already declared themselves in favor of a referendum (against the Statement), and the collection of signatures is proceeding at full speed ahead.

Yet another false assertion is made in Article 5 of the Statement, to the effect that the USSR President cannot abrogate the Statement, inasmuch as this exceeds his powers or competency. However, in accordance with Paragraph 2, Article 127<sup>3</sup> of the USSR Constitution, the USSR President "shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the sovereignty of the USSR and that of the Union republics, the country's security and territorial integrity, and for implementing the principles of the USSR's national-state structure or system."

In Paragraph 7 the authors of the Statement refer to international law, but they forget that implementation of the Declaration would lead to a breakup of the state borders which have evolved in Europe during the postwar period. The Declaration also contradicts the concluding document of the 1989 Vienna Meeting. The states which signed this document have affirmed their own obligation to strictly and effectively observe the principles of states' territorial integrity. "They will refrain from any violations of this principle and, thus, from any actions having as their goal, by direct or indirect means,...the violation of the territorial integrity, political independence, or unity of states. No actions or situations which violate this principle will be recognized as legitimate by the participant-states."

Paragraph 8 of the Statement asserts that there is no document in existence by means of which Latvia would hand over any of its own sovereign rights to the USSR. This argument too does not stand up to criticism. In Paragraph 1 of this same Statement it is said that the sole, legitimate successor of the Latvian Republic's Sejm is this republic's Supreme Soviet, and thereby it recognizes the validity of the Latvian SSR Constitution, and, therefore, the USSR Constitution as well.

The "Equal Rights" Faction considers that this republic's Supreme Soviet should abrogate the Declaration and decide the question of Latvia's independence on the basis of the laws which exist and are valid in this country.

#### **Latvian Industries Show Production Decline**

904A0507A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
27 Jun 90 p 2

[Article by economic correspondent E. Amerik under the rubric "Economic Survey": "The Market Does Not Tolerate Laxity"]

[Text] May, unfortunately, did not introduce any notable positive changes in the unfavorable economic situation in the republic. Moreover, individual sectors showed a further decrease in production, which is caused to a significant degree by a relaxation of labor and production discipline, a breach in ties of cooperation, and an increasing imbalance in the national economy. Thus, for the last five months the general volume of industrial production decreased by 18 million rubles [R] or 0.5 percent in comparison with the same period last year. In May alone this decrease amounted to R8 million.

In order to be accurate, I will note that there were four working days less during this segment of time than during the five months of last year. Therefore the average daily production is a more accurate indicator. According to it, a small growth in production, two percent, is maintained, while it was minus in the country as a whole—1.1 percent lower than last year. And nonetheless, one is alarmed by the presence of a large number of collectives where a decrease in production occurred—161 enterprises or 62 percent of the entire number.

Specific types of products interest the consumer most of all. And in this case you may not call the situation cheerful. **Of the 110 most important types of industrial production designated for periodic reporting, the target was not fulfilled for 40, and a reduction in output took place for 54 types.** For instance, output of lacquer paint materials decreased by 1,600 tons (to 93 percent of the level of last year's five months), railway passenger cars—by 35 units (86.6 percent), telephones—by 192,700 units (84.8 percent), milking machines—by 2,300 units (78.5 percent), electric light bulbs—by 2.8 million units (85 percent), fans for general use—by 1,900 units (93.8 percent), refrigerating plants—by 240 units (77.3 percent), plywood—by 11,900 cubic meters (73.8 percent), and structural glass—by 66,000 square meters (96 percent). The list could be continued.

It is not difficult to figure out how all this has affected the fulfillment of contract obligations for deliveries of products. In May alone the volume of undelivered consumer goods increased in comparison with the previous four months by R5.5 million and for the five months comprised R35.3 million (the figure for the corresponding period last year is R20.8 million). As a result, contract obligations for the delivery of production for January-May were 99.0 percent fulfilled. The situation for this important indicator was not any better in the country as a whole—98.8 percent.

**Fifty-five collectives, or 20.7 percent of the total, let down the consumers.** In May another nine enterprises joined those lagging behind. When you consider that active work should already be underway to prepare for the introduction of market relations, then such a number of "outsiders" is too great. The accurate fulfillment of contractual obligations is one of the most important conditions for the normal functioning of the market.

And who are the most notorious debtors? The "lead" position is occupied by the light industry concern "Atrums," where a debt of almost R15.8 million was formed. It only fulfilled contract obligations by 98.1 percent. In turn, the concern itself was shorted by the collectives that belong to it: The production associations "Rigas Tekstils" (R6.6 million), "Rigas Manufaktura" (R2.9 million), and "Sarkaynas Rits" (R1.8 million), and the textile plant "Astotays Marts" (R2.2 million).

The debt of the furniture production association "Riga" increases from one month to the next. Over the five months it has already grown to a substantial sum—R2.9 million. Things are no better at the Riga diesel engine construction factory, in the BEF and "Alfa" production associations, at the artificial leather factory "Dinamo," and at the Daugavpils production association "Khimvolokno."

Why has delivery discipline weakened? There are many reasons. Of course not everything always depends on the producing enterprise. Often they themselves are let down by suppliers. The necessary centrally distributed resources do not supply the production program at full volume everywhere. There are many such examples. The effective help of supply organizations is needed here. Nonetheless, a direct cause of the low discipline of deliveries lies elsewhere—a breakdown in targets for the output of production in terms of both volume and assortment. In a word, each lagging collective is now in extreme need of a purposeful effort to eliminate the specific reasons for lagging behind, and complete clarity is needed: How, at what cost, and when will the enterprise function as required?

This also applies in full measure to overcoming arrears which have occurred in the production of consumer goods. The aggravation of tensions on the consumer market, the growing shortage, and empty shelves in the stores move this problem into the center of the attention of each production collective. The situation here is quite alarming. Sixty-six enterprises, or 18.2 percent of the total, did not meet their five-month targets. More than R31 million of various goods were not delivered. Of 49 types of the most important consumer goods, 28 saw reductions in the volume of production. Significant reductions in output occurred in cotton fabrics—by 2.4 million square meters or 27 percent, woolen cloths—by 0.3 million square meters or 4.2 percent, children's stockings—by 63,000 pairs or one percent, knitted garments—by 0.6 million units or 3.3 percent, footwear—by 121,000 pairs or 2.7 percent, and furniture—by R2.9 million or 3.3 percent.

The major debtors were the production associations "Sarkanays Kvadrats" (R3.9 million), "Riga" (R2.4 million), "Rigas Audums" (R1.2 million), "Rigas Tekstils" (R3.4 million), the Brotseny cement and slate plant (R1.0 million), and the textiles plant "Astotays Marts" (R1.8 million).

Supplying the population with food products remains a crucial problem. Despite the fact that production increased by R8.1 million in comparison with the five months of last year, the situation continues to worsen. The increase in the production of food goods is held in check for the most part by a scarcity of raw materials sources. For this reason processing enterprises underwent reductions in the output of such products as meat—by 1,800 tons, sausage products—by 400 tons, prepared meats—by 1,200 tons, butter—by 300 tons, and fish products—by 15,100 tons. Less candy, sugar, and whole milk products were produced than during the same period last year.

In turn, all this is directly connected with the fall in the production of agricultural goods. A decrease in the sale to the state of livestock and poultry by 5,900 tons (3.7 percent) and milk by 14,300 tons (2.1 percent) occurred on all categories of farms in January-May in comparison with the same period last year. The decrease in purchases of livestock and poultry occurred on farms in 17 rayons. It was especially notable in Yekabpilsskiy Rayon—28 percent, Tukumskiy Rayon—14 percent, Talsinskiy Rayon—13 percent, Ludzenskiy Rayon—12 percent, and Saldusskiy—11 percent.

Sale of milk to the state decreased in 18 rayons. In Saldusskiy Rayon alone this decrease was 10 percent, in Rizhskiy Rayon it was nine percent, in Ventspilsskiy and Tukumskiy Rayons—seven percent, and in Yekabpilsskiy and Liyepayskiy Rayons—five percent. One can only hope that the summer will make up for what was not produced in the preceding months.

And finally, the worsened situation in capital construction gives rise to great concern, especially in the construction of social and cultural facilities and, as paradoxical as it may be, of construction industry facilities. The program for housing construction is going extremely unsatisfactorily. For instance in January-May 103,500 square meters of housing were brought into operation at the expense of centralized state capital investments and resources from the funds of enterprises. This is 34,900 square meters or 25 percent less than in the corresponding period last year. In other words, the annual plan will only be fulfilled by 13 percent. Other facilities of the social infrastructure are not being built any faster. For instance, the annual plan for the construction of kindergartens is only being fulfilled at seven percent, and for outpatient clinics—at four percent. Of course it will require a great effort for the builders to make up the arrears. The situation is further complicated by the fact that a rather difficult problem has arisen in the supply of cement and other materials. The supply organizations must provide aid in this case.

In short, we see that more than enough unresolved problems have accumulated in the national economy. The road to their final resolution, of course, is attained through the introduction of market relations. But even today much can be done to strengthen discipline and

responsibility, which is fairly “limp.” Order, organization, and enterprise are inseparable components of a market economy. And we need to begin making preparations immediately to work in the new conditions of management.

#### Landsbergis Note to Perez de Cuellar

90UN2308A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
16 Jun 90 p 1

[Open Letter by V. Landsbergis, chairman, Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic: “To Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Secretary General of the United Nations”]

[Text] Esteemed Mr. Secretary General:

On 16 February 1918 Lithuania restored its state sovereignty, which had been cherished for centuries, and, after overcoming many difficulties, it was confirmed as an independent state among the world community of states; in 1921 it was accepted into the League of Nations. On 15 June 1940, the tragic anniversary is being marked today by all our people, the USSR carried out an armed aggression: it occupied and annexed to the Soviet Union Lithuania, as well as Latvia and Estonia. This brought immeasurable sufferings to the Lithuanian people and to Lithuanian ethnic communities: hundreds of thousands of people were deported, the population was exterminated, the natural economic, political, and cultural structures were destroyed, and a totalitarian, communist regime was imposed upon our country.

Lithuania never became reconciled to this, and on 11 March 1990, by a decision of the new, democratically elected parliament, it restored independence to the Lithuanian Republic, having expressed its adherence to the commonly accepted principles and norms of international law, as well as the hope that it may return to the community of free nations. However, force has again been used on Lithuania. By employing its Armed Forces, the Soviet Union has committed an economic and political aggression against the Lithuanian Republic, grossly violating the goals and principles of the United Nations, as affirmed within the UN Charter (Pars. 1, 2, and 3 of Article 1; Pars. 3, 4, and 7 of Article 2 of the Charter).

While pledging to adhere to a political path acceptable to all parties in the dispute with the Soviet Union, and seeking the most peaceful possible confirmation of Lithuania's state sovereignty and democracy in accordance with Paragraph 2, Article 35 of the UN Charter, the Lithuanian Republic hereby addresses to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly a proposal to include the matter relating to Lithuania and the other two Baltic states on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly. And it expresses the hope that the world community of states will support the legitimate aspirations of the Lithuanian Republic and its people.

At the behest of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic

V. LANDSBERGIS, chairman, Supreme Soviet.

Vilnius, 15 June 1990.

### **Landsbergis Statement on Moratorium Offer**

90UN2317A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
20 Jun 90 pp 1, 2

[Statement by Vitautas Landsbergis: "On the Government's Proposal Regarding the Proclamation of a Moratorium, Made at the 19 June Session of the Republic's Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] I have received a letter from the Lithuanian government dated 16 June. I must familiarize you with it, although I suppose that everyone already knows its contents. It is reproduced below:

"The Lithuanian government at its session of 16 June 1990 examined and considered further steps with regard to confirming and reinforcing Lithuania's state sovereignty. Being convinced of the need at the present time to adopt at the present time more concrete or specific decisions in order to begin negotiations with the USSR, the Lithuanian government has directed a request to the Supreme Soviet that it discuss the following text for possible adoption as a decree:

#### **A Decree of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet**

For the period of negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet proclaims a temporary moratorium on the Act of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet dated 11 March 1990 and entitled "On Restoring the Independent Lithuanian State."

"The Lithuanian government directs the attention of the Supreme Soviet to the fact that the concept of the moratorium as employed in the draft moratorium, in the government's opinion, is the most acceptable one for retaining the validity of the Act Regarding Independence; it will be elucidated and interpreted to the public. Such an elucidation would be capable of serving to shape public opinion in a direction favorable to adopting the decisions of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet. Kazimera Prunskene, Prime Minister of the Lithuanian Republic."

At the same time it was announced or reported to the world and to all the news services how the Lithuanian government regards this problem and its own proposal. In point of fact, what the government says is extremely important. It must be explained to the society. The society, i.e., the public, is disturbed. It reacts sensitively to everything connected with independence and to documents and acts pertaining to independence. The explanations which were made by our Lithuanian government itself have, obviously, been insufficient for our society. They are also, possibly, insufficient for us. We have

already exchanged opinions on this matter in the Presidium as well as at a joint session with the government, and later at a meeting held by the deputies' club.

Many questions have arisen, and we must regard them seriously, at the same time explaining not only the possible implications that are connected with them, but also the possible juridical, constitutional, and other dangers. Although, at first glance, this does not seem to have to do with our provisional Fundamental Law or Constitution, do not other interpretations arise in this connection which are fraught with danger? This must be studied and handled consistently, step by step, and calmly, taking into account, of course, the opinions of Lithuania's inhabitants and even their feelings, for many persons react primarily with their feelings. What we absolutely do not need is any sort of split in society, dissension, suspicion, etc. People could even be alarmed by such a fact as the name of the proposed document—a decree of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet. Moreover, this is not a decree, but merely a letter to the Supreme Soviet and a proposal to discuss it. And, of course, we will discuss it. The Supreme Soviet intends to discuss the political situation as a whole in the Presidium and in the commissions, bearing in mind the proposals which were made by Moscow during the course of our meetings with the leaders of the Soviet Union. There were various proposals and formulas. One of them could be similar to this.

And we intend to do this. There are commissions of the Supreme Soviet—for restoring independence, for the legal system, and there is the Presidium. There are other instruments and possibilities for discussion. I suppose or assume that there is no need to begin debates today without examining the matter beforehand in commissions and groups. Finally, in connection with the departure of the government leaders Kazimera Prunskene and Romualdas Ozolas and with the fact that Algirdas Brazauskas is at a different session, I propose today to draw attention to one of the proposals—to discuss our present-day political and partially economic situation, which has evolved after the meetings in Moscow, and to assign the study and handling of the issue to be examined specifically to the commissions of the Supreme Soviet. The Presidium, in turn, will also constantly be examining what is going on in the commissions and will monitor, i.e., keep tabs on the reaction of the public.

We would possibly not have any against conducting a public-opinion poll in Lithuania and explaining how the public understands the concept which has been employed, if it is the beginning of inter-state negotiations or talks with the Soviet Union. But this concept would be linked with the immediate recognition of the Lithuanian Republic as an independent state. We still are confronted with a great deal to discuss and to verify with our possible opponents regarding the negotiations so that the work may not be conducted in vain. And we must not be disturbed in vain if the results still prove to be unacceptable for the other side. Restricting ourselves to such information, I propose that the Supreme Soviet assign or



entrust further examination and consideration of this matter to its own parliamentary mechanism.

### Latsis Reaction to RSFSR CP Congress

90UN2315A Moscow VECHERNAYA MOSKVA  
in Russian 19 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with Otto Rudolfovich Latsis, first deputy editor-in-chief, KOMMUNIST, by Zh. Avyazova, correspondent: "Turn in One's Party Card? There Is Another Solution!"]

[Text] Lying in front of me is the decree of the party meeting held by the editors of the journal KOMMUNIST. It was adopted on 25 June, hard on the heels of the just-concluded first stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party. It was born, as I was told in the editorial offices, under the impression of the account narrated by O.R. Latsis, the first deputy editor-in-chief of this journal and a delegate to this congress.

The opinion of these communists is as follows: the elections of the RSFSR Communist Party's leadership organs were conducted too hastily and undemocratically. They did not take into consideration the proposals of the Moscow City and several other party organizations—to hold the elections during the second stage of the congress. The declarations of many delegates to the effect that such an election of the Central Committee could become an obstacle to consolidating the ranks of the CPSU and cause a mass exodus from the party were not heeded.

The editors' party organization proposes to the 28th CPSU Congress that it establish an extraordinary conference of the CPSU's city organization and that it adopt thereat a decision to the effect that Moscow's party organization may retain its former status within the CPSU.

Our correspondent requested Otto Rudolfovich LATSIS to comment upon this decision.

[O.R. Latsis] You know, I don't think that this congress was so homogeneously conservative as it seemed to many persons, based, perhaps, on its decisions and, in particular, the election results. Recall the voting as to whether a threatening message should be sent to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, as proposed by Docent Rebrov. At first heatedly, without having seen the Declaration on Power, which was under discussion, and not having read the draft itself, as they should have done, only 400 persons voted against Rebrov's resolution. At the conclusion, when they had discussed it and given it some thought, almost 1500 delegates voted against this item.

Among many persons there was a predominance of conservatism not because of conviction, not because they are opposed to perestroika, but due to insufficient political experience. I do not say this by way of consolation. The fact that even the delegates fail to understand the party policy to a large degree is certainly very

alarming. But there is far from a majority of conscious "conservatives," i.e., those whose interests are in conflict with perestroika. However, many persons have been for them. Why is this so? I think that it's because there are serious shortcomings in working out or developing the party's policy and its propaganda, in preparing the congress, and in many of the party's decisions. Such extremely important decisions, for example, as making the transition to a market-type economy. This matter was worked on by the state structures, and Gorbachev did good work on it as President, but he did not do enough work on it in his capacity as General Secretary. As a result, the party turned out to be on the sidelines.

It's another matter as to whether they could help but be on the sidelines. But the fact remains that they practically did not participate in working out these decisions, and they did a very poor job of explaining them to themselves and to their own members.

This also pertains to the Program Statement which will be discussed by the 28th CPSU Congress and, in general, to all the most important issues of our life. Because, you know, it turned out that, as a result of the party's basic decisions and those of the 19th Party Conference, there has occurred a separation of the party power from the state power, a division of the legislative and the executive powers, an abandonment of the one-party principle and Article 6 of the Constitution.... All those positive factors which strengthen the country's political system were, unfortunately, accompanied by the fact that the party itself proved to be the weak link in this system at this time. And this is felt very tangibly.

[Zh. Avyazova] How were the proposals made by the communists of your editorial office received in the party's city committee?

[O.R. Latsis] The conference of delegates from Moscow to the 28th CPSU Congress, which was recently held in the gorkom, had familiarized themselves with our decree. With regard to Yu.A. Prokofyev, the first secretary, he received our decision calmly. And the reaction of most of the delegates, it seemed to me, was sympathetic. It's important for us that many communists who are filled with determination to place their party cards in the table and leave should see that another solution is possible. We would also like to see certain certain delegates from the Russian congress take an objective look at the decisions which they adopted. And before adopting similar ones at the 28th CPSU Congress, they should give some thought as to whether they would be causing some harm to the party itself.

The question of the Moscow communists' attitude toward the Russian congress was decided by the conference of delegates, who also supported the intention of the conference of secretaries of primary party organizations to discuss matters after the second stage of the RSFSR Communist Party Congress. This does not exclude support for our opinion also.



[Zh. Avyazova] But why didn't Moscow declare itself at the RSFSR Communist Party Congress? And will such tactical errors be taken into account at the 28th party congress?

[O.R. Latsis] You know, the congress had been well organized by the opponents of perestroika. Moscow's representative, who worked in the secretariat, said that the first speaker registered from the capital was placed 86th in line.... And, according to the regulations, it was necessary to collect the signatures of 50 Muscovite delegates for him to be allowed to speak. Nor did they take advantage of those possibilities which they had at their disposal—the same side microphone to which the presiding officer paid attention least of all.... As the delegates at our own conference emphasized, all this must be taken into account, of course, prior to the CPSU congress.

#### **Decree on Gagauz Autonomy**

90UN2673A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA  
in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 3

["Decree of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] **Decree of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet on the materials of the commission of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for the study of the demands of USSR people's deputies and other appeals for the formation of an autonomous Gagauz nationality.**"

The Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To confirm the joint resolution of the commissions of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet for national issues and for issues of local self-management and local economy "On the materials of the commission of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for the study of the demands of USSR people's deputies and other appeals for the formation of an autonomous Gagauz nationality."

2. To annul the decisions of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd sessions of the extraordinary congress of the representatives of the Gagauz nationality regarding the formation of a Gagauz ASSR and parallel organs of state power adopted 12 November 1989, 3 December 1989, and 22 July 1990.

3. To direct the Government of the Moldavian SSR to develop a program of socioeconomic, national, and cultural development for the republic's South.

4. To accelerate the development of laws on citizenship, on the guarantees of the rights of ethnic groups residing in the Moldavian SSR, on local self-management and local economy.

5. Taking into consideration the national interests and the similar historical fates of the Bulgars and the Gagauz

of Bessarabia, to recommend the inclusion of settlements with their dense populations in one of the administrative units in accordance with the impending administrative-territorial reform.

M. Snegur, chairman, Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, Kishinev, 27 July 1990

#### **Commission Report on Gagauz Autonomy**

90UN2673B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA  
in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 3-4

[Unattributed report: "Conclusion of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Permanent Commissions for National Issues, for Issues of Local Self-Management and Local Economy, and on the Activity of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium commission for the Study of the Demands of Certain USSR People's Deputies and Other Appeals for the Formation of Autonomy of the Gagauz People in the Moldavian SSR"]

[Text] History bears witness that the Moldavian people formed in their historical territory in the Carpathian-Danube-Pontii area, in which their ancestors, the Getodaki, subsequently Romanized, dwelled. The ancient Moldavian state, Moldova, was formed in 1359, having the boundaries of the Danube and the Black Sea to the south, the Dnester to the east, and the Carpathians to the north. The land of the ancestors within the borders of the Moldova of (Shtefan chel Mare) is also the national territory of the Moldavian people today.

"National territory should be understood to be... the territory in which a definite nation or people historically dwells and which is a necessary condition of their national and state self-determination," (International Law, Moscow, 1970, p. 285).

"... from the point of view of modern international law, territory is the material expression of the supremacy and independence of the people inhabiting it. Its borders are the embodiment of territorial integrity, political independence, sovereignty, and the unity of the people and the state. The people are the master of their territory, and only they have the highest right to its distribution... The fate of the given territory is being resolved in accordance with the will of its population, and the state borders are the boundaries of the historically formed national territory of the given people" (International Law, Moscow, 1987, p. 157).

Over the course of more than 630 years, the State of Moldova did not wage wars of occupation of alien peoples and territories. The Moldavian people were forced to have numerous battles in the defense of their national territory. Inimical neighboring great empires violated the sovereignty of the Moldavian people within their national territory on more than one occasion. Thus, starting in 1484, the Ottoman Porte captures a number of territories from Moldova: Chetatya Albe, Kiliya, Budzhak, Tigina, Khotin. In 1775, Austro-Hungary occupied the northern part of Moldova, Bukovina, and

in 1812, the Russian Empire, together with Turkey, partitioned the State of Moldova into two sections and annexed Bessarabia.

The Moldavian lands forcibly annexed by the great empires never ceased to be the national territory of the Moldavian people.

Historical documents irrefutably demonstrate that the Gagauz are not indigenous residents of Moldova. The homeland of the Gagauz is Bulgaria, where the nationality and statehood of the Gagauz formed during the 12th-17th centuries, and where a portion of the Gagauz ethnic community still lives today.

The ancestors of the Gagauz (the Oguz) settled south of the Danube in the 9th century; they came here from the Dnepr river valley, and never dwelled in the south of the area between the Dniester and the Prut rivers.

The first Gagauz groups came to the territory of the State of Moldova, along with other trans-Danubian refugees (Bulgars and others) at the invitation of Russian tsarism during the Russo-Turkish War, 1806-1812. It must be emphasized that the Tsar of Russia made such propositions not only to the Gagauz, since such "invitations" were a reliable mechanism of tsarist policy for creating a national and social base in alien annexed territories within the border zone of the Russian Empire.

Based upon such a policy, tsarism organized the influx of numerous colonists from Central Russia, the Ukraine, beyond the Danube (Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Bulgars, Gagauz, Swiss, Czechs, and others) to Bessarabia, annexed in 1812. In 1818, these received the status of colonists.

The colonists invited to Bessarabia by Russian tsarism were allocated large land parcels (up to 60 desyatina [162 acres] per family, while at the same time, each Moldavian family averaged only 8-12 desyatina [22-32 acres]).

The tsarist colonial policy operated relentlessly, with a "symphonic" effect; its consequences were disastrous of the indigenous population. Thus, over the course of just 20 years (1896-1915), 42,291 Moldavian peasants were forced to leave Bessarabia. The Moldavian villages founded at that time and later are to be found even today in Russia, the Ukraine, Siberia, the Caucasus, and near Vladivostok. Even today, more than 500,000 Moldavians live beyond the boundaries of the Moldavian SSR.

Given the obvious and major shortage of land (0.4 hectares per inhabitant; 130 persons per square kilometer) and of ecological cataclysms in the republic, the monstrous plans for a new partitioning of the national territory of the Moldavians is equivalent to direct encroachment upon the existence of the Moldavian people and their state.

The members of the aforementioned commissions, having studied and discussed at their meetings of 10, 19, 23, and 24 July of this year the materials of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission for

the study of the demands of USSR people's deputies for the creation of so-called Gagauz autonomy, as well as the analogous materials presented by the Moldavian SSR people's deputies from the regions inhabited by the Gagauz, and the reports and proposals of 20 deputies on various permanent Supreme Soviet commissions who studied the problem on the scene from 4 to 18 July of this year, having visited 43 settlements comprising 75 percent of the total number of villages and cities proposed for inclusion in the so-called Gagauz ASSR, and the opinions of a number of public education and health care ministry officials, and having heard the scientific arguments of many experts on history, ethnography, law, and other specialties came to the following conclusions:

1. The fundamental condition for the formation of any national-territorial autonomy is the national territory.

Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgars, Jews, Germans, Gagauz, and citizens of the other nationalities which now live together with the Moldavians within the territory of modern Bessarabia, a component of the ancient State of Moldova, are groups that are a part of other nations and nationalities formed in other geographic territories.

2. According to international law and ethnographic science, if a segment of any people or nation emigrates to inhabit the territory of another people or nation, both the emigrants and their heirs comprise an ethnic group. This means that the Russians, Jews, Germans, etc. comprise ethnic groups within the territory of the Moldavian SSR, regardless of their populations.

In connection with this, it seems necessary to draw attention to the concrete formulation contained in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia concerning the fact that "...groups of people having a common nationality with this or that nation, but not residing within its territory, are not representatives of the given nation" (Vol. 17, p. 375).

3. The Gagauz, as well as other ethnic groups residing in the Moldavian SSR within the national territory of Moldavians do not have their own national territories within the Moldavian SSR.

4. In accordance with the aforementioned, and as founded in the fundamental principles of jurisprudence, global practice of the resolution of national issues, the 1917 Russian Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, and an entire range of international law documentation, the 1966 Pact of Civil and Political Rights, the 1960 UN General Assembly Declaration of Decolonization, the documents of the 1975 Helsinki Conference and the 1990 Copenhagen Conference, the commissions assert that the within the territory of the Moldavian SSR, not one of the ethnic groups dwelling with the Moldavian people has the historical or legal grounds to claim state-territorial autonomy, including grounds for the formation of the so-called Gagauz ASSR within the body of the Moldavian SSR. The formation of such autonomy

would be in contradiction to the Moldavian SSR Declaration of Sovereignty, and international law for national territory.

5. The commission simultaneously feels that the problem of the Gagauz exists only in the sector of the free cultural development of this ethnic group. As regards the socioeconomic factor, no such problem exists specifically for the Gagauz. This is a problem of the republic's entire South, and concerns the interests not only of the Gagauz, but the Bulgars, Moldavians, and the Ukrainians, etc., as well.

6. The commission considers it necessary to accelerate the development of law on citizenship in the Moldavian SSR, on ensuring the development rights of ethnic groups, on local self-management and local economy, which must guarantee the free development of all ethnic groups residing within the territory of the Moldavian SSR in all spheres of life (economic, social, and cultural).

7. The commission recommends that during the course of the preparation and discussion of the program of socioeconomic and cultural development of rural areas, the specific problems of the South be taken into consideration.

Bearing in mind the common historical fates of the Bessarabian Bulgars and Gagauz, the commission recommends that settlements with relatively dense habitation of Bulgars and Gagauz be included in one of the administrative units within the framework of the future administrative territorial reform.

8. Not one of the decrees or measures for the development of the Gagauz culture and language was realized during the period of stagnation and the command-administrative system. Because of the nihilistic attitude toward them and the lack of cadres, at present the law "On the Functional Languages within the Territory of the Moldavian SSR" is not being observed in many Gagauz and Bulgar population points. Therefore, the commission recommends the formation under the Moldavian SSR Government a mixed coordinating group (comprising specialists of Moldavian, Gagauz, and Bulgar nationalities), or even a department for national minority issues, which would forge a concrete program for the development of the language and culture of the Gagauz and Bulgars. They should take up first and foremost ensuring the import of textbooks, training pedagogical cadres for teaching the Gagauz, Bulgarian, and state languages in schools, and increasing the time of radio and television broadcasts in their languages, using cable transmission.

Only through the laws of the Moldavian SSR and concrete measures that would guarantee the existence and free development of ethnic groups can the development of the languages and the cultures of the Gagauz and Bulgars dwelling in the Moldavian SSR be brought out of an impasse.

### Odessa Rejects Moldova Territorial Claims

90UN2515A Kishinev MOLODEZH MOLDAVII  
in Russian 12 Jul 90 p 2

["Statement of the Odessa Oblast Council of People's Deputies"]

[Text] The Editors of MOLODEZH MOLDAVII have received the text of an official announcement of the Odessa Oblast. In assuming that this would be of interest to our readers, we are publishing it with a certain delay which was not due to our fault.

Recently in the statements of officials, in the documents and decisions of the Supreme Soviet and in the programs of the public organizations of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova, territorial claims have been repeatedly voiced against the Ukraine, including the southern part of Odessa Oblast.

In respecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, its territorial and other rights and in recognizing its interest in the fate of the Moldavians living in any corner of the nation, including on the territory of our oblast, we, the deputies of the Odessa Oblast Council, in being elected by the will of the people, reject the designated territorial claims as invalid.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the supreme body of state power in our republic, the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the leadership of the other public movements and organizations are united in the opinion that the territory of the Ukraine is not up for revision and repartitioning. We fully share this conviction.

We, the oblast soviet, are the guarantor for fully ensuring all the constitutional rights for all the citizens of our oblast, independently of their nationality. The Moldavian population in the oblast, in living compactly or dispersed, has universal respect and it is guaranteed equal support for socioeconomic and cultural-national development.

We feel that in the interests of the Ukrainian and Moldavian peoples, in the interests of the inhabitants of our regions, all the peoples and nations living on the territory of the Ukraine and Moldova, must strengthen in every possible way the traditions of friendship of economic, political, sociocultural and interethnic collaboration. From this position we are prepared for a comradely discussion of any questions which exist or could arise in our relations. The basis of such a discussion is equality, mutual respect and consideration of rights and interests.

The bitter experience of recent years indicates that any territorial claims are fraught with interethnic tension, the disrupting of stability and acute conflict which exacerbates the already tense crisis situation in the nation.

The call for a territorial reapportionment means a threat of a national split in an unique international community

of people who for almost a century have lived amicably and worked side by side, it will harm both the Ukrainian and the Moldavian peoples, the cause of perestroika, the cause of democratization, and the establishing of a democratic federation of equal republics in our country.

We urge the people's deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Moldova, the deputies of all levels and all persons who value the interests of the Moldavian people, the interests of democracy, to show understanding for our concern, to follow common sense and assist in strengthening the traditions of friendship and mutual respect in our relations, friendship with the fraternal people of the Soviet Ukraine.

Adopted at the Second Session of the Odessa Oblast Council of People's Deputies, 21st Sitting on 28 June 1990.

#### **Ukrainian Republic Name Change Proposed**

90P50054A Moscow SOBESEDNİK in Russian  
No 30, Jul 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Citizen Registration"]

[Text] The Ukrainian People's Republic began in Lvov. The Lvov chapter of Rukh is conducting a referendum on changing the current name of the republic. The social committee is conducting the registration of oblast residents who voluntarily want to become "citizens of the Ukrainian People's Republic." The first 1,000 applications have been submitted.

#### **Ukrainian People's Deputy On 'Free Democracy' Group**

90UN2200A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 10 June 90 p 3

[Interview with S. Holovaty, senior academic of the Institute of social and economic problems of foreign nations at the AN of the Ukrainian SSR and people's deputy of the Ukrainian SSR, by V. Desyatnykov, chief of the ideological division on the editorial board; no place, no date given: "And the Values of Liberalism"]

[Text] We have already informed you about the creation of, in the ranks of the Higher Council of Ukrainian SSR, a twelfth convocation of a number of groups of deputies—"Accord," "Rebirth," "Independence," "For Human Rights," and so on. The chief of the ideological division of the editorial board, V. Desyatnykov, conducts a conversation about the activity of one of these groups—"The Free Democrats"—with one of its initiators, the senior academic of the Institute of foreign nations' social and economic problems at the AN of the Ukrainian SSR, S. Holovaty.

[Holovaty] And so our group of deputies decided to enter the arena of political debates in the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR under the name "The Free Democrats." Its members are of the view that in society, as in

nature, only a system which is self-regulating is stable. In economics, by means of self-regulation, the market, competition, diverse forms of ownership are protected. In politics, we are thinking of allowing for a multi-party system, parliamentarism, de-ideologization, democratic freedoms, wide possibilities for opposition, independence for the channels of mass communications.

The basis of the program for parliamentary activity of the "Free Democrats" at the session of the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR has the following points:

1. To consolidate the Ukraine's status of state sovereignty, which we understand as above all else, the republic's independent, complete, and indivisible authority within its territorial borders; the sovereignty of the legislative, executive and judicial authority within its territorial borders; Ukraine's independence in foreign affairs;
2. To make Ukraine a lawful nation, implementing legislation in the field of the defense of human rights, which would make this legislation completely correspond to the international law;
3. The creation of a multi-faceted market economy ensuring a level of security in terms of social and ecological safeguards for its citizens;
4. The formation in Ukraine of a society of citizens based on an individual's free political and economic activity; a privatization of the social life by means of transferring certain state functions to certain political and economic associations of the free citizens.

The basic elements of our program are freedom of political and economic activity and democracy regarded as a higher form of society's organized life.

If the first three points on "The Free Democrats" platform are rather similar to the other groups of deputies' already-proclaimed principles, then our fourth point fundamentally differentiates our program from that of others. The matter at hand is not so much a decisive rejection of the totalitarian regime, as it is a realization of the concept of a society of citizens, which in its essence and in its ideals is separated from the state structure, which is made up of associations, voluntary groups of free people, and which at the same time controls the state itself. We see that a highly developed society is the basis for stability in any political orders. It is necessary to remove state's pressure on its society, to remove the weight of guardianship over everyone and everything. By means of creating a society of citizens, a certain compromise between the state and society is attained, which is based on the fundamental values of liberalism: freedom, political rights, economic independence.

Perhaps, it is difficult to acknowledge that today the main political barrier does not so much divide the supporters of democracy and the adherents of totalitarianism, but rather the champions of freedom and the defenders of subjugation. The best evidence of this lies,

in my view, in the Baltic experience. The attempts there at a political discussion were very often unproductive, since the opponents interpreted the concepts of "freedom," "democracy," "sovereignty," "federation," "a union republic" in various ways.

The group of deputies "The Free Democrats" holds to a simple and clear interpretation: the sovereignty of a people is in their state, in their own ethnic territory which it either has or does not have. Our group of deputies is preparing for a discussion of this issue at the session, which by all signs, will be very complicated and tense.

It should also be noted that "The Free Democrats" see the confirmed point that "Only in the framework of a federation" as undemocratic and not the kind of point which has the quality of an a priori postulate. The key question lies in something else: will Ukraine be a sovereign nation or will it be an inseparable part of another state organization. As we see it, the aspiration to establish one's own nation is completely natural for any given nation. However, we are conscious of the fact that a nation—this is an abstract concept. Finally, it is the concrete, living people, and if a certain number are for independence, it would be completely democratic to respect such an aspiration. It is another matter what kind of independent country Ukraine will be and how it will attain this status. In this case, the same democratic principle should operate, but in a reverse direction—democracy will demand one listen to the ideas of all the minorities, knowing, that the Ukrainian people will found their national state for their own self-preservation, carrying out the right of a nation to achieve its self-recognition.

"The Free Democrats" understand that the democratic process in Ukraine is only being born. The deputies of the "Democratic Bloc" and their opponents have practically no experience in parliamentary struggles. As the President of the USA, Woodrow Wilson once remarked in his time, "democracy is the highest form of government." Our society should reach a consensus. And not by taking the path of smothering interests, as this was done earlier, but on the basis of conflict. Yes, by peaceful conflict itself between those party interests, though no matter how paradoxical this may sound. Insofar as we do not have a multi-party system formed, it is all the more important, it seems to me, to develop the parliamentary forms of legislative authority, which has in its ranks, professional, qualified politicians, who represent the interests of various social groups.

Thus, the ideal is a consensus, for no matter what we may all want, we will never attain a complete accord in everything. The subordination of the minorities by the majorities is hardly the high point of democracy, but only its initial stage, first step. Instead, the consensus is possible wherever and whenever, where and when the majority voluntarily takes a step back, when both sides truly, insistently search for a compromise and do not

treat the compromise as dependent on some type of "ideological program," as something "unprincipled" or "spineless."

[Desyatnykov] Now, that you, Serhy Petrovych, have put forth the main points of your program, I have a couple of questions.

[Holovaty] Please.

[Desyatnykov] Who makes up this group? How many people does it have?

[Holovaty] There are 21 people in "The Free Democrats." The group is made up of representatives from various regions of the republic. Here we have Kievans, Lvovans, those who have left their homes behind, Transcarpathians. In accordance to the parliament's regulations, a group must be established with no less than 20 people. So here everything is lawful.

[Desyatnykov] Who are these members of the group? Do they belong to any parties, to Rukh?

[Holovaty] We are not interested if they belong to some other organization. We do not even ask them about their group affiliation. We have members of the CPSU and Rukh.

[Desyatnykov] Now to the main point, the document. You are proposing a concept of a citizen's society, which, to quote you, "in its essence and in its ideals is separate from the state structure." I do not completely understand this. What is this, anarchism? Stalin spoke thus about the death of the state.

[Holovaty] And so did Marx and Engels. This is their theory. This, in fact, is that state of society, which functions on account of its self-regulation. With the most minor intrusion into state affairs, the Stalinist state decided everything—where a person should go, or not go, what can and cannot be done. In the conditions of rebuilding, the state interferes less in the people's activities. When the scope of democracy will expand, the role of the state will diminish, while the role of the independent citizens will increase. This orientation leads to the people's own self-administration.

[Desyatnykov] In accordance with your concept, a society of citizens does not oppose the state.

[Holovaty] No, it does not oppose the state. A society of citizens will exist within the state. And the state can and should be strong.

[Desyatnykov] Let us consider the issue of sovereignty. In your program, I see, the question of the relations between sovereignty and federation were somewhat vague.

[Holovaty] Let us explain the basic points of the issue. We are for Ukraine's sovereignty. In order to be in a federation or a confederation, it must become a completely sovereign nation.

[Desyatnykov] So the point is to initially become sovereign, but later think about the entering a federation or confederation or is there some other type of organization? That is, first there is a departure from the existing federation, and then later either an entry into it or not?

[Holovaty] Not necessarily. The problem does not lie in this. The essence of the matter is that sovereignty, in our view, can be attained by an evolving path.

[Desyatnykov] Finally, once again concerning the place of your group among the groups in our parliament. How can one in a few words sum up its main goals, in what way does it above all else differentiate itself from other groups.

[Holovaty] People belong to it who are attracted to the idea of a liberal-democracy, the ideas of a liberal democratic party. This is essentially an outlook of the youth.

[Desyatnykov] That is how it seems to be in your view...

[Holovaty] This is really the outlook of the youth; well, and the ideas of liberalism, we are sure, are very relevant today in life.

### **No Ukrainian Troops in Ethnic Conflicts**

90UN2659A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY  
in Russian 5 Aug 90 p 1

[Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Report: "Statement of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet"]

#### **[Text] Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Statement**

Numerous appeals from citizens are coming to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet expressing concern for the life and health of relatives and dear ones in urgent military service, and of staffers of the Ukrainian SSR law enforcement organs directly participating in maintaining public order and localizing interethnic conflicts beyond the republic's borders.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet declares the utilization of Ukrainian SSR citizens in urgent military service or working in the republic law enforcement organs in areas of heightened interethnic relations to be inadmissible, and appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR President to apply all efforts for the resolution of interethnic and other conflicts by political means.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet considers that Ukrainian SSR citizens must, as a rule, perform their active military service within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet appeals to the highest organs of state power of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Armenian SSR, the Kirghiz SSR, and the Uzbek SSR to provide law and order in their territory with their own forces.

30 July 1990.

### **Resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on Performance of Urgent Military Service by Ukrainian SSR Citizens and the Utilization of Staffers of the Ukrainian SSR Law Enforcement Organs Beyond the Republic's Borders**

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To approve the Statement of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on the indicated issue and to direct it to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR President, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Soviets of the union republics.

2. That the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet:

Ensure within one month the return to their permanent place of service the staffers of the Ukrainian SSR law enforcement organs participating in maintaining public order and localizing interethnic conflicts in other regions of the country.

Resolve the issue of transferring to the Ukraine by 1 December 1990 Ukrainian SSR citizens performing urgent military duty.

Resolve the issue of transferring by 1 October 1990 to the territory of the Ukraine from regions in which interethnic conflicts are taking place Ukrainian SSR citizens performing urgent military duty.

In accordance with the Ukrainian Declaration of state sovereignty, and with respect for the sovereign rights of other states in whose territory Ukrainian SSR citizens are serving, a procedure for performing military service by Ukrainian SSR citizens be developed by 15 September 1990, and, commencing with the autumn of 1990, the call to urgent military service be implemented, as a rule, in the military units deployed within the territory of the Ukraine.

The course of the execution of this resolution is to be reported at the second session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

L. Kravchuk, chairman, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, Kiev, 30 July 1990

### **Appeal of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to Urgent Military Service Soldiers-Ukrainian SSR Citizens**

Our dear countrymen!

Comrade soldiers, sailors, warrant and petty officers!

On 16 July, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the historic document, the "Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty."

In developing the statutes of this Declaration, on 30 July 1990, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Resolution of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on performance of urgent military service by Ukrainian

SSR citizens and the utilization of staffers of the Ukrainian SSR law enforcement organs beyond the republic's borders.

These most important documents proclaim the need to resolve the issue of performing urgent military service by Ukrainian SSR citizens, as a rule, within the territory of the Ukraine, yet they do not have a direct force of law.

In the near future, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet will make decisions and adopt laws that will precisely determine the rights and responsibilities of the Ukrainian SSR citizens for the defense of the Soviet Union and the procedure for performance of military service, thus relieving mothers' alarm for their children.

Until the adoption of these decisions and laws, we appeal to you to honorably and conscientiously execute your military duty in those subdivisions to which you have been sent to carry out your service, and to be worthy citizens of our native Ukraine.

#### **Armenian Commission for Economic Reform Created**

904A0431A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian  
18 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "State Commission for Economic Reform of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] In the interest of radically improving administrative methods in the economic and social sphere, ensuring the consistent conversion of the republic over to economic independence and organizing operations concerned with carrying out the radical economic reform, the government has formed a permanent organ in keeping with its overall size—the State Commission on Economic Reform of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

In connection with the creation of this new organ, a decree as adopted has abolished the commission for improving the economic mechanism of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

In order to implement the functions assigned to the new commission, a staff is being created using personnel from appropriate subunits of the staff of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, ministries and republic departments.

The state commission will be headed by a chairman who will serve simultaneously as the deputy chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

In accordance with the approved statute, the state commission will coordinate the work of organizing implementation of the economic reform for the republic's economic organs and for ministries and departments of the Armenian SSR.

In order to achieve a thorough and comprehensive validation of the measures for implementing the economic reform and its subsequent development, a scientific-economic council is being created within the commission, the staff of which will include leading scientists and national economic specialists.

In carrying out its work, the state commission will rely for assistance upon the basic scientific-research organizations—the Institute of Economics of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences and the Scientific-Research Institute for Economics and Planning attached to Gosplan for the Armenian SSR. It will coordinate mutual relationships on questions concerned with implementing the economic reform and improving inter-republic economic contacts with the central economic organs of the USSR and the economic organs of union republics, based upon the principles of federalism and the economic independence of the republics.

The commission will concern itself with the development and introduction of new administrative methods, planning and state regulation of the socio-economic processes and the functioning of the new managerial model, ensuring equal conditions for the development of all forms of business undertakings and ownership, eliminating monopolistic phenomena in the economy and in the work of enterprises and associations, implementing a system of measures for developing the market and its efficient functioning, developing methods for controlling market relationships and creating the conditions needed for ensuring social protection for all members of society.

In the work of the commission, special attention is given to preparing recommendations for further improving the organizational structures for administering the principal element of the national economy through the development of the initiative and independence of enterprises and the formation of diverse inter-branch associations on the order of concerns, unions and associations and other forms of state, cooperative and joint-stock organizations, including combination enterprises and organizations, created jointly with foreign firms or enterprises and organizations of other union republics.

Included among the priority functions of the state commission is the development of draft legislative documents of the Armenian SSR and decisions of the republic's government having to do with the republic's conversion over to economic independence and implementation of the economic reform.

In keeping with its terms of reference, the commission will hand down decisions which are mandatory for carrying out by republic economic organs, ministries and departments of the Armenian SSR and by enterprises, organizations, institutions and executive committees of soviets of people's deputies. It will provide methodological direction and coordinate the work of the Armenian SSR ministries and departments in matters concerned



with the preparation of recommendations aimed at creating a new managerial model and improving the system for administering the economy.

The State Commission for Economic Reform of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers is being granted extensive rights in connection with directing and controlling the work of enterprises, institutions, ministries and departments throughout the republic, under the new conditions for administration and management.

The preparation and introduction of materials for examination during meetings of the state commission must be carried out by the Armenian SSR ministries and departments, the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies, the staff of the state commission and by working groups which bear full responsibility for the quality of the materials presented.

The state commission will provide extensive information on its work and on decisions handed down by the ministry and departments and also by society throughout the republic, while making active use of the mass media facilities.

#### **Karakalpak Supreme Soviet Chairman Discusses Sovereignty**

90US1239A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
27 Jul 90 p 2

[Interview with T.A. Yeshimbetovoy, chairman of the Karakalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent I. Nigay: "I Cannot Imagine Myself Outside the Party"]

[Text] [Nigay] How do you assess the performance of the 28th CPSU Congress?

[Yeshimbetovoy] The congress and everything which preceded it, as well as the intense and open debate engaged in at the congress are clear evidence of the development of intraparty democracy. The Communists' forum demonstrated that all the delegates have a profound understanding of the fact that the restructuring is our destiny, an opportunity given to us by history, which we must not miss. Assessing the performance of the congress, I can say that it differed fundamentally from previous congresses. In the intense debates we still succeeded in avoiding erroneous decisions, and reason won out over emotions. In my opinion, the congress justified the hopes pinned on it, provided a fundamental, objective assessment of the times in the nation and pointed out the paths which led to the society's crisis. Despite persistent and deliberate attempts by certain forces to split the party, the congress succeeded in preserving its organizational and ideological unity.

Yet another positive element for me and my fellow countrymen was the broad response to efforts by our delegates to direct the congress' attention to the fact that the condition of the Aral and the Aral region is in a class

with the Chernobyl tragedy, and so little is being done to save the region that there is practically no progress in evidence. We were supported by all the Central Asian delegations. This problem was reflected in many congress documents. The ecological situation of the Aral region was singled out even in Gorbachev's concluding speech on the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee and in the resolution on this matter.

[Nigay] There was a great deal of discussion at the congress about sovereignty for the republic communist parties. In your opinion, what is the significance of this issue with respect to the autonomous republic party organizations?

[Yeshimbetovoy] The delegates from the Karakalpak Oblast party organization, who were a part of the delegation from the Uzbek Communist Party, supported the new status for republic communist parties submitted to the congress in the draft CPSU Charter. Now, under the new charter, the Uzbek Communist Party has the authority to work out its own program documents and to define the priorities in its political work, based on the opinion of the Communists and republic interests, including our own autonomy, and decides on all organizational, cadre, financial and other matters of party life. I should probably begin by saying that we shall now be called the Karakalpak Republic Party Organization. This, in turn, gives us authority independently to define the structure of our organization, to work out and submit to state authorities and the population, programs for resolving political, national, social, economic, cultural and moral problems in the region, and to vest in the larger primary party organizations the authority of party raykoms in matters of registering CPSU members, which was previously not permitted. The primary party organizations have been given exclusive authority in matters of accepting CPSU members, and their decisions are final. I want to point out that for the first time the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Central Control Commission now include one member each from the Karakalpak Republic Party Organization. Z. Pirmazarov, a lessee on the Madaniyat Sovkhos in Karauzyakskiy Rayon was elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee, and G. Khodzhanizova, a doctor at the Turtkulskiy Rayon Central Hospital, was elected a member of the Central Control Commission.

[Nigay] One more question about sovereignty: Karakalpakia and its economic complex are now a part of both the Union republic and the USSR.

[Yeshimbetovoy] The previous question was about political sovereignty. I would like to return to it and point out that political sovereignty hinges on economic independence. The Karakalpak Autonomous Republic must be recognized as the sole owner of its land, the contents of the land, enterprises and everything else located on its territory. Incidentally, the just completed 2nd session of the Karakalpak ASSR Supreme Soviet passed the Law of the Karakalpak ASSR on Land, which acknowledges all of this. The draft Law on Ownership in the Karakalpak



ASSR was approved in its first reading at the same session. Naturally, the ties in the economic, national and cultural areas between the autonomous entities and the Union republics must be preserved and further developed. I consider it essential to develop direct ties also with other regions.

We know that for all indicators of socioeconomic development the Karakalpak ASSR lags behind not just the Union but also the republic average. This is first of all a result of the ecological crisis and the preservation of the one-sided raw materials focus of our national economic complex. During the period of transition to a regulated market economy we must therefore have a reliable social protection system and equivalent compensation for the cotton, rice, fruits, vegetables and other raw materials produced. The realistic way to resolve these issues is to work out a new Union agreement.

[Nigay] The need for a Law on Local Self-Government and Local Management is apparent. What sort of law do you envision for the autonomous republic?

[Yeshimbetovoy] In order to resolve all the problems pertaining to the work and the provision of vital necessities for the population the soviets must have the necessary material and financial means. Unfortunately, however, local state authorities, particularly the lower elements, do not have authority today. The soviets have turned out to be materially dependent in things large and small upon the executive agencies of enterprises and organizations located within their territories.

Many rural soviets in the autonomous republic have actually become adjuncts of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and are not in a position to make decisions on a single issue of any significance in rural life. The Law on Local Self-Government and Local Management must therefore indicate that the right to local self-government belongs to the community of residents (the territorial collective) and is implemented through representative agencies and other agencies of local self-government. The elected agencies must themselves define their structure and their operating procedure, and must be totally autonomous with respect to all decisions on matters under their jurisdiction. I believe that it would be a good thing for the law to provide for including in the local budget all of the income taxes from blue- and white-collar workers residing within the territory of the local soviet. In my view, such a measure could uplift many cities, settlements and villages with poorly developed economic strength.

[Nigay] Are the soviet organs being strengthened in the autonomous republic? How are their relations with the ispolkoms, party organizations, ministries and departments, enterprises and organizations set up?

[Yeshimbetovoy] The process of turning over authority to the soviets of people's deputies, the people's agencies, which is the keystone of the restructuring, has begun. This is occurring with great difficulty, however. Its presidiums have been set up with regular staffs in connection with the

new structure for the soviets. Most of the executive committees are deciding issues pertaining to materials and equipment support for the soviets, but we still have ispolkoms which have taken advantage of the shaky position of the party organs and newly elected soviets to artificially drag out the process of defining and organizing the work of these apparatuses. I regard the cause as underestimation by the ispolkoms of the role and, most importantly, the constitutional rights of the rayon soviets with respect to the former. I believe, however, that as the level of competence of the local soviets improves and they acquire experience and skills, situations like this will be resolved at sessions of the rayon soviets.

We also have committees which are surrendering authority to the soviets unwillingly, and the soviets do not consider it necessary to take that authority into their own hands more decisively. That is one thing. A second is that we have cases of resistance on the part of the executive organs, which out of habit still want to retain practical authority as well. In short, the establishment of the soviets as real agencies of popular power and the division of influence are proving to be a complex and painful process. It needs to be pointed out that in this situation the party organs as a whole are serving as a consolidating force. Without certain efforts on their part the process of turning over power to the soviets would be even more difficult.

With respect to cooperation with departments, enterprises and organizations, I believe that the Law on General Principles of Local Self-Government and Local Management in the USSR should be in effect. Incidentally, however, it does not have direct effect, and a corresponding republic law has not yet been passed. The republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet are therefore presently working hard on the draft of a corresponding law for the Karakalpak ASSR.

[Nigay] What is your opinion about combining the work in the soviets and party organs? How do you feel about Yeltsin's action at the congress, when he announced that he was leaving the CPSU to enable him to influence the activities of the soviets more effectively? Do the party duties, measures, conferences and bureau sessions not hamper you in your work in the Supreme Soviet?

[Yeshimbetovoy] If you mean the combining of the posts of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the USSR, I consider that this measure is essential from today's standpoint, since the situation of the party and the nation as a whole is very serious. If there had been a division of duties, the situation, both economic and political, would have been further complicated. If you have in mind the combining of the duties of party organ secretary and the head of the soviet, however, I believe there is no need for this. In any case, however, it is for the electors to say. With respect to the statement by B.N. Yeltsin and other supporters of the Democratic Platform with respect to leaving the party, this naturally evoked a turbulent reaction at the congress, and the reason given by Yeltsin of "having a greater opportunity to influence the activities of the

soviets more effectively" is not convincing. But free men can do as they please, as they say. Do the party duties hamper me? They do indeed take up part of my time. It is beneficial to take part in the party activities, however. One gains a clearer picture of the direction taken in the work of the soviets by being frequently in the midst of various groups of the population and gaining a more

complete and all-around understanding of the republic's pressing problems. As a Communist I have party assignments and am a member of an elected organ and of the bureau of the Karakalpak Republic party organization. This is not a burden to me, however, since I made a deliberate choice to become a Communist and cannot imagine myself outside the party.

**Armenian CP, Pannational Cooperation Noted**

90US1276A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 16 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent in Yerevan V. Aydinyan: "A Meeting at the Crossroads: Representatives of Various Political Forces Attempt to Collaborate in the Armenian Parliament"]

[Text] The candidacies of the claimants were put up for the vote three times, and each time, AOD [Armenian Pannational Movement] leader Levon Ter-Petrosyan failed to get the few last votes needed. It was apparent that the communists' candidate, Central Committee First Secretary Vladimir Movsiyan would not be elected, but it was also apparent that if they wanted to do so, the communists could block the election of the AOD candidate. What now? A parliamentary crisis? Whom would that serve today, while the economy is spinning its wheels and the situation in the republic is unstable, and armed bands are taking up weapons in the cities and rayons?

In this situation, the deputies made a bold decision that raised their prestige in the republic: they withdrew their candidacy for the office of republic Supreme Soviet chairman in favor of Ter-Petrosyan.

After election, Levon Ter-Petrosyan announced that in cadre issues, it was not the party affiliation that would be taken into consideration, but the professional and intellectual qualities of the aspirants. This position was confirmed literally the next day, when AOD board member Babken Ararktsyan and republic Communist Party Central Committee socioeconomic department manager Gagik Arutyunyan were elected deputies at his recommendation.

Yet, of course, the collaboration would hardly be getting along if it were not for one important condition: As became clear during the course of the hearings, the positions of the communists and AOD members coincide or are close in the most principled issues. Just some 2 years ago, this was impossible in principle. But it was over these 2 years that a great deal changed: Under the fire of critics, the best forces of the party became closer to the needs of the people, and learned to act independently, even if not always successfully. On the other hand, the AOD members, upon entering parliament, had to reject the reckless rally habit of criticizing anything and everything, of putting tasks before the leadership without any thought as to whether they can be fulfilled.

However, the USSR presidential Ukase on illegal military formations voluntarily turning in arms is a serious test for parliament. The correctness of the President's demands caused no doubts, yet during the course of the discussion, the deputies came to the conclusion that interference of internal troops and the army can lead to excessive victims, to the growth of anti-army sentiments in the republic and anti-Armenian sentiments in the country. The decision to fulfill the Ukase with their efforts proved to be the only acceptable one. It can

already be said that today, the country's leadership has met this step with understanding, and the the plans to supplement the militia with their forces, and to create in labor collectives workers' volunteer patrols [druzhdina] to assist the law enforcement organs have been approved. Thanks to the new 2-month period designated by the President, the opportunity has appeared to find peaceful paths to resolve the problem. There are already grounds to assert that many armed detachments will show prudence, and will not disregard the will of the parliament, which in the given case coincides with the will of the people.

The most acute resistance of the two main groupings in parliament was expected in the discussion of the Declaration of the Status of the Republic. Naturally, it is a weighty issue, and any mistake can cost dearly. And once again, the communists and the AOD representatives managed to find points of contiguity during the course of heated debates. On the whole, if stripped to the essence, the general position appears as follows: However nice and attractive the words on complete independence sound, the resolution must be realistic; independence is not declared, it is achieved by persistent labor. Together with the other republics, with the entire country, Armenia must proceed on the path of democratization, which naturally does not exclude independence in the resolution of an entire range of issues vitally important to the people. Of course, there are contentious aspects as well, but on the most important things, the positions converge.

Considering the importance of the issue, after several days, the discussion of the debates were interrupted—let the deputies consult with the voters again. Incidentally, an event occurred during these debates that showed quite clearly what the people themselves think about this issue. There exist in the republic several organizations fighting for immediate withdrawal from the body of the Soviet Union; certain of them have their own representatives in parliament. So, seeing that their plans were suffering a defeat, they decided to hold a rally and appeal to the people for aid. However, they gathered very few of their supporters on the Theater Square.

Now we have to hear the talk about how supposedly the "AOD and the Communist Party arm in arm lead the people to slavery"; they talk about the "alliance," even a "junta." Of course, people cannot be bewildered by such gossip; the overwhelming majority is for a sober, sensible approach to the problem of sovereignty. But the issue lies elsewhere. Under a multi-party system, which will undoubtedly soon come into being, there will always be certain forces in power, certain forces in opposition, and we must learn not only to win, but to lose with dignity, otherwise schism and chaos in society are inevitable.

There is one more conclusion toward which the still meager experience of the Armenian parliament, earned through suffering in heated debate, is leading: Nothing good will result if the various political forces are to build their relations based upon the existing differences; the

only way to avoid fierce resistance is to seek out a path toward compromise and consent.

And a new, crucial phase has begun in the life of the parliament—the confirmation of government. Will the deputies be able to preserve their loyalty to the declared principles of the selection of leaders, to avoid the temptation to divide the claimants into “ours” and “not ours” while handing out ministerial portfolios?

### **Uzbek Informal Group Requests Safety for Russian Speakers**

90US1296A *Moscow MOSCOW NEWS*  
in English No 31, 12-19 Aug 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: ‘Asking for Help’]

[Text] The Fergana regional nonformal movement ‘Intersoyuz’ gathers over 10,000 signatures for its appeal to the governments of the USSR, Uzbekistan, and the RSFSR.

It speaks about the need to ensure the safety of the Russian-speaking population in Fergana. A leader of the Intersoyuz, who asked for his name not to be mentioned, told our correspondent that the document contains a demand to make a political evaluation of the pogroms in Ferghana and Andizhan, to stop the forced emigration of the Russians and to strengthen the efficacy of laws to prevent international strife. If the Uzbek government is not able to guarantee the safety of the Russian-speaking population, the statement says, then it is necessary to organize their departure from the Republic at Uzbekistan’s cost.

### **Moscow Branch of Rukh Deplored**

90UN2258A *Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA*  
in Russian No 25, 22 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Lidiya Golenko: “Bitter To Listen To, Ladies and Gentlemen”]

[Text] The publication in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA of Ivan Aleksandrovich Ilin’s article, “What Does the Breaking Up of Russia Promise the World” (No 19, 1990), has lately become a significant event for Russians. Significant—in the continuous revelation to us of this historian. And very bitter—because of his penetrating prediction of the present moment.

My grandfather, Grigoriy, was Belorussian by nationality, born in the Belvezhskaya pushcha [virgin forest]. My other grandfather was a Russian from the village of Fatuyevka in Penza Guberniya. Both my grandmothers were Ukrainian. I myself was born in Ukraine and lived there until I was 17. Now I live in Moscow and study 19th-century Ukrainian literature, in particular Kuban Cossack literature in Ukrainian. My heart aches because of the condition in which three fraternal peoples: Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian—find themselves.

Ilin’s article pays a great deal of attention to Ukrainian separatism. Unfortunately, his predictions concerning this matter are also coming true. One doesn’t have to go far for examples. Today we have manifestations of them even in Moscow.

I love the Ukraine. I know its history, which is filled with bitter tears. But now it’s even more bitter because this nation’s historical grudges are being reanimated, heated up, and successfully implanted first of all among Ukrainian youth who for one reason or another live in the Russian capital.

For example, on 13 May of this year, in the conference hall of the Moscow Physics-Technical Institute, a constituent conference of the Moscow branch of the Ukrainian People’s Movement, Rukh was held. About 50 constituents were in the hall, which was decorated with national yellow and blue, and black and red flags. A considerable number of those present consisted of students from the Physics-Technical Institute and Bauman University. The representative of the board of Rukh from Kiev, a journalist of the newspaper MOLOD UKRAINI, and a representative of the Moscow branch of the People’s Front of Belorussia greeted those present. The majority of speakers spoke passionately of the necessity for the most rapid destruction of the “empire of Great Russian evil.” In the organizers’ opinion, participation in the alternative demonstration in Red Square on 1 May was considered the greatest achievement of the Moscow branch of Rukh. Alongside yellow and blue flags, Rukh members carried a banner with the slogan, “Down with the Empire of Red Fascism!” Luckily for them, that slogan was reproduced in one of the West German newspapers in a cartoon where the USSR President, standing on the Mausoleum tribune, says after having read this slogan, “There’s more noise from this than from all the military equipment.” Speaking about this cartoon, which brought Moscow Rukh “international popularity,” one of the leaders said, “As you see, we’ve learned to whistle. And we whistle very loudly.”

But politics is not the art of whistling, and those who see their goal in chaos and the disintegration of our great state always head the political games of such “whistlers” as these Ukrainian young people in Moscow. Those who, establishing false reference points, send these and other young people ready to take part in public life along a route “Road to Nowhere.” Lads! Stop, don’t give your impetuous heads over to slaughter by political adventurers!

How painful it was to listen to the representative of the Moscow branch of the People’s Front of Belorussia, A. F. Drayenkov, when he rejected the suggestion of those present to speak in his native Belorussian language (evidently because of his poor command of it), excusing himself before the group for being obliged to speak in the language of the “militant chauvinists,” Russian. With characteristic Belorussian sincerity and candor he said that, if one puts the slyness aside, the people’s fronts set

themselves the task of seizing political power and creating, on a federative basis, a new state out of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Those present greeted this with stormy applause, as they used to say in the old era of stagnation. But one of the associations of compatriots of Moscow Rukh—the association of students of Bauman University—had already found a name for itself and its wider goals, the Association of the Mad, the members of which are allegedly prepared to take extreme measures to achieve their aspirations.

Ah, ladies and gentlemen, it's bitter to listen to you! The historical, literary, and linguistic helplessness that ran through many speeches makes these "whistlers" politically vulnerable and easily used by those who catch nice fish in the turbid waters of today.

But unfortunately all of us can soon become witnesses of an unprecedented dramatic event—no, a tragedy—of the Ukrainian people, when on religious ground there can flow the blood not even of the unloved "elder" brother but of one's own Ukrainians. Perhaps only then the members of Ukrainian Rukh, who are struggling to open a Greek Catholic commune in Moscow, will read the article by the Ukrainian writer Ivan Semenovich Nechuy-Levitskiy, "Union and Petro Mogila." Written in 1875, today it addresses a very important and timely subject, the Catholicization of the Ukrainian people through a system of Greek Catholic (Uniate) churches and schools. Today the Rukhites attempt to proclaim the Greek Catholic Church the sole national church of the Ukrainian people. This is leading to the involvement of very many in an irreconcilable religious struggle in which there won't be any victors.

**In I. S. Nechuy-Levitskiy's opinion, the Uniates became more the enemies of his people than the Polish szlachta. Only the poorest part of the population in the Ukraine remained Orthodox.**

**The Orthodox Church played a great role in the preservation of Orthodoxy and of the Ukrainians as an ethnos. In 1615 the Epiphany School opened. Orthodox monks taught there, and children from all social estates studied free. The metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mogila, a relative of the Moldavian hospodars, especially promoted the development of education. He believed that "it's difficult to lead**

**an intelligent, erudite person astray." At Bratsk Monastery he opened a seminary for the poorest pupils. The best of them were sent abroad. From this school came many scholars, priests and bishops. They spread out over all Ukraine and taught children and adults the Orthodox faith and their native language. "The school has enormous power! In the darkest hours the schools did not let the Ukraine and the Orthodox faith perish," Nechuy-Levitskiy writes.**

Petro Mogila died on 1 January 1647. The great liberation movement in Ukraine began after his death.

And everywhere, with the Ukrainian people and the Cossacks, there were Orthodox priests, often selected from among their own people "on the basis of society's trust." Examples could be the father and grandfather of the outstanding native public figure and scholar Fyodor Andreyevich Shcherbina, a Kuban Cossack from the Novoderevyankovskaya stanitsa.

And everywhere these priests enriched the souls of the Orthodox with the light of the most exalted spirituality, in which there was a single goal: "Give your soul for your friends."

Today the time has come for us Slavs, for us Rus, to recall this Great Commandment and to learn from our common ancestors, who created one of the most remarkable states in the history of world civilization, Kievan Rus—not forgetting that it was precisely discord that led to its downfall and destruction.

Is it now for the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, children of the same mother, for the victims of monstrous genocide and for the martyrs of Chernobyl suffocated by its wormwood bitterness, for those who stand on the verge of ethnic extinction, to nudge each other with the grin of the frenzied into the pit of historical non-existence?!

Let us give our souls for each other. And, having risen, we'll be reborn!

*Lidiya Golenko*

The author is assigning the honorarium for this article to the Fund for the Restoration of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

### **Chief of KGB Military Counterintelligence School Interviewed**

*90UN2226A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
24 Jun 90 First Edition p 4*

[Interview with Yu. Stepanov, major general and chief of the USSR KGB military counterintelligence school, by N. Fedoseyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent and lieutenant colonel: "How To Become A Counterintelligence Agent"]

[Text] **KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent and lieutenant colonel, N. Fedoseyev, has met with the chief of the USSR KGB counterintelligence school, Major General Yu. Stepanov.**

[Fedoseyev] Yuriy Nikolaevich, in a recently published KRASNAYA ZVEZDA an interview appeared with the deputy representative of the committee of government security of the USSR, general lieutenant, V. Ponomarev in which it was stated that along with the USSR KGB higher academy in the name of F. V. Dzerzhynsky, which is preparing Cheka cadres, there also exist other educational institutions. Among them is your institution, which has its specific features: here military counterintelligence people are being trained...

[Stepanov] Yes, military counterintelligence personnel are being prepared namely by us. The history of the academic institution begins in July 1941, when a need arose to create in the distant rear, a center to prepare military Cheka agents, called on to conduct a struggle in terms of carrying out reconnaissance of the enemy. At first this was a two month course; however, the term of training constantly got longer. During the war years, thousands of army counterintelligence agents went through training here.

[Fedoseyev] SMERSH has some kind of relation to your department also?

[Stepanov] Of the simplest sort. Why from 1943 this was the school of the main administration of counterintelligence of the people's commissariat of defense, SMERSH... Of course, today the learning institute takes on different sorts of tasks. Graduates are sent to work in organs of military counterintelligence, where, as a rule, they are appointed to posts as fully authorized to do counterintelligence work in security sections and subdivisions of the armed forces, the armies of the Ministry of Defense, and the KGB. There duties include timely manifestations, prevention, and keeping an eye out for interrupting the intelligence-subversive activities of foreign governments' special services, the uncovering and prevention of spying, acts of terrorism and sabotage, smuggling, and other crimes that lie within the USSR KGB's competence.

[Fedoseyev] Yuriy Nikolaevich, by what criteria do you select students?

[Stepanov] The criteria for selection are very rigorous. Only officers are accepted, who have finished higher

military schools of various types and have a sufficient amount of experience in the [police] service and the military. A candidate should have indispensable political, practical, and personal qualities, the best health, and a high degree of psychological stability.

[Fedoseyev] And what is the future for counterintelligence?

[Stepanov] The social-political, legal and special disciplines. The students go through a functional-military preparation. In the conditions of building a lawful society, there arises a need for the juridical preparation of government security workers. Indeed, in accordance with the laws, the jurisdiction of the organs of government security comes to include the investigation of a number of crimes against the state. This is why future Cheka agents are studying the practical application of the norms of international and soviet administrative, criminal and criminal-procedural law, and also criminal means and methods in their everyday work.

The practical-military preparation of the students is aimed at making clear to them the present military defensive doctrine and the mutual armament and practical defense of the soviet government; the refinement of their skill in applying military knowledge in resolving practical-service tasks; the development of endurance and an ability to firmly handle all of the burdens of the service. The task also arises of mastering typewriting, use of personal computers, photographic techniques, and other kinds of technology.

[Fedoseyev] One would want to hear a few words about the teachers working in your educational institutions.

[Stepanov] The instructors staff is made up of employees from of the subdivision of the organs of the KGB, who have considerable experience, an ability to do academic research and pedagogical work. We have quite a few instructors with an academic degree, many study as graduate students in the higher schools of the KGB; there are adjuncts to the higher military school departments.

[Fedoseyev] And the final question: how long does the training last?

[Stepanov] A year and a half. The graduates receive a college diploma and a pin on their chests; this is the second highest level of education.

### **Autonomous Armed Groups in Republics Described**

*90UN2293A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 5 Jul 90 p 4*

[Article by staff correspondent Sergey Doronin: "Armed and Very Dangerous; Whom do the 'Separatist' Armies Serve?"]

[Text] "...I had to do something, but did not want to get caught in a crossfire; the moroso, since there were wounded, and we were unable to take cover from the

*answering fire: many of the people who lived in the nearby houses spilled out onto the street to see what was going on and became casualties. Then I took off my service cap and crossed over to the side of those firing on the soldiers. In order to parlay..."*

That is how USSR People's Deputy General-Major M. Surkov, chief of the Yerevan Garrison Political Department, described what took place on the evening of 27 May in the area of Nubarashanskoye Shosee. He evaluated the situation and took action, and on the basis of cold logic, issued an order to himself to localize and defuse the conflict that had developed into an armed clash. Not by force, which of course the Army possessed in greater amount, but by reasoned argument.

And you see, it was a troubling time; that it was. Every day there were reports, each one more troubling than the other: attacks on military subunits and on the police. Their goal? To acquire weapons, to get hold of ammunition, and to seize motor vehicles.

And that is how it turned out. Where are they now, the 17 pistols and 34 ammo clips for them, stolen the day before from the Aragatskiy Rayon police station? In whose hands are they now? What about submachine-gun No 1514GS, which had belonged to Sgt Kulkov?

Exchanges of fire. Wounded. Dead. There it is, the bitter account of the tensions in the Trans-Caucasus, which they have not yet managed to put down. The statistics are not amenable to calm discussion of what took place. As a result of armed attacks, shooting and sabotage, in Armenia alone more than 250 lives have been wasted. Most losses, of course, fell to the lot of the citizens; but there were also losses among the police and military servicemen.

Thus, there is confrontation: local, for the time being. But it is already dangerous and widespread. And who is being threatened? The army, the internal troops, the KGB and the MVD. The state institutions which embody the stability of the authorities. And their permanence.

Who then has assumed responsibility for resolving conflicts by means of arms; who is taking it upon himself to contend with government decrees of one sort or another by means of arms? Militants, extremists—some say. The defenders of the people and the sacred goals of the national movement, others say: those who consider themselves members of the Armenian National Army (ANA), or one of the numerous groups in the republic.

How many people belong to them? I will not attempt to cite an exact figure. One can only take the word of actor Razmik Vasilyan, ATA commanding general:

"One could say, the entire republic. But if you want to be specific, those who have made written declarations and are ready to submit to the regulations—number 140,000."

An altogether definitive statement. But not about all of them; only about his own. There are also others who have long since been at odds with the law, and are therefore more aggressive. They, as a rule, stop at nothing. And they employ their weapons at the slightest pretext. One cannot dispute such arguments.

This is what those forces are like, with which the republic authorities responsible for maintaining public order are no longer capable of coping effectively. For they are outnumbered; and, I would add, decisively. Moreover, public opinion today is clearly not on their side. The public not only does not condemn the actions of the armed formations, it even approves of them.

Who is right and who is guilty? Just try and figure it out. But a fact remains a fact: the actions of these forces have not brought tranquillity to Armenia, and have not contributed to order in the republic. And the border with Azerbaijan, on both sides, was and still is a place of bloody clashes. Therefore it is hard not to agree with G. Sarkisyanets, an official at the Armenian SSR KGB, in his analysis of what has taken place:

"The members of the ANA are, in my view, simply irresponsible, both in their thoughts and in their deeds. I base my judgment on my own observation, made in one of the villages in Krasnoselskiy Rayon. Until the last moment the people there lived without fear or enmity toward the Azerbaijanians. They were guests in one another's home. And then a few months ago the 'defenders' descended on them. They began firing and killed several people... And that was it; the peace is over. For a long time..."

By whom, when and why did the idea of national armed formations become a vital necessity to this or that republic? An idea which is in no way connected with the defense of any state whatsoever. And which, in the larger sphere of things, will not withstand serious criticism.

Without gaining official recognition (and perhaps not wanting any), the idea has nevertheless added to the prestige of those leaders of national movements who desired to lead their people along a different path. By what other path? And where to? To be specific, to the disintegration of the socialist federation.

The armed forces of the state are a barrier to the realization of such plots. A barrier which must be taken by any means. Everything is put into motion, and anything goes. The adoption of unconstitutional acts, which infringe upon the political and social rights of military servicemen; branding them with the label of occupier; slander and provocation. In such an incandescent atmosphere, understandably, they no longer listen to reasoned arguments. Hence they are more willing to accept the idea of national liberation, for which some of them are ready to fight to the end, even with a weapon in their hands.

I know how they created "their own" army in Lithuania; I know and I saw it: in deepest secrecy. Here is but one

episode. At Sajudis headquarters in Kaunas they are registering volunteers. One of the leaders categorically refuses to engage in concrete dialogue: the permission of two others is required for this. And at the given moment they are absent.

Ordinary members of the organization are more obliging; although, their information is terse, and they do not go into detail. The detachment commander is Ts. Norus. A former officer, he is now retired. The recruits are of various ages, from 19 to 40 years. Preference is given to those who managed to serve, to sportsmen, and to owners of personal motor transport. What do they do? On the whole, they stand watch and monitor the legality of the actions of the army and internal troops.

But my interlocutors were not open in everything. There were actions somewhat more serious in the record of the future guardians of the region: surveillance of military units and military objectives. With their direct participation, the Press Building in Vilnius has been placed under constant guard by Sayudis.

Apparently the regional guardian army will in time be reinforced by members of "Shaulyu sayunga" (Union of Riflemen), who consider themselves the continuation of the traditions of the postwar "resistance."

They are formed up as companies and quick-reaction detachments, the "Green Armbands," which enjoy the sympathy of the republic MVD. These are in a military respect a bit more serious—they have 1,500 SKS [Simonov Semiautomatic Carbine] carbines, and about a thousand [artillery] tubes of World-War II vintage. Also formed in the republic was the "Lithuanian spiritual army of unarmed volunteers," led by self-appointed generals. For now they are allegedly unarmed.

Under the guise of struggle with the growing crime rate, an organization called "Kaytseliyt" [Defense League], which is infamous for its past deeds, was resurrected at the heart of the Estonian People's Front. The actual goals of the league are peculiar, and are not hidden. Here is how a certain Kh. Eller defined them: "to prepare an officer cadre for the future self-defense forces of an independent Estonia." It is not surprising that the organization is so bold in its statements; it is supported by the present republic leadership. Assistance in terms of weapons has been promised from abroad.

In neighboring Latvia too, they have not stopped their attempts to reanimate the nationalist formation, "Aizsargi," as well as "Ognenny Krest" [Fiery Cross] detachments in defense of order, and "Sokoly Daugavy" [Daugava Falcons] auxiliary guardians of public order. While differing in their organizational make-up, they are all similar in one respect—overt hostility to everything that is nation-wide and Soviet.

The instructions drawn up by one of the departments of the Latvian National Front are interesting in their own way. True, they have not yet been approved. But they explain in detail how to determine the place where

weapons and ammunition are stored, how to carry out surreptitious surveillance, how to penetrate the territory of [guard] posts and so on. The document is more than clear.

Such is the reality. Can one fail to take into consideration the fact that militarized and paramilitary structures have appeared in the country, dedicated exclusively to narrow nationalistic interests—who are not stabilizing the present situation, but rather are heating it up. What such things will lead to one can only guess. If not to civil war (of which some people are already speaking), then to clashes on an inter-ethnic basis, with uncontrolled use of weapons. And this we already have in the Transcaucasus.

Do the leaders of the people's fronts understand the situation? They say they would not permit events to develop to such an extent. Although, it happens, that in a fit of temper they put it into words... What, for example, did Moldavian Premier Mircha Druk want to say with respect to the violent disagreement of the Russian-speaking populace with a number of the decisions of the republic parliament: "My advice to them: don't play with fire. We do not want Moldavia to become like Lebanon, nor Kishinev like Beirut. Moldavians are ready to go to the limit, but not to retreat. If they do not accept our explanations, then there will be an Ulster, or a Karabakh."

A prediction, a warning or a fear?

It is hard for everyone today. How can we complete our forthcoming journey without losses? Let us not hasten to take sides and lose all at once, that which was created with such immense difficulty, denying ourselves what we need the most—state independence, the symbol of which has always been the Army. Are unprofessional formations capable of replacing that?

And what kind of army are we getting, that does not wish to serve outside its own republic? But with their own neighbor they are ready to slug it out nose-to-nose at the drop of a hat. And who is there to reconcile the two hostile parties: a third party?

The defense of the Fatherland is a matter that does not tolerate superficial judgments, much less hasty actions. But we have already succeeded in this. They place deserters under the protection of the parliament and the public, they overturn regular draft calls, they adopt without serious study laws on alternative service, and they bring forth demands to immediately introduce a territorial principle for furnishing new recruits for the Armed Forces.

The Army, which they are trying to separate into national parts; para-guerrilla formations under the command of self-made commanders... What could be more absurd today?



**From the Editors**

The formation of militarized structures apart from the official ones and counter to them is a clear indication of trouble in a society, and the beginning of the process of self-destruction. Healing is required: rapid, decisive, and competent; confiscation of weapons, and a total ban on the existence of, or attempts to form, any kind of formations like or similar to the Army—a measure the alternative to which does not and cannot exist as long as the State, Power and the Law exist. Otherwise chaos awaits us all, a state of armed resistance, and victims among the peaceful populace.

And who will have the last word? Those to whom such authority has been given in full. We believe that the significance of the given problem completely deserves to be the subject of discussion at the session of the Presidential Council.

**Militia Colonel on Ways to Alleviate Crime Situation**

90UN2293B Moscow SOVETSKAYA MILITSIYA  
in Russian No 5, May 90 pp 7-9

[Article by doctor of juridical sciences, professor, Militia Colonel Anatoliy Ivanovich Alekseyev: "Summations and Predictions: USSR MVD Academy Chief Muses on Crime Situation"]

[Text] How shall one characterize the criminal situation that has come to pass in our country in 1990? There can only be one answer: "The situation has been very complex." It was not by accident that last August the USSR Supreme Soviet ascertained the critical conditions for the struggle with the criminal element. But in the months to follow, it has not been possible to put a stop to the crime wave. The NUMBER OF CRIMES recorded by Internal Affairs organs has, for the first time since 1985, significantly exceeded the two million mark. During the year the number of crimes increased by 31.8 percent. Serious crimes increased by 42.3 percent, and there was an increase in crimes of greed and avarice as well.

The larceny dynamic is especially alarming. In 1989 recorded larcenies topped the million mark for the first time. There was a 28.5 percent increase in premeditated murders, severe aggravated assaults increased by 38.4 percent, and rapes by 23.9 percent. The number of crimes committed by juveniles rose by 21.6 percent. And an unfavorable dynamic was observed in group, recidivist and so-called drunken crimes.

Concerning the crimes recorded under the heading of BKhSS [Struggle with Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation], these were somewhat fewer than in 1988. But the slight decline, considering the economic situation in the country, must not be considered a positive development.

I operate from data on recorded crimes. But the real scope of crime is much broader than that reflected in the

official data. In addition to those recorded, there is a large layer of hidden, latent crime. Specialists estimate its level variously. If from the many variants one chooses the most moderate, then in order to determine the real scope of crime (recorded plus latent), the number of crimes under the heading of criminal investigation must be doubled, and those under the heading of BKhSS must be multiplied—tenfold.

By means of simple calculation, the reader can reach the conclusion that in 1989 the actual number of crimes amounted to about 7,000,000. But even that is not all. The inertia of the embellishing approach remains to this day. Even on recorded crimes the public is not yet fully informed. Quite often we "forget" about crimes registered by the courts (cases of so-called personal incrimination). Thus, in 1988, more than 48,000 persons were brought to justice for these crimes, and 17,114 of them were convicted. These cases should, of course, be included in the general surveys on the crime situation. Completely absent from the cycle are data on crimes committed by military servicemen, and on violations of the law the cases on which are handled by KGB investigators.

I am not even referring to certain "clever tricks" in criminal statistics carried out under departmental instructions. For instance, the murder of several persons in a row is nevertheless considered a single murder. Crime statistics record an escape of several dozen convicts by prior arrangement as a single crime. But that is a topic for another conversation.

At this time I would like to stress that in organizing the battle with crime, we must proceed from its true scope, and from the most accurate information possible on the actual crime rate (and not the bureaucratic paper-version). Otherwise we shall not be able to decide the most important thing, namely: to properly estimate the resources required—to determine the necessary appropriations, the optimal staff for law-enforcement organs, and a sufficient level of material-technical supply. Such an approach is especially important at this time, as we have begun to draw up a nationwide crime-fighting program, which includes using and accounting for not only legal and ideological means, but also economic, social, and many other means. Otherwise the program will be reduced to just another propaganda campaign, of which there were not a few in the past.

**ONE MUST NOT FAIL TO PAY ATTENTION** to the qualitative changes which have taken place in the nature of crimes. Primarily this concerns the deep penetration of organized crime into society. Criminals who operate in organizations are a type of elite in the world of crime. And they, so to speak, do not succeed by dint of numbers, but by their ability to cement together ordinary criminal structures, to increase them, develop them in their own way, and give them power. Crime in the area of economics is merged with common crime, and "respectable" businessmen find common interests with the declassé elements—recidivists; misappropriators and bribe-takers occupying high official positions resort

to the aid of murder-for-hire, and so on. This evil symbiosis is at times combined with corrupt shape-changers from among the organs of power and administration. As a result, so-called white-collar crime appears at the next branch of this social erosion. In other words, a strong chain reaction arises, developing both in the horizontal and vertical planes. And it is not all that easy to stamp out.

I would also list the increase in criminal professionalism among the malignant symptoms of crime. The given phenomenon is to a significant extent associated with the strengthening of the positions of organized crime, which is becoming a kind of industry, and is becoming the basic or even the sole source of income. Naturally, such professionalism requires criminal specialization.

In the late 1980's common criminal elements began to blend with political extremism, and with unbridled nationalism in particular. Last year and in the first months of this year in a number of places acts of civil disobedience were organized with the participation of narcotics addicts, recidivists and other criminal elements; and also unlawful group actions under anti-socialist slogans. "Politika," which has in its arsenal blackmail, confrontations, endless ultimatums and even murder, arson and pogroms, is not only profoundly immoral but extremely dangerous as well. The color of their banners has no significance. Thousands and thousands of people are breaking the law under demagogic slogans, united by herd instincts, and not squeamish by any means.

Finally, it must be noted that criminally-active background phenomena such as narcotics addiction, social parasitism and prostitution are gaining strength. The same can be said with respect to 1989 about drunkenness (especially in consideration of moonshining and the underground alcohol business). All this makes its mark upon crime, and aggravates its qualitative characteristics.

**ALAS, THE FORECASTS ARE DISTRESSING AS WELL.** According to some estimates, by 1995 the number of recorded crimes will reach 3,000,000. It is highly likely that extortion and other forms of criminal "control" over unearned and semi-unearned income will increase further, and over any extra income for that matter. It is likely that new forms of unlawful phenomena will spring up, associated with computerization, with loopholes in tax policy, and with organization of cooperative activity. Further consolidation of the world of crime and an increase in its aggressiveness are anticipated.

Thus the quantitative increase in crime, its alarming qualitative changes, and the unfavorable trends and rather pessimistic forecasts. But what is the reason for all this? And what stands behind it?

The fact of the matter is, first of all, that crime has a rather powerful root system. It is associated with a

multitude of the most varied factors—economic, demographic, political, social, ideological, legal, ethno-psychological and so on. Certain criminologists cite up to 250 of them. The complex of reasons for crime is very dynamic, and quickly reacts to changes in social conditions. Today one criminogenous factor is prominent—tomorrow, others will be. In general, I would say that life is full of criminological paradoxes. Try, for example, to provide a simple explanation for the recently observed outbreak of crime among persons with higher and secondary education.

Nor are our perceptions, and objective analysis of all the many different reasons for crime, distinguished for their consistency. In the past many, many ideological taboos operated here. For example, not all that long ago we were still explaining many things as vestiges of the past in the consciousness and behavior of the people. Contemporary problems and conflicts in such a context were looked upon as no more than "individual shortcomings." At present the accent has shifted to the current crisis situation in the sphere of production and distribution; to the total lack of goods; to the growing disproportions in economic, political and social development; to spiritual life; and to law-enforcement activities. But reducing a complex of reasons for crime to only the realities of today, to the so-called "easy money" (as opposed to "vestiges of the past")—this is also somewhat of an oversimplification of the essence of the matter, and exhibits a certain one-sidedness. After all, one could get the impression that as soon as the total lack of goods, the shadow economy, all disproportions and crisis phenomena disappeared, crime would come to an end. Alas, one must not count on this: world experience testifies concretely to this. One must not forget that, of course, the inertia of many phenomena and processes which, it would seem would sink into oblivion, are still affecting the crime of today (and tomorrow too), and its basic characteristics and trends. And this "criminogenous echo" of past events still resounds loudly. Let us take, for example, the fact of the increase in crime on the soil of inter-ethnic conflicts. We have encountered this practically for the first time, in recent years. But this new problem has very old roots.

A survey of the reasons for crime would not be complete without mentioning its ability to parasitize everything that is new. This concerns, for example, the criminal ripple that is now appearing on the wave of democratization; or, let's say, the crimes of avarice associated with production costs in the cooperative movement and the development of individual labor activity.

**THE READER HAS A RIGHT** to say that I am merely establishing the facts, but am not offering any concrete proposals on how to solve this problem. A detailed dialogue on this would take up too much time, and too much magazine space. Therefore, I will dwell here on only certain aspects.

First of all there is the material base. The assets directed toward the battle with crime must be increased many-fold (and not by a few percentage points). But first an accurate estimate is required. To this day, we have no one actually engaged in this. Not like, for example, the USA, where all expenditures for the battle with crime are estimated to the dollar. I would very much like that in this respect our nationwide program would look the same. When developing the estimate, it is important to properly define the priority directions, on which we must focus attention first of all, which includes the area of financial support as well.

Second. It is time to make it clear that the sphere of application of criminal law is not the very best place for affirming humane principles. Humanization of life must begin not with the criminal-law and criminal-procedure establishments, but within life's deeper layers, where people ought to live like people—working, eating, dressing, relaxing, and enjoying the blessings of culture and so on in a normal manner. We must immediately "decisively repulse the criminal world," as it is stated in the resolution of the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Third. The Congress stressed that the sharply intensifying problems of the battle with crime must be directly solved by all of society. This is a vitally important element. No argument—the system of resisting crime by all healthy elements of society has in recent times gone somewhat awry, and has begun to come apart. This is manifested in various ways in phenomena of social consciousness, and in the facts of true everyday life. Legal nihilism is observed among a significant portion of the populace, as well as a decline in social activeness in the sphere of preserving law and order and the battle with lawbreakers.

And last. It has become a well-worn cliché that the basic, the principal method of battling crime is—preventive work, and forestalling crime. However, as it was clearly stated first, in the report of USSR Internal Affairs Minister V.V. Bakatin, "On Intensifying the Struggle with Organized Crime," "Preventing crime and eliminating the reasons for crime has been proclaimed since 1961 as our main direction; but it remains no more than a slogan." The bitter truth, but the truth nonetheless. One can discern from the following fact the colossal gap between words and deeds here, between what could be and what actually exists: According to estimates by scientific experts, up to 80 percent of the crimes committed could have been prevented, in principle. Under conditions, of course, of the faultless operation of the mechanism of both social and special prevention. The reality is much worse. A certain kind of mechanism has evolved in life that is applying the brakes to crime prevention. As the results of an expert survey show, its basic components are: the lack of cadres specially trained for preventive work; the lack actual capabilities of the law-enforcement organs to bring in all the appropriate objectives and contingents for active prevention work; the decline of public activeness in crime prevention; and

the fact of the lack of ways and means in support of the recently-created preventive service.

There are, of course, other factors as well, which are hampering the transfer of the energy of words into the energy of deeds. Overcoming them will require additional material resources, new legal means, carefully thought-out administrative decisions, psychological perestroika of the employees of law-enforcement organs and the populace, and a lot more. And genuine, and not simply declarative affirmation of prevention as the top-priority and principal direction in the battle with crime will provide a hundredfold return.

### **Ukrainian KGB Public Relations Official Interviewed**

*90UN2263A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 10 Jun 90 p 3*

[Interview with Ivan Mykolayovych Bozhko, Ukrainian SSR KGB Press Office spokesman, by RADYANSKA UKRAYINA correspondent M. Doroshenko: "KGB: For Greater Openness"]

[Text] Interest in the activities of state security agencies is not dropping off. On the contrary, although more and more articles on this subject are appearing in the press, one frequently hears complaints about insufficient openness on the part of the KGB services. And it is because of this that there occur various speculations and attempts to undermine the image of today's Chekists [members of the state security apparatus]. Recently PRAVDA reported the establishment of a new subdivision within the structure of the USSR KGB: a public relations center. Is a similar service being established in this republic's Committee for State Security? RADYANSKA UKRAYINA correspondent M. Doroshenko spoke with Ukrainian SSR KGB press office representative Ivan Mykolayovych Bozhko about this and other aspects of glasnost in KGB activities.

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[Bozhko] The press office, which is tasked with informing the Ukrainian SSR public about the activities of state security agencies, is not a regular table of organization entity. And yet the scope of informational activities has been steadily growing in recent years. Societal processes dictate the need to establish in the Ukrainian KGB a public relations center with specifically designated functions.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] And just what are they?

[Bozhko] The center's stated task is to synthesize and analyze information on problems of KGB activities, to communicate this information to the public via the mass media, to assist in the preparation of works of literature, film and television on Chekist themes, and to offer needed consultative assistance. The public relations center will also promote more active search for and study of documentary and other pertinent materials from

archives of the Ukrainian KGB and oblast KGB directorates for the purpose of making such materials public. Journalists and writers are invited to help with this. The Center will also be establishing liaison with the press services of other ministries and agencies.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] The reforms and changes in this country have not passed by KGB subdivisions which in the past were cloaked in a veil of secrecy. This is already obvious. And, as we see, efforts are continuing to deepen this process. But what practical steps has the republic Committee for State Security taken recently to expand glasnost regarding KGB activities? What possibilities are being utilized toward this end?

[Bozhko] It is appropriate to mention once again that in the first years following the revolution glasnost was mandatory in the practical activities of state security agencies and found expression in various All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) and All-Ukrainian Extraordinary Commission (VUChK) appeals to the people and in newspaper articles. The YEZHENEDELNIK CHREZVYCHAYNYKH KOM-MISSIY [Extraordinary Commissions Weekly] was published, as were two volumes of "Krasnaya Kniga" [Red Book] (incidentally, they were recently reprinted in a new edition), etc. The public was kept informed about the current situation and about measures being taken by the Chekists in the struggle against counterrevolution. As we know, however, during the years of the Stalin regime these principles were subjected to deformations and subsequently were relegated to oblivion. What is happening today is a revival of these traditions.

For this reason appearances by KGB officials in the mass media are becoming regular occurrences. They reveal the nature of activities of state security agencies, discuss their jurisdiction, authority, and legal underpinnings, and tell about combating espionage, protecting secrets and guarding our borders, combating smuggling, and defending the Soviet constitutional order.

Get-togethers between state security officials on the one hand and USSR and Ukrainian SSR deputies, deputies to local soviets, workforces, and the general public on the other are also becoming common occurrences. Diverse assessments and thoughts about the role and place of KGB agencies in present-day conditions serve the cause of further restructuring of Chekist activities and promote the common struggle against organized crime.

Get-togethers between M. M. Holushko, chairman of the Republic KGB, and Ukrainian writers, the people at Ukrainian SSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting], the workers of the Elektron (Lvov) and Kiev Arsenal scientific-production associations, as well as with working people from a number of rayons in Zhitomir and other oblasts, have been extremely informative. KGB personnel are also now giving accountability reports to the workforces which recommended them for this work. The public is

being officially informed about matters on the agenda at meetings of the Ukrainian SSR KGB Collegium.

Glasnost applies not only to right now but to the past as well. Overcoming the consequences of Stalinism cannot be complete without objective analysis. This is the reason for such great interest in archival materials. These include materials of historical value. For example, previously unknown diaries of Academician Yefremov and of innovative educator Durdukivskyy have been discovered and turned over to the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. A number of Rylskyy manuscripts have been turned over to the Rylskyy Museum in Kiev.

Thanks to recent publications, the public has learned of honest and upright Chekists Mantsev, Trepalov, Livshits, Kropyvnyanskyy, and Karin-Danylenko, victims of repression, who resisted illegality and lawlessness to the end. Little-known facts from the history of the VUChK-Ukrainian SSR KGB have also been made public. Materials of historical significance have been found in KGB archives dealing with NKVD special school graduates and Young Guard heroes L. Shevtsova, the Levashov brothers, and V. Zahoruyko, which have been handed over to the Krasnodon Museum. Stories about intelligence officers Bobyrev, Rybakov, and Struhalevych, based on archival materials, have been published in the press, and film and TV sketches have been produced, dealing with Chekists Strokach, Danilov, Radulo, and others. The first issue of SBORNIK KGB SSSR [USSR KGB Reports] was published in May. Every copy was sold literally within hours (it will be coming out monthly)....

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] But this shows once again that the level of glasnost in the activities of KGB agencies does not yet fully meet the demand of the times. Do the Ukrainian SSR KGB people feel that the present level is adequate?

[Bozhko] It is true that people are not adequately informed. This is also indicated by letters received from the Ukrainian SSR public. They also point out that our information is sometimes belated. Sweeping criticism and malevolent attacks directed toward KGB agencies sometimes go without response.

[boxed item:

- Glasnost in Place of Secrecy;
- What They Did Not Know About Lyubov Shevtsova;
- "Golden" Operations of the Chekists]

While giving consideration to these comments, at the same time our position is that glasnost for us is not an end in itself. It is, first and foremost, one of the means of accomplishing Chekist missions in conditions of democratic development of society. In addition, it is a form of accounting to the people, the interests of which the Chekists are defending. And, in the final analysis, it is also a means of oversight over the Chekists' activities.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] Ivan Mykolayovych, you were talking about the important role of glasnost in overcoming the consequences of the Stalinist regime. Could you tell us more about how things are progressing in the matter of rehabilitation of citizens who were subjected to repression in the 1930's, 1940's, and at the beginning of the 1950's? Our readers are very interested in this question.

[Bozhko] First of all I shall state that all state security agency personnel resolutely condemn the mass repressions of Stalinism and sincerely share the pain felt by our people, and are doing everything they can to help accomplish the complete rehabilitation of each and every innocent victim, and as soon as possible. And public condemnation by today's Chekists of lawless actions as well as of those who committed them constitutes the best reply to attempts to place the present generation of KGB personnel alongside the NKVD.

Intensive efforts to rehabilitate the victims of repression are returning honest names every day. A total of 171,991 citizens of this republic have been rehabilitated from 1988 to 1990, while a total of 263,000 persons who suffered during the years of cult of personality have been rehabilitated since 1953.

The KGB is working in close cooperation with the public prosecutor's office and the courts on these matters, with the support of the soviets and of public organizations. These latter include the Memorial Society. The board of this society is looking for the possibility of publishing a special newsletter, containing lists of victims, documents, and recollections on that period, which was so tragic for the Soviet people. A portion of these materials has already been prepared, working in close contact with Memorial. The Ukrainiann SSR KGB and its local offices are also helping to locate and identify burial sites containing victims of Stalinism and are helping to perpetuate their memory. Such sites have been identified in Kiev, Vinnitsa, Cherkassy, Khmelnytskyi, and other oblasts. In spite of the difficulties caused by the passage of time and loss of a large part of the applicable documents, all inquiries are being examined with the greatest care and deliberation. The rehabilitation of individuals subjected to repression in this republic without due legal proceedings has been completed for the most part. On the other hand, however, there still lies ahead the immense job, both as regards extent and complexity, of examining 185,000 legal proceedings.

How can this work be sped up? As has been reported, the USSR KGB has suggested to the USSR Supreme Soviet that a special law is needed which would form the legal foundation for rapid rehabilitation, through legal proceedings, of citizens convicted during the years of cult of personality for so-called counterrevolutionary crimes.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] Inasmuch as one can now read more often about the past of the state security agencies, the question comes up: "What is the KGB doing today?" Can you give us an answer?

[Bozhko] Take counterintelligence activities, for example. The task of counterintelligence is to protect the Soviet State against subversive intelligence activities on the part of foreign intelligence services. The number of exposed agents, Soviet citizens recruited by intelligence services of the NATO countries, has been reported in the press (more than 20 in the last three years). One should bear in mind thereby that it is a very painstaking and complicated matter to uncover an agent or operative of a foreign intelligence service. In addition, why should every incident of exposure of an agent be reported in the papers? In many such cases glasnost is restricted by the extent to which professional secrets can be revealed as well as by the interests of the specific case. There are many cases in progress about which it is simply premature to talk. State security agencies are also tasked with protecting the border, combating smuggling and currency violations, and recently with fighting organized crime as well....

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] Incidentally, can you tell our readers about any recent operations by republic state security agencies in these areas of activity?

[Bozhko] Giving enterprises more extensive powers and authority has resulted in an increase in direct contacts with foreign companies. Contracts are signed, for example, for supplying equipment. But after this it sometimes happens that smugglers, black-market currency dealers, profiteers, and various "sharp operators" move aggressively to get a finger in the business process, moving extremely short-supply raw materials, supplies, a lot of valuable items, money, manufactured goods and foodstuffs out of the republic, which aggravates the situation on the domestic market and causes serious detriment to the economy.

Just in the last two years alone state security has uncovered and prevented more than 150 attempts at financial manipulation connected with contracts giving one-sided advantage, with sale of ineffective technologies and delivery of incomplete sets of equipment. Losses representing a total of hundreds of millions of rubles in foreign currency have thus been prevented.

Or, for example, information has been obtained indicating that trips to Yugoslavia have for many "tourists" become possible thanks to phony invitations by "relatives" and "friends." State security has uncovered individuals who were arranging for and carrying out such "invitations." On 17 May of this year the KGB Directorate for Transcarpathian Oblast, working together with the police, mounted an operation to catch them. Searches revealed more than 1,000 phony blank invitation forms and phony municipal seals for cities in Austria, West Germany, and Yugoslavia, lists of persons for whom "invitations" were being arranged, three typewriters with Latin-letter keys, as well as 149,000 rubles, 5,000 West German marks, 30,000 Hungarian forints, more than 50 gold articles, eight passenger cars, 10 sets

of foreign-made video equipment, a large quantity of automotive spare parts, manufactured goods, and two pistols.

On 16 May, following discovery of a gang of thieves stealing petroleum products connected with a foreign company, foreign nationals alone turned over more than 100,000 dollars cash to investigators. On 17 May the republic Committee for State Security handed over to the courts the results of a criminal investigation dealing with smuggling strictly-allocated and short-supply raw materials out of the country. As a result of revisions which a Swiss company was forced to make in a signed commercial contract in the course of an investigation, the Soviet party obtained commercial benefit in an amount exceeding 2 million rubles. Ukrainian KGB officers have confiscated a total of 12 million rubles worth of contraband since the beginning of 1990.

Chekists are carrying out jointly with the police a great many operations aimed at racketeers. Nine such criminal gangs were arrested in Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankovsk, Lugansk, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts just in April and May alone.

#### **Ukrainian MVD Official Interviewed On Republic Crime**

90UN2222A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 15 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with V. V. Durdynets, the chief deputy minister of internal affairs, by A. Kraslyansky; no date, place given: "Let Us Insure the People Have Peace"]

[Text] [Kraslyansky] Vasyl Vasylovych, though the main theme of our conversation is the High Council of the Ukrainian SSR's work at a session, I cannot but take advantage of the opportunity to ask you about the state crime today in the republic.

[Durdynets] It, as earlier, is fairly intense. Crisis-like phenomena in many spheres of social life are stimulating the spread of a nihilistic attitude towards the law, a disrespect for the laws and the universal norms of human behavior. And as a result—there is a noticeable growth of crime. This year in the republic more than 320,000 criminal violations have been registered, which is 40 percent more than five years ago. The situation continues to worsen and especially so this year in the Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Zaporozhya, Lviv, Luhansk [presently, Voroshylovhrad] Oblasts.

One is especially disturbed by the criminals' violent and profitable tendency, as a result of which the personal safety of people and their property is being threatened; normal economic relations are also being threatened. Groups in the black market are taking advantage of the economic reforms, taking the greatest gain for themselves, and taking advantage of the drop of discipline in laws, financial matters, and contracts, and the sensitive

spots in cooperative activity. Considering only the criminal cases, which were sent to the People's Court last year, the total damages add up to more than 20 million karbovanets.

At the same time, organized crime is developing at a fast pace. Corrupt civil service people are taking to it; there is a professionalization of the criminal elements taking place, a rebirth of criminal traditions and customs. The criminals' aggressiveness and cruelty and their actions taken against the forces of law and order have noticeably been on the rise. Last year and this year, in carrying out their duties, 21 men were killed and 400 associated members of the militia were injured. The measures undertaken by the police organs are insufficient; they cannot neutralize the negative processes and stabilize the lawful order. To a certain extent, one can see that this becomes apparent in the essential errors that are being made in the course of our work.

In many areas, nothing in fact is being done in terms of taking prophylactic measures against the some of the community organizations—without the help of volunteer people's militia, which can take prophylactic measures amidst the working collectives, and without the help of the court of colleagues and other organizations, it is very difficult for us to work; it is simply impossible to subdue the criminal element.

As I have said already, there is a noticeable drop in respect accorded to the lawful norms, to the state authority and its symbols by a certain number of citizens, and individual councils are completely ignoring these symbols. The numerous unsanctioned meetings and demonstrations attest to this fact; at these meetings and demonstrations, anti-soviet slogans are being proclaimed; the state flag, monuments, and other sacred things are not being treated with respect. However, the current laws in these cases are not being applied with full force. The police organs' attempts to bring the responsible people to justice in accordance with the law, immediately provoke a violent, negative reaction among a certain circle of individuals, who confuse the concept of democracy with one of anything goes.

[Kraslyansky] Yes, the picture you painted cannot be called happy. And already the people are asking, demanding that there should be stability and calm in the republic. Finally, they are waiting for the highest state organ of the republic to say something meaningful on this subject during their first session. And what kind of outlook does the people's deputy, Durdynets, see for resolving this problem?

[Durdynets] Together with other ministries and departments, with oblast councils, we have worked out and presented for review to the Council of Ministers of the USSR a republic program of urgent means to be undertaken in fighting crime in 1990-1991. At the heart of these programs, there are provisions for strengthening

law and order at all the state and community institutions, working collectives, and there are provisions for increasing the population's degree of civic activity.

Considerable attention is given also to the improving the police organs' quality of work, particularly, the work of the organs of internal affairs, by means of strengthening them with cadres, improving their professional expertise, and providing them with material-technical supplies.

The Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR gives us help in this affair. However, this help is insufficient. So, for example, only 65 percent of the total costs for the militia's criminal technology are being funded. And 30 percent of the photographic technology is being funded; 3.5 percent of the video technology; 63 percent of the communication devices. We are thankful to the collectives in firms, collective farms, state farms for their actual material and financial help to subdivisions of the militia. On May 1, in view of providing help to these subdivisions, they were allocated 27 million karbovanets; this gave us the possibility of bringing in 9,200 staff people, mainly for carrying out watch services, and for organizing district inspectors, and for acquiring functional, criminal-related technology and cars for 4 million karbovanets.

Yes, we know, that the people are justifiably demanding from the MVD organs better, more effective work, and we are working on this. We have created sub-divisions in the fight against organized crime; the investigative apparatus is being strengthened; the methods used for searching are being improved. However, the security workers are often helpless to combat the criminals' desires, pressure, and interference in their work. The authority and prestige of the police organs is suffering. We also require protection, and first of all from the Higher Council of the republic, which can resist all those who without reason diminish the dignity and honor of the militia workers.

[Kraslyansky] Therefore, what do you expect from today's session of the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR in terms of resolving the problems you have mentioned?

[Durdynets] I put great hopes on the Higher Council of the Ukrainian SSR. I am happy that V. A. Ivashko was chosen as its chairman; he knows our complicated problems well and always helps out in resolving them.

Perhaps, we, the deputies of the Higher Council of Ukrainian SSR, the new body of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR should devote more attention to the problems of fortifying the law and the state of law and order. Too often, we run up against obsolete norms in the law, which are not appropriate to the demands of life, which slow down the development of new forms and methods of fighting against crime. Long ago, it was time, to pass a law about taking preventive measures against criminal violations. Perhaps, our Higher Council, not waiting for the decisions of the union organs, will work

out and pass appropriate laws, which, naturally, do not oppose the Constitution of the USSR. And the special make-up of the militia will work more urgently in order to noticeably make changes in the lawful order, so that every person can feel certain and safe at home, on the street, and at work.

**'Illegal Chernobyl Cruise' Organizers Punished**  
*90UN2301A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA*  
*in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 4*

[BELTA Report: "Postscript to a Cruise"]

[Text] A communique from the Committee for Party Control under the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee arrived at the Belorussian News Agency which talks about fulfillment of a Belorussian CP Central Committee resolution "On Cases of Very Gross Violations and Abuse While Organizing Cruise Trips That Have Been Permitted by the Leadership of the Minsk-turist Association and the Belorussian Tourism and Excursion Soviet, Some Trade Union Committees and Enterprises." We are talking about that very cruise that was allegedly organized for Chernobyl accident victims and about which the Republic Press wrote so much. And not only the Republic Press.

The communique reports that the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau resolution was reviewed at the Minsk and Gomel Party Obkom [Oblast Committee] bureaus, at the Minsk and Mogilev Party Gorkoms [City Committees], at the Belsovprof [Belorussian Trade Union] Presidium, at the Minsk Oblsovprof [Oblast Trade Union] Plenum, at leading Party and trade union organizations, and workers collectives whose workers permitted the violations or abuses while organizing the cruise.

A Mogilev Belorussian CP Gorkom Bureau decision expelled Mogilevturist Association General Director M.N. Yelin and his deputy A.P. Savin from the Party. The Oblast Trade Union Presidium expressed no confidence in them in accordance with existing labor legislation.

The Minsk Belorussian CP Gorkom expelled Sportcultorg [Sports, Culture, and Trade] Director V.G. Vasilyev from the CPSU.

Severe reprimands and registration card entries were pronounced for Gomel Oblast Trade Union International Operations and Soviet Tourism Department Head P.S. Lychkovskiy, Belsoviet Deputy Chairman for Tourism and Excursions P.P. Sakovich, Minsk Obkom Sales Workers Trade Union Chairman A.I. Dichkovskiy, and Minsk-turist Oblast Tourist and Excursion Production Association Foreign Tourism Department Head V.Yu. Kashevskiy. Other communists who were guilty of allowing violations during organization of the cruise were also disciplined by the Party.

The Belsovprof [Belorussian Trade Union] Presidium and Minsk Oblsoviet [Oblast Soviet] decided to dismiss Republic Tourism and Excursions Soviet Chairman Ye.F. Roslik, Minskturist Association General Director F.K. Solyanik, and his deputy A.M. Kritchenkov. Several other officials of this association were punished.

A Belorussian SSR Procurator resolution on the cases of violations while organizing the cruise initiated criminal proceedings and a special investigatory group was established. The Belorussian SSR Ministry of Finance and Belsovprof are conducting documentary audits.

At the same time the Minsk Trade Union Oblsoviet Plenum, having concurred with the assessments and conclusions of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Bureau, decided to leave in their previous positions the Oblast Trade Union Chairman and Secretary A.P. Martysyuka and R.A. Davidovich. Belmedpribor NPO [Scientific Production Association] workers collective representative soviet presidium made the same decision and decided Association General Director V.P. Vaaks' fate at the same meeting. Later V.P. Vaaks was dismissed as general director of Belmedpribor NPO as a result of his selection as director of Frebor Enterprise.



# **Ukrainian CP Rescinds Decrees On Literature, Art, History**

90UN2282A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
20 June 90 p 1

[Collective Statement by the Ukrainian CP; no place, no date given: "In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine: A Fundamental Political Evaluation"]

[Text] The Ukrainian CP Central Committee examined the question concerning the decrees [issued] by the Central Committee of the KP(b)U [Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Ukraine] from the end of the 40s to the beginning of the 50s in regards to the development of Ukrainian literature, art, and history.

In the resolutions which were passed, it is evident that during the years 1946-1951 in the then political current, in the spiritual sphere, the Central Committee of the KP(b)U accepted a number of resolutions concerning issues related to the development of Ukrainian literature, art, and history. The decrees were marked by an authoritative, voluntaristic approach taken to artistic-creative processes in the republic and to academic research in the history of Ukraine. The realization of these decrees led to a truly subjective distortion in the cultural building process and hindered the creative ventures of representatives from culture and science.

In criticism of the works of a considerable number of the well known representatives of Ukrainian Soviet literature and art—A. Dovzhenko, M. Verykovsky, B. Lyatoshynsky, S. Maslov, P. Panch, M. Rylsky, V. Sosyura, Yu. Yanovsky, and the historians S. Belousov, K. Huslysty, N. Petrovsky, N. Suprunenko, F. Yastrebov, and others were labelled with cliché accusations of being "bourgeois-nationalistic in character," cosmopolitan, having an anti-national character, and being formalistic. Condemned and withdrawn from cultural and academic attention were the artistic legacies of V. Vynnychenko, B. Hrynchenko, M. Hrushchovsky, P. Kulish, and other representatives of national culture and scholarship, who turned out to be the "founders" and "leaders" in promoting bourgeois nationalistic conceptions and schools of thought. The orientation towards depicting the history of the Soviet period, using the "Stalinist short course of the history of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] as a point of departure, to a great extent caused the academics to stray from the true, sacred, post-October history of the nation and the republic with all its complexities and contradictions.

The resolutions in question of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U have in fact been nullified by life. However, a fundamental political evaluation of these resolutions appears to be a significant prerequisite in shaping the Communist Party of Ukraine's contemporary political position in the spiritual sphere, a position which should promote the complete rehabilitation of the historical record as it applies to a considerable number of academics and the representatives of literature and art.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee has rescinded the decrees of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U, seeing them as political mistakes which were made from the end of the 40s to the beginning of the 50s concerning the questions of the development of Ukrainian literature, art, and history:

"Concerning the distortions and mistakes in the interpretation of the history of Ukrainian literature in 'A Sketch of the history of Ukrainian literature'" (24 August 1946); "Concerning the journal FATHERLAND" (1 October, 1946); "Concerning the dramatic repertoire and operatic theaters and measures taken for their improvement" (2 October, 1946); "Concerning the political mistakes and the unsatisfactory work of the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of the Ukrainian SSR" (29 August, 1947); "Concerning the follow-up review of the implementation of the Union of Soviet writers of Ukraine's decision Central Committee of the VKP(b) in the journals STAR and LENIN-GRAD (7 October, 1947); "Concerning the condition and measures in improving the musical arts in Ukraine according to the resolutions of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) as regards the presentation of the opera "Great Friendship" and "V. Muradeli" (22 May 1948); "Concerning the journal DNIPRO (11 February, 1950); "Concerning the conclusions of the VI plenum of the board of the Union of Soviet writers of Ukraine" (14 August, 1951).

It has been recommended to the committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine to decisively reject an administrative type of approach in deciding the problems of development in the spiritual sphere, [but] to [instead] intensify the constructive dialogue and cooperation with leaders in culture and science, to promote the consolidation of a platform of a socialist nature, and to insistently oppose tendencies which would lessen the party's ideational influence amidst the intelligentsia.

In the conditions of today it is necessary to mobilize the efforts of communists, workers in art and science, to create in every collective a moral-psychological atmosphere, organically combining artistic freedom with a consciousness of great responsibility for the ideological and political results of artistic activity.

The initiative of the Institute of History of the AN [Academy of Sciences] of the Ukrainian SSR has been supported for preparing sketches of the history of Ukraine from the most ancient times to our day, with the enlisted help of the best academic forces in the republic and a wide scale utilization of the creative legacy of all the generations of Ukrainian historians. A request has been made to the State publishing house of the Ukrainian SSR to carry out the publication of the sketches in editions with a large number of copies.

To the Communists, who are leaders in mass communications in the republic, it is being recommended to promote the formation and propagandization of an objective evaluation of the historical past, the phenomena and processes of the spiritual life of Ukraine, and to strengthen in society an exacting civic call for moral-aesthetic qualities to appear in artistic works.

### Georgian Environment Chief on Black Sea Pollution Problems

90WN0146A Tbilisi KOMMUNIST GRUZII in Russian  
No 4, Apr 90 pp 60-68

[Article by Shota Ivanovich Chalaganidze, chairman of the Georgian State Committee on Environmental Protection and the Timber Industry: "The Black Sea and the Ecology"]

[Text] The ecosystem of the Black Sea, just like any natural ecosystem, has the capacity to endure periodic heavy or severe anthropogenic loads. Therefore, for a long time the development of traditional kinds of economic activity did not lead to any serious conflicts at all; that is, the peace of the seashore regions was not disturbed by the vacationers and tourists, the shores largely undisturbed by the sea, and the sea received little pollution from the shores. However, the situation began to change markedly in the post-war years, when man's economic activity assumed a scale incompatible with the actions of and the natural factors.

According to data published in the press, from the territory of the Soviet Union alone every year an entire river of poison empties into the Black Sea—over five billion cubic meters of sewage. In the last few decades alone this stream has become nearly twice as powerful. The sea, although it is large, is beginning to choke, for it is unable too purify that which the industrial and agricultural enterprises are casting off. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the Black Sea is one of the most closed water basins in the world. The straits connecting it with neighboring seas are very narrow, and therefore the exchange of its entire water mass is possible only once in 2,250 years.

The gradual degradation of the waters of the Black Sea began long ago, when humus began to wash into it from the neighboring cultivated fields. This process has intensified greatly in the last three decades, after the intensive spread of populated places on the Black Sea coast, the increased dumping of fecal materials and waste waters saturated with organic materials into the sea. Phosphates, nitrates and hydrosulfuric compounds, harmful to the life of sea organisms, and the decay of these organic wastes, saturated the upper layers of the sea water in ever-increasing amounts, raising the ceiling of the so-called "dead zone," which today has come within 150-200 meters from the present surface of the sea.

In practical terms this means that the functional bottom of the Black Sea is now at a depth of 200 meters. Only this zone is suitable for the development of oxygen-using inhabitants of the sea. The remaining, lower depths on the order of 1,800 meters are inaccessible to the live environment. At the same time the rapidity at which this dead zone is moving threatens danger. In the past four decades its upper boundary has soared upwards an entire 70 meters. If the movement to the surface of this ceiling continues at the same rate, by the end of the year 2040, the Black Sea will be completely dead.

Therein lies the primary reason for the increasingly catastrophic death rate of Black Sea mussels, bonito, mackerel, flounders, and other typical Black Sea fish and animals, which until recently had fed the population of the Black Sea coast. If to this one adds the often rapacious exploitation of fish reserves and the destruction of the dolphins, a still more unpleasant picture emerges. Thus, according to data from the International Alliance for the Protection of the Environment and Natural Resources [MSOP], by now 70 percent of the sea spawning grounds have already become unsuitable for the development of fingerlings, 25 percent of the most valuable industrial varieties of fish have been completely annihilated, or their numbers have sharply declined because of constantly increasing catches. This pertains to such varieties as herring, cod, mackerel, many varieties of sea perch and so on. And every year 250,000 dolphins are destroyed.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Resolution, "On Measures to Forestall Pollution of the Basins of the Black and Aral Seas," was adopted back in 1976. The councils of ministers of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia and Moldavia together with the interested ministries and agencies of the USSR were instructed to implement a complex of measures which would ensure the complete halt of dumping of untreated domestic and industrial waste waters into the watersheds of the basins cited, by means of introducing progressive production technology, which would prevent the pollution of the outer environment, comprehensive processing of raw materials, utilization of industrial wastes, and construction of effective purification installations and purification facilities.

A number of measures were implemented in Georgia in execution of the indicated resolution. For the purposes of focusing the efforts and means directed toward protecting the watersheds of the Black Sea Basin, and specifically for improving construction of sewage and purification installations in towns and populated areas, the functions of sole client were bestowed upon the Main Administration for Capital Construction at the Republic Council of Ministers (At the present time it is situated in the system of the Georgian Goskomstroy [Main Construction Administration]); while the Gruzspetstroy [Georgian Special Construction] Trust and the Gruzspetstroyrem [Georgian Special Construction and Repair] Administration were established at Gosstroy [State Construction Administration] and Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee]. The Gruzvodokanal [Georgian Water Main] Administration was designated the sole administrator of the purification facilities in the system of Minzhilkombinat [Ministry of the Housing and Municipal Services]; and for conducting shoreline-reinforcement and beach-formation work, the Gruzbergozashchita [Georgian Coastline Protection] Administration was formed. The Batumi Specialized Subdivision for Elimination of Spills of Petroleum and Petroleum Products into the Sea was formed at the Georgian Steamship Co.; and for implementing control

of work on preservation of sea waters, specialized maritime inspectorates were established in the Georgian Goskompriroda [State Environmental Protection Agency] system in Sukhumi, Batumi and Poti.

More than 100 million rubles of capital investment were assimilated for water-preservation construction. Purification facilities were built for municipal and domestic waste water for 20 cities and populated points with a total planned capacity of 647,500 cubic meters per day, as well as water preservation installations at a number of major industrial enterprises—the Gruzbumprom [Georgian Paper Industry] Production Association, the Chiatura Manganese Production Association, the Kutaisi Automotive Plant, the Tkvarcheli GRES [State Regional Power Plant], the Kvaisi Lead and Zinc Ore Administration, the Zestafoni Iron Smelting Plant, and others, which has permitted reducing the dumping of unpurified waste water into the Black Sea Basin by more than 60 percent.

The Batumi Central Petroleum Transfer Base is accepting and treating ballast water from all native and foreign vessels calling at the republic's ports, as well as lyalnye vody [possibly—mineral-laden water], which is delivered to the ports of Batumi, Poti and Sukhumi.

The Georgian Steamship Co. and the Gruzrybprom [Georgian Fishing Industry] Production Association have developed and are consistently implementing plans coordinated with the Georgian SSR State Environmental Protection Committee for providing additional water-purification equipment to ships and other seagoing vessels in accordance with the MARPOL Internal Convention.

In spite of the work being carried out, the sea remains in grave condition. The volume of polluted and insufficiently-treated waste waters entering the watershed of the basin amounts to 90 million cubic meters per year.

From these sources, the rivers and the coastal strip of the sea receive up to 13,400 tons of suspended materials, 743 tons of petroleum products, 5,500 tons of organic materials, 3.1 tons of ammonium nitrate, .95 tons of heavy metals, and so on.

Even extremely rough calculations show that discharge of these materials alone causes losses to the state of more than 2.5 million rubles a year. And this does not take into account the bacteriological pollution of the sea waters, which in recent years has shown a tendency for growth.

In fact, in recent years vacationers on the Black Sea coast have from time to time received various kinds of warning notices, and in certain places it is even suggested that people refrain from bathing in the sea. Unfortunately, all these alarms are far from groundless. From a biological point of view the Black Sea is highly vulnerable, since its lower water layer is quite isolated from the upper, and total exchange of water occurs only once in several decades. Water pollution from river discharge

along the coastal zone of the Black Sea takes place also because of the direct discharge of untreated domestic waste waters from cities and populated points situated along the coast.

Nearly two-thirds of the polluted wastes pouring into the Black Sea basin are attributable to municipal services.

The Resolution of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers of 17 April 1984 approves the "General Plan for Sewage Systems for Cities and Populated Places of the Black Sea Basin, Situated on the Territory of the Georgian SSR," which takes in 55 cities and populated places. The total estimated cost of construction of the water-conservation installations indicated amounts to 179 million rubles. However, the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, within the limits of the established ceilings for capital investments throughout the "Sewage System" branch (in consideration of proportional sharing), annually directs only 5-7 million rubles for water conservation construction. In addition, because of the reduction of ceilings for capital investments allocated by USSR ministries and agencies for non-manufacturing construction and the annual ceilings which they transfer to the republic in the form of proportional participation in the construction of water-conservation installations non-manufacturing construction have been greatly reduced. At this rate, completion of measures for completely stopping discharge of untreated waste waters will not be achieved not only in the 12th, but most likely not in the 13th Five Year Plan either.

Therefore we believe that the republic Gosplan, Gosstroy and Minzhilkombyt must draw up specific proposals for increasing the ceilings for capital investments for the construction of sewage systems and treatment installations for the waste waters of cities and populated places.

Things are even worse with the allocation of capital investments for water conservation construction, which are getting smaller every year among the republic's ministries and agencies. For example, in 1985, 1.9 million rubles were allocated for construction of water conservation facilities at projects which are now under Georgia's Gosagroprom; in 1988 the figure was 1.1 million rubles. The percentage of assimilation of allocated assets is declining as well: from the sums set aside for 1985, 1.3 million rubles were assimilated; in 1988, 0.23 million rubles. And this, in spite of the fact that several years ago, a Spetsstroyrem administration was established in the Gosagroprom system for carrying out work on construction and reconstruction of water conservation facilities at Gosagroprom projects. The situation is no better in other ministries and agencies in the republic.

On the whole, whereas from 1976 through 1986 the volume of capital investments assimilated for water conservation construction in the Black Sea and Azov

basins amounted to 3.5 billion rubles for the USSR, 256 million rubles were assimilated for Georgia during that period.

The second question: what sort of positive effect was achieved as a result of the operation of treatment facilities constructed, as stated above, in 20 cities in Western Georgia? Unfortunately, not one of them, with the exception of Tskhaltubo, has completely halted the dumping of untreated waste waters. The majority of the city treatment installations are operating at a low degree of effectiveness, and do not provide normative treatment of wastes.

For example, Batumi's treatment installations were accepted for operation by the State Acceptance Commission in 1982 (Client for construction was the UKS [Capital Construction Administration] at the Adzharskaya ASSR Council of Ministers, and the general contractor was the Gruzspetsstroy Trust of the former GSSR Ministry). The project was accepted with a rating of "good," but as early as June 1983 an official document was drawn up on incomplete construction and installation matters and defects in the treatment facilities, consisting of 159 points. To this day, that is, more than five years later, the unfinished work has still not been completed, as a result of which the operation of the biological stage has not been regulated.

In 1980 the State Acceptance Commission accepted for operation the treatment installations for domestic sewage in Kutaisi (Client—Kutaisi Automotive Plant; general contractor—the Gruzspetsstroy Trust). This project too was accepted with a number of construction and installation items defective or not completed, as a result of which the biological stage does not work, and the mechanical stage operates with large interruptions.

The treatment installations at Lanchkhuti were accepted for operation by the State Acceptance Commission in 1984 (Client—the Guriya Plant; and the general contractor—the Gruzspetsstroy Trust). At the time of acceptance, work had not been completed on all major components. To the present day work on eliminating the unfinished items has not been completed, and the installations do not, for all practical purposes, work.

Major overhauls of treatment installations are not organized on a timely basis. For example, the treatment facilities in Sukhumi, which were put into operation in 1981, has not had a major overhaul once. The situation is about the same at treatment facilities in Zestafoni, Zugdidi and elsewhere. As a rule, the skills of the service personnel at the treatment facilities are rather low.

As a result, at a number of projects the degree of waste water treatment does not correspond to the planned indicators. Thus, the operating effectiveness of the treatment facilities in Batumi does not exceed 50 percent; in Sukhumi, 33; in Poti, 30; in Zestafoni, 15 and in Zugdidi, 40 percent—whereas installations of this type must ensure a degree of treatment not lower than 80 percent.

In addition, the cities in which treatment installations have been built, with the exception of Tskhaltubo, have not completely halted the dumping of untreated waste water, since at the time construction of the treatment facilities was being planned, they did not as a rule plan for the simultaneous development of the sewage system nor for putting outlet collectors into operation.

It is not surprising that the treatment facilities built in towns and cities in the Black Sea Basin are operating at only 60 percent capacity (in Batumi, at 70 percent capacity; in Sukhumi, 65; in Samtredia, 30; in Poti, 25; in Ozureti and Kobuleti at 15; in Gali, at ten percent; while the treatment facilities at Leselidze, Gantiadi, Gudauta-Novyy Afon and Lanchkhuti do not receive waste water at all).

Significant amounts of untreated waste water is released into the sea, rivers and the underground water table from these cities (in Batumi, 30 percent; in Kobuleti, 40; in Sukhumi, 30; in Gagra, 33; in Gali, 85; in Poti 70 percent; and so on).

And this is the basic reason for the high level of pollution on the coastal region of the Black Sea with domestic waste water, and the high content of intestinal bacilli in the sea water, owing to which at times Minzdrav [Ministry of Health] authorities close certain sections of the beach.

Significant volumes of polluted waste water continues to pour into the basins of the Black Sea from major industrial enterprises, and there are frequent incidents of pollution of the coastal strip as a result of accidental spillage of petroleum products from both shore installations and vessels.

In this respect an especially severe situation is noted in the Batumi region. During the period from 1986-1988, Goskompriroda [State Environmental Protection Agency] authorities in Georgia have recorded 27 incidents of accidental spillage of petroleum products in the region of Batumi, for which the corresponding installations (the Batumi Central Petroleum Transshipment Base, the Batumi Oil Refinery, the Batumi Rail Freight Station, as well as various vessels) have received damage claims for violating water legislation to the tune of 900,000 rubles. Of this amount the Batumi Oil Refinery, charged for 19 accidental oil spills in which 13.6 tons of oil poured into the sea, was assessed 600,000 rubles.

No less harm is caused by the continuous (established) discharge into the sea of industrial waste waters from this enterprise. In 1988 the plant dumped into the Black Sea up to 13 million cubic meters of waste water. Even with normal operation of existing treatment installations (with purification of oil-bearing wastes of up to 20 mg/liter, as stipulated by the plan), every year over 250,000 tons of petroleum products pour into the sea, whereas in consideration of the maximum allowable concentration of petroleum products for sea water (0.05 mg/liter) and the volume of waste water, the plant has the right to dump no more than 1.25 tons per year.

The operation of a plant in the resort zone of Adzharia is creating an extremely unpleasant ecological situation, which is causing a great deal of public protest and complaints from our republic, from the local population, and from vacationers from all ends of the land and from abroad. At present, as is well-known, a decision has been taken—to halt work on reconstruction and expansion of the Batumi Petroleum Refinery, and to carry out only environmental protection measures there—introducing a system of water-supply recycling, elimination of direct dumping of industrial wastes into the Black Sea, and sending them for treatment to the purification installation in Batumi. The question of constructing a new oil refinery in another region of the republic is being examined.

The danger of petroleum pollution consists of the fact that, being a toxic compound, petroleum has a negative effect on all groups of sea organisms: plankton, nekton and benthos. According to UN data, the harmful effects of oil pollution on biological resources is manifested in the direct destruction of sea organisms, from being coated with oil or ingesting it; in the poisoning of organisms as a result of contact with large doses or the long-term effects of lesser concentrations of the toxic components of oil; and in the destruction of sea flora food sources and the displacement of valuable varieties of fish.

In spite of the water conservation measures undertaken, the Chiaturi Manganese Production Association, the Zestafoni Iron Smelting Plant, the Kutaisi Automotive Plant, and the Poti Ship Repair and Construction Yard are still making a significant "contribution" to the pollution of the watershed, because their treatment installations are not purifying the waste water to the degree of the permissible norms for discharge.

The most promising solution to the problem for such projects is—transition to completely closed water supply systems, whereby an enterprise does not dump a single cubic meter of waste. Transition of major water-using projects to closed water supply systems will also permit carrying out the requirements proceeding from the resolution of the Georgian CP Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers of 10 May 1988, "On Top Priority Measures for Improving the Use of Water Resources in the Republic," in accordance with which by 1990 industrial enterprises must reduce up to 20 percent of their net use of water per unit of production.

Many years of observation have shown that not only harmful discharge of polluted water, but also the state of the air basin of the region has a significant effect on the ecology of the Black Sea aquatorium.

Discharges of harmful particles into the atmosphere by industrial enterprises and motor vehicles along the coastal zone of the republic, precipitated onto the surface of the sea, significantly increase the Sea Coast.

According to data from the republic Goskomstat and the Georgian Hydrometeorology Administration, more than

130 industrial enterprises are situated in a 30-kilometer coastal zone in the Sukhumi-Batumi sector, and are discharging harmful elements into the atmosphere.

In addition, over 50,000 motor vehicles, including nearly 35,000 private cars, are operated on the region's main highway adjacent to the coastline. During the resort season this number increases significantly.

More than 342,000 tons of harmful elements discharged (22 percent of the discharges in the republic), falls to the portion of gross discharges by industrial enterprises and motor transport in the region. At the same time, industrial enterprises in the region discharge more than 70,000 tons of harmful elements into the atmosphere every year.

Because the prevailing winds in the area blow in the direction of the sea, more than 50 percent of the harmful elements discharged into the atmosphere settle on the surface of the sea, leading to additional pollution of the water surface. This is also confirmed by chemical analysis of precipitation samples taken along the coastline in the Sukhumi-Batumi sector. A higher quantity of ions of the acidic groups were discovered in the precipitation, as well as other chemical elements, including ions of l-fates, chlorides, nitrates, hydrocarbonate of ammonia, nitrites, potassium, magnesium and others.

Observations of the pH factor in the water environment have shown that from 1985 through 1988 this indicator has shifted toward the acidic side—in the Batumi region by 4, and in the Sukhumi area by 10 percent.

At the present time the amount of pH in Sukhumi and Batumi is below the neutral state (7); it has moved toward the acidic side, and in the Batumi zone amounts to 6.37; and in the Sukhumi zone, 6.34 (the critical significance of 4 is, that it is dangerous for the environment).

In spite of measures taken to restore the health of the air basin, the general level of pollution of atmospheric air in such major resort zones of the republic as Sukhumi, Batumi and others, still remains high.

Thus, the index of atmospheric pollution (for four ingredients) in 1988 amounted to 4.25 for Sukhumi and 4.1 for Batumi, which is higher than the average national indicators. Taking into consideration also, that the PDK [Maximum Allowable Concentration (radio-biological)] for the resort zones is lower than the PDK for industrial centers (0.8 PDK), it becomes obvious that the level of atmospheric pollution in the resort zone of the Black Sea coast in the republic does not yet meet the ecological requirements of the present day.

Additional measures are required to restore the health of the air basin in the region.

We believe the most effective of them are:

—complete transition of the Tkvarchelskaya GRES to natural gas;—a ban on the use of hard (coal) and liquid

(fuel oil) varieties of fuel in the resort area, and transition of all fuel-burning equipment in the resort zone to natural gas;—construction of bypass roads in Sukhumi, Poti, Kobuleti and elsewhere;—continuous and stable supply of non-leaded brands of gasoline to motor transport in the resort zone.

Carrying out the measures indicated will permit significant restoration of the health of the air basin in the region, and will lower the overall level of pollution of the water surface in the aquatorium of the Black Sea coastal area in the republic.

At the same time it has long been necessary to define a sanitary protective zone along the entire shoreline of the Black Sea, in which industrial production would be forbidden, and other kinds of economic activity limited. The Black Sea is above all a resort and recreation zone; therefore, the development of the vacation industry must be given first place, and not industrial. Moreover, this question must be resolved at the national level, and even better, in conjunction with all the states bordering the Black Sea (Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria); since local measures in the given situation will hardly provide an effect.

Recently, as already noted, the bacteriological pollution of the watersheds has intensified, in particular along the seacoast, right down to the observation of pathogenesis of microflora in certain sectors. The source of this pollution, apart from the influx of unpurified domestic wastes, is waste water from hospitals which have an infectious disease ward. Meanwhile, not one of them is equipped with the necessary installations for purifying waste water, and many do not even have primitive treatment facilities.

The most serious polluters of the watersheds are the agricultural enterprises—livestock and swine-raising complexes and farms, and poultry farms, which dump waste water in significant amounts into the watershed (on the whole for the republic, up to 6.5 million cubic meters per year), as well as manure and droppings.

At the present time, out of 55 livestock complexes in the republic, 34 lack treatment facilities, and at the other 21 they do not function at all. Out of 66 enterprises of the Gruzptitseprom [Georgian Poultry Industry] Production Association, 20 have no treatment facilities at all, and at 22 they are not functioning.

Every year, for example, the Kindgi poultry farm dumps into the River Tikhistskali, and through it into the Black Sea, up to 650,000 cubic meters of waste water, the concentration of pollutant substances of which exceeds the allowable limits by a factor of 5-15. The Ochamchiri poultry farm dumps into the River Mokva over 400,000 cubic meters of waste water and up to 300,000 tons of droppings per year.

An extremely unsatisfactory situation is also noted at the Tsageri, Zestafoni and Terzhola poultry farms; at the

Abasha and Lanchkhuti swine-breeding complexes; at the Kobuleti, Kirtskhi and Khobi livestock complexes; and others.

One of the principal means of forestalling the pollution of the watershed when operating major stock complexes and poultry farms is the use of manure piles on sewage farms—which, on the one hand, prevents them from entering the surface and underground water; and on the other, is a resource for increasing the fertility of feed crops. However, this work has still not been organized in the republic. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the complexes and poultry farms in the republic do not possess plots of land, as is the case in other regions of the country, and therefore they cannot make use of the manure and the droppings on their own farms as fertilizer.

Georgia is one of the republics where chemical means are used especially widely and the volume of their use is steadily increasing with every passing year. Whereas in 1960, 67,000 tons of mineral fertilizer were applied to the agricultural lands in the republic, expressed in terms of 100 percent nutriment elements, in 1988 251,200 tons were applied. Naturally, such progressive application of chemicals is cause for altogether understandable alarm.

Under these conditions, application of pesticides and mineral fertilizers must be done thoughtfully, from the point of view of the biology of the plants. However, in most situations, an altogether different picture is observed.

According to data from GruzUGM [unknown], soil contamination in the Abkhazskaya and Adzharskaya ASSR with chloro-organic preparations (DDT, its metabolite DDE, gamma and alpha isomers of hexachlorocyclohexane) are extremely high—in a number of cases it exceeds the maximum allowable concentration by a factor of 4-11.

It is noteworthy that, although the use of DDT has been banned for over 20 years now, the residual amount of this pesticide, by virtue of its stability and migrational ability, is observed in amounts much higher than the maximum allowable, not only in the soil and agricultural products, but in the human organism as well. A significant amount of this preparation is observed every year in milk, eggs and meat products, in which even an insignificant amount of DDT is unacceptable. Moreover, DDT has been observed even in the milk of breast-feeding mothers (in Shuakhevskiy Rayon).

At present the DDT replacement, DDT-HCCH [DDT-Hexachlorocyclohexane], is widely used in agriculture, the residuals of which are also observed in amounts greatly exceeding the allowable in agricultural products; while in terms of stability and ability to migrate in the environment this preparation is somewhat below DDT.

Of the practical measures directed toward preventing the harmful effects of pesticides on the state of the water sources, an important place must be given to work on

selection of new preparations which have selective effects on the pests and at the same time are less toxic and stable. It is necessary to expand the work on creating biological methods of fighting pests and the most rational means of combining them with chemical methods. Here our scientific-research organizations must have the deciding vote.

At the present time new treatment methods are being worked out in the country, using absorbent materials which have won recognition abroad as well. Baltic scientists are working on the question of treatment of liquid manure-bearing waste water—which is a severe problem for our republic as well; and there are interesting developments on treatment of waste water from galvanic production.

The article, "Baykalskiy Patrol" [Baykal Patrol], which appeared in the 23 March 1988 edition of PRAVDA, is worthy of note. The article reports that the Laboratory for Monitoring the Natural Environment and Climate (LAM) of Goskomgidromet [State Hydrometeorology Committee] and the USSR Academy of Sciences have developed a scientifically-based observation system for Lake Baykal and the entire region, have begun to take regular measurements both in the water and in the ambient air, and have analyzed contaminated soils. The Limnology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Water Toxicology of USSR Minlesbumprom [Ministry of the Timber, Pulp-and-Paper and Wood-Working Industry] have taken up the study of the reaction of water organisms. Thus they have been able to record the extent of change of the chemical make-up of water and changes in microbiological and hydrobiological indicators. The Institute of Applied Geophysics (IPG) and LAM have established the role of airborne pollutants, including those from sources located a significant distance from the lake.

Based on the data from monitoring, priorities have been determined for implementing nature-conservation measures.

It would be well to conduct work on the Black Sea as well, after concluding a special agreement with Bulgaria, Turkey, Rumania or other interested states.

Thus, many measures have been and are being taken in the republic on the problem of forestalling the pollution of the Black Sea basin; but for an effective and economically optimal solution of this global problem it is necessary to develop a general program for developing a complex of water conservation measures, in consideration of the future, which would ensure satisfying the needs of a developing national economy and growing population in the region for water sources of normative quality.

Scientific-technical progress has been and will remain the driving force and main source of changes in society.

Today it has become the fashion to complain about technology as a result of its negative effects on the

environment, for which there is some justification. Even preliminary estimates indicate that at the present time one-fifth of industrial labor productivity must be devoted for ten years to eliminate the pernicious effects of industrial production. However, we, nevertheless, must not underestimate the significance and role of scientific-technical progress in our lives.

Consequences to the natural environment must always be taken into consideration, but they must not pass sentence on technical development. It is namely technical progress that will define the problems with which we must deal in the future. In actuality, the conditions for applying equipment and technology may change, but their importance cannot be denied.

The rational introduction of ever greater portions of natural resources and the scientific potential of our republic to production increases our confidence in the fact that we will be able to effectively control this process and promote the satisfaction of society's needs.

#### Scientist Explains Ecological Map of Black Sea, Sea of Azov

90WN0195B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
19 Jun 90 p 4

[Article by Yu. Zaytsev, UkSSR Academy of Sciences member correspondent under the rubric "Ecology": "The Colors of Disaster: Ecological Portraits of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov From Outer Space"]

[Text] Hundreds if not thousands of different kinds of harmful substances are today entering the seas and oceans. Among them are some whose impact upon the marine environment is particularly discernible. Organic and mineral fertilizers belong to this category of contaminants. These seemingly innocuous substances, when they turn up in the sea in excess amounts, can do more harm than powerful chemical compounds that are known to be toxic. They enter the water supply in river water carrying drainage from populated areas, industrial enterprises, stock farms, and the like.

What does all this lead to? The fertilizer in the sea stimulates a hyperactive reproduction of microscopic plant life—phytoplankton—in the depths of the water. In this instance we may speak of the malignant growth of biological productivity in the marine environment. With an excess amount of plankton, the water becomes turbid; so the algae at the bottom, deprived of solar energy, tend to wither and die.

But this is not the most dire consequence of efflorescence. A worse one is yet to come when after a short period of vegetation (two or three weeks), the phytoplankton die and settle at the bottom. Such an event occurs at all times, but whereas previously a few grams per square meter in all settled on the bottom, today from ten to a hundred times that amount accumulates.



These algae decompose; for they require oxygen dissolved in the water, and in the layers near the bottom a state of oxygen deficiency (hypoxia) occurs. As a result, the fish who live at the bottom die. In other words, a process of mass asphyxiation takes place, and this has become the major disaster that has befallen shallow-water (shelf) areas of the seas during past decades. For each square kilometer at the bottom that suffers from hypoxia, from 100 to 200 tons of living creatures perish—among them, mussels, oysters, shrimp, crabs, bullheads, flatfish, and young sturgeon.

The large-scale decomposition of organisms, from one standpoint, enriches the sea water with nutrients for bacteria. From another standpoint, however, it fills it with a gas, hydrogen sulfide, which is toxic for most living creatures. (This is a process generally to be observed at greater depths.)

Not all regions of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, however, are subject to efflorescence and asphyxiation to the same degree. In some areas this phenomenon reoccurs each year with varying degrees of intensity; in others it is observed much more infrequently; and there are areas where it is virtually unknown. It is by pinpointing the locations of the first, second, and third areas that it becomes possible to make accurate assessments of the ecological situation and so make the decisions needed to protect the marine environment and its inhabitants.

Information of this kind is available on marine ecological maps compiled by scientific research ships. Marine research surveys, however, have one distinct drawback. A considerable amount of time is required to survey large bodies of water and analyze the data collected. The various parameters indicating the marine environment are subject to substantial change between the start of an expedition and its conclusion, so that maps compiled in this way may present distorted data.

Another way to survey the environment is from space vehicles. In terms of data collection of these variables, satellites still lag well behind what can be accomplished in marine expeditions, particularly aboard large well-equipped vessels. But the speed with which data can be collected largely makes up for this deficiency and makes it possible to collect comparative data over vast areas of the world's oceans. The intensity of marine efflorescence, for example, may easily be determined from the amount of chlorophyll, the green pigment contained in the cells of phytoplankton, which may be measured accurately with special instruments on satellites designed for oceanographic research.

The following schematic map of waters of the Mediterranean basin has been compiled by the author on the basis of published information from space photographs taken by U.S. and Soviet satellites, supplemented with data obtained from marine expeditions by various countries.

Along the broad expanse of waters from the Straits of Gibraltar in the West to the Sea of Azov in the East, the

areas may be seen that contain significant quantities of chlorophyll. This condition is particularly characteristic of regions adjacent to the mouths of rivers. The Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, however, are sharply distinguished on the map from all the other seas of the Mediterranean Basin by the amount of black and cross-hatching. The southeastern and especially the northwestern part of the Black Sea together with the entire Sea of Azov are the most over-fertilized aquatic areas of the Mediterranean Basin and are distinguished by the number and biomass of phytoplankton. This situation is to be explained by the discharge of major rivers flowing into these seas as well as the limited amount of intermingling with the other seas of the basin through the narrow straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The map indicates that the entire Sea of Azov and the waters off the shores of Odessa, Nikolayev, and Kherson oblasts in the northwestern area of the Black Sea are over-fertilized. Waters in a similar condition are to be found off the shore of Adzhariya, but there the water contiguous to the shelf is much deeper and the coastal waters can mix with the less fertilized waters of the open sea. The Sea of Azov and the shoal waters of the northwestern shelf of the Black Sea have no such opportunity. There in hypertrophied form are all the signs of the so-called "eutrophic syndrome"—efflorescence, hypoxia, and asphyxiation.


The black expanse on the map does not in itself indicate the inevitable extinction of marine life. It indicates that the sea water in these areas is already saturated with fertilizers, and even a fairly small additional amount of fertilizer therefore (as from an accidental seepage of sewage, a sudden washout of fertilizers from the fields, or a high density of vacationers on the beaches without proper sanitary facilities) can trigger the chain reaction of eutrophication, resulting in a number of ecological disasters along the coastal waters of the sea.

The thick black and cross-hatching on the map indicates the areas in need of priority attention and requiring radical measures to ameliorate the conditions of the waters represented. A description of each of the measures called for may form the subject of a separate discussion. Here, we shall limit ourselves to enumerating them.

Throughout the drainage area of the rivers that empty into the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, it is necessary to provide for a technology for industrial and agricultural production that will guarantee that mineral and organic fertilizers do not get into the rivers. In ports, population points, and recreation areas along the coast, it is necessary to provide for thorough purification of water draining into the sea. The "unburdening" of the sea of the fertilizers that get into it (as well as other substances of no less importance) may be carried out by methods of so-called hydrobiological reclamation, which includes large-scale cultivation of aquatic plant life, mollusks, and other organisms to be used in collecting these substances, along with a "harvest" of raw materials on shore to be



## Chlorophyll Distribution in Seas and Rivers of the Mediterranean Basin (in milligrams per cubic foot)



## УСЛОВНЫЕ ОБОЗНАЧЕНИЯ НА ЭКОЛОГИЧЕСКОЙ КАРТЕ

Распределение вод с различным содержанием хлорофилла (мг/м³) в морях и реках Средиземноморского бассейна.  
 МОРЯ: I — Азовское, II — Черное, III — Мраморное, IV — Эгейское, V —

Левантинское, VI — Ионическое, VII — Адриатическое, VIII — Тирренское, IX — Лигурийское, X — Альпийско-Прованский бассейн, XI — Альборанское, XII — Атлантический океан, XIII — Красное.  
 РЕКИ: 1 — Кубань, 2 — Дон, 3 — Днепр, 4 — Южный Буг, 5 — Днестр,

6 — Дунай, 7 — Марица, 8 — Вардар, 9 — По, 10 — Рона, 11 — Эбро, 12 — Гвадиана, 13 — Гвадаquivир, 14 — Муллуя, 15 — Нил, 16 — Джейхан, 17 — Сакарья, 18 — Кызыл-Ирмак, 19 — Ешил-Ирмак, 20 — Чорох, 21 — Рioni, 22 — Ингури.

Key: SEAS: I—Sea of Azov, II—Black, III—Sea of Marmara, IV—Aegean, V—Lebanon, VI—Ionian, VII—Adriatic, VIII—Tyrrhenian, IX—Ligurian, X—Algeria-Provence Basin, XI—Alboran, XII—Atlantic Ocean, XIII—Red.  
 RIVERS: 1—Kuban, 2—Don, 3—Dnepr, 4—Southern Bug, 5—Dnestr, 6—Danube, 7—Maritsa, 8—Vardar, 9—Po, 10—Rhône, 11—Ebro, 12—Guadiana, 13—Guadaquivir, 14—Moulouya, 15—Nile, 16—Ceyhan, 17—Sakarya, 18—Kizil Irmak, 19—Eshil Irmak, 20—Chorokh, 21—Rioni, 22—Inguri.

used in a variety of valuable products for animal or human nutrition, pharmacological purposes, or some other technological purpose.

The transformation of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov into ecological disaster zones took place during the period of the past three or four decades as a result of the "best efforts" of the countries situated in these drainage basins. In the case of the Black Sea, for example, it includes eight nations of Europe and Turkey. Rectification of this situation therefore presupposes a joint international effort.

Such work is not simple or easy; nor can it promise rapid results. But it is the most realistic way to restore the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to its former state as a fishing ground of renown and a reservoir of good health.

## Expedition Leader Summarizes Black Sea Pollution Study

90WN0195A Moscow VODNYY TRANSPORT  
in Russian 12 Jun 90 p 2

[Interview with Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences V. P. Keondzhyanom, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry imeni V. I. Verdanskiy, by V. P. Uzelman: "Black Days on the Black Sea"]

[Text] It appears that there is more to be said about the ecological condition of the Black Sea. And how much has been said and written about it lately! This makes all the more interesting new data received from the multi-purpose ecological expedition of the scientific research ship "Academician Boris Petrov" under the USSR Academy of

Sciences, which was conducted as part of the international program "Eco—Black Sea 90." Discussing the findings with our correspondent is the man who headed the expedition, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences V. P. Keondzhyanom, deputy director of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry and director of the firm Ekosi.

[V. P. Keondzhyanom] You will agree that there has long been a prevalent opinion, strongly supported in our own country as well as by municipal authorities and state agencies in Bulgaria, that the pollution of the Black Sea is primarily due to the discharge from the rivers of Northern Europe, and that the Bulgarian coast is primarily a victim of the waters of the Danube. In short, it was widely assumed that all the pollution came from the Danube. One of the main questions to be addressed by the expedition was: How much of the pollution of the Black Sea comes from the Danube, the Dnepr, and the Dnestr rivers? The findings were truly sensational.

It turned out, for example, that the amount of pesticides in the drainage from the rivers of Northern Europe, which for the last decade have been known only as garbage, were 50 times less than along the Bulgarian shoreline! This is a catastrophic figure, which reveals the amount of pesticides being used in Bulgaria. Moreover, in the Gulf of Burgas, which is partially land-locked, their share of man-made contaminants amounts to 90 percent. That is, to put it simply, 10 percent of the pollution there comes from the outside—the rest is produced locally.

Speaking of the Gulf of Burgas, I must say that it would be difficult to find anything in other regions like the amount of phenol compounds and related products that are provided generously to the sea by the Burgas Petrochemical Combine. Their concentrations are 50-60 times the maximum allowable limits.

It is a bad situation also with respect to heavy metals such as zinc, lead, tin, and copper. Runoff wastes from stock farms, which, for example, in the past year have carried uric acid 18 times above the allowable limit into the gulf, present a considerable danger. Why do I cite these figures? To emphasize once again the fanciful nature of previous assertions that all the contamination was coming from the Danube.

One other finding that was surprising confirmed the fact that very serious changes have occurred in the Black Sea in connection with the arrival in the ecosystem of a "newcomer" from America, dog's-tail grass [grebnevik], the population density of which in the past year and a half has grown to catastrophic proportions. It now exceeds the population of jellyfish and competes successfully with the fish for plankton, thereby depleting their stocks. The biomass of dog's-tail grass has already reached 40 percent of the total biomass of the Black Sea. And the most frightening thing about it is that there is no antidote to it in the form of a natural predator, so that it continues to devour everything around it.

[V. Uzelman] Vitaliy Pavlovich, a question of urgent concern to virtually everyone since the moment following the Chernobyl catastrophe: What is the amount of radioactivity in the Black Sea?

[V. P. Keondzhyanom] The question is entirely understandable because people fear radioactivity more than anything else; after all, man can defend himself against everything except radioactivity. Following the Chernobyl disaster the radioactivity of the water rose sharply and in 1986, according to the UkSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Marine Hydrophysics, surface radioactivity reached 600 Becquerels per cubic meter in an area extending from the southern coast of the Crimea almost as far as Turkey. There was radioactivity, too, in Bulgaria, where the greatest concentration of cesium oxide 137 in the water amounted to 250-300 Becquerels per cubic meter.

The situation now in the upper levels is significantly better. Long-lived radionuclides are now sinking at a rate of about 15-20 meters per year. Since the amount of radioactive fallout since Chernobyl remains unchanged, a redistribution of these particles is taking place. Whereas earlier the maximum radioactivity was to be found in the upper 5-meter layer, now cesium is concentrated for the most part at a depth of from 50 to 70 meters. The fact that cesium is breaking down in the water does not in itself mean that it is being taken out of the ecological system of the Black Sea. Fortunately, this is simply a convenient form of conservation. Inasmuch as the half-life of cesium is 32 years, but decontamination requires six of these disintegration periods, it will be 180 years before the presence of cesium may be said to have disappeared.

Along the coast of Bulgaria, our data indicates that the cesium content is about 20 Becquerels per cubic meter; and in spots where it was formerly 300 Becquerels—about 30 Becquerels.

[B. Uzelman] How reliable is the data?

[V. P. Keondzhyanom] The measurements of radioactive contamination in the water, for example, were made with two independent methods, the results of which were close to one another, so that there is no reason to doubt their reliability. On board the "Academician Boris Petrov" these methods and methodologies were designed especially to include a maximum number of variables to indicate the condition of the Black Sea. There were physicists, chemists, and toxicologists, as well as other specialists; and in addition to routine measurements to find the content of oxygen, nitrogen, and other elements present, which are to be expected in an aquatic environment, special attention was given to factors conditioned by man and modern technology. In all, the research took into consideration about 50 parameters.

A special detachment of researchers was also on board to analyze the data—that is, to determine what all the

information indicated in its totality. It should be understood that the indicator most commonly used today—I am referring to the maximum permissible concentration (MPC)—is unable to give a true and complete picture; for it is based on the assumption that the water contains no other components than the ones that are being measured. But the water has a host of chemical substances that continuously interact upon one another. We may have components substantially below the MPC which can become poisonous pollutants in terms of their total toxicity.

Then the expedition also passed close to the coastal areas, and we conducted our research in the north-western and western sectors, which may well lay claim to the name of ecological disaster zones.

[V. Uzelman] What general conclusion did you come to about the condition of the Black Sea?

[V. P. Keondzhyanom] Let me put it this way. In the coastal areas it is approaching crisis conditions. Man-made pollution of the Black Sea has reached a very high level. Let us not lose sight of the fact, moreover, that the Black Sea does not mix to any considerable extent with the rest of the world water supply; and that although at one time it could be counted upon to purify itself, and the contamination in it could not be considered large by comparison with the size of its natural tributaries, today the amount of pollution in a number of regions, as we have demonstrated, exceeds its capacity for self-purification, and the ecological system is in danger of being thrown out of balance. In Odessa Bay a reddish efflorescence of plant life may already be seen. In addition of a number of other harmful characteristics, this condition is leading to illnesses on a massive scale of people who come into contact with the water as well as the algae. New forms of illness are developing. On the Bulgarian coast, for example, outbreaks have been reported of skin ailments, lasting from a week to a month in some instances, sometimes leading to irreversible alterations in skin pigmentation.

[V. Uzelman] Has not the time come then to declare these areas ecological disaster zones?

[V. P. Keondzhyanom] That is a difficult question. International environmental protection organizations have devised special criteria for determining ecological disaster zones. We still do not use these criteria. This we may do after examining the situation, establishing the sources of pollution, identifying their characteristics, and analyzing the total synergistic effect, thus arriving at a specific answer to this question. Even now it is possible to speak of certain areas. In the Odessa area, for example, pollution from petroleum products has reached catastrophic proportions, and it is possible to find practically every sort of intestinal parasites because of the discharge into the sea of domestic sewage and other waste without purification. Thus it is possible to assert at virtually the level of demonstrable proof that the Odessa area, as well as the runoff areas of the Danube River

(near Zmeinyy Island), the Gulf of Burgas, and possibly Varna Bay have every right to be called ecological disaster zones. I want to emphasize that I am speaking only of the regions visited by our expedition. I can say nothing, for example, about the Sochi area.

[V. Uzelman] Vitaliy Pavlovich, now that the expedition is over, what lies ahead?

[V. P. Keondzhyanom] The expedition was originally proposed by the movement Eco-Forum for Peace, which in October of this year suggested holding a conference with the participation of a wide range of specialists to attract the attention of mankind to the tragic condition of the Black Sea. Our expedition was to provide the scientific foundation for the marine part of it. The USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Geography is currently conducting an expedition along the coast and will also present its findings.

In the course of the expedition we had many meetings and discussions, particularly in Burgas, where we presented our recommendations to the local authorities and economic managers. For us this was the main thing since we are concerned with matters of practical ecology rather than basic research. But before building any purification facilities, it is necessary to find out what needs to be purified—what elements in the “mix” of those that have been discharged into the water are the most toxic. If we can succeed in removing the ones with the greatest toxicity, this will substantially lengthen the life of the drainage basin.

To determine toxicity in terms of its ecological characteristics in the water, new methods are needed. These are now being devised in our companies. Standardized criteria will enable us to determine what must be purified in terms of priority. In general, everything is need of purification, but we must be realistic—we do not have the money for everything.

The protection of the environment is such a complex problem that to resolve it by means of one method alone is impossible. It cannot be done except in coordination with economic and other kinds of decisions. We look upon our role as one of assisting leaders to make the right policy decisions. We must not underevaluate the political and social dimensions. But we can deal with this subject in a separate discussion.

It is extremely difficult to halt the pollution of the environment not only because it requires great expenditures of funds for the modernization of technology, but because it requires as well the upgrading of technological science and training institutions. And this is a very slow process. Nevertheless, such measures must be undertaken. The Americans brought Lake Erie back to life at a cost of \$100 billion. By comparison, the trip by the U.S. astronauts to the moon cost \$36 billion. It is clear to everyone that the less an illness is neglected, the easier will be the cure. Today, for example, the cost of purification treatment of the Gulf of Burgas is from 100 to 150 million Bulgarian leva. If treatment is delayed a few

years, however, the cost may increase threefold. The situation is much the same in Odessa. An ecological breakdown has occurred there that by all indications is irreversible. Our country now faces the very difficult task of saving Odessa Bay and other maritime regions as well.

### **Rostov Oblast Ecological Problems, Antinuclear Efforts Chronicled**

90WN0149A Moscow YUNOST in Russian  
No 4, Apr 90 pp 40-45

[Article by Ivan Kunitsyn and Aleksey Nikolayev, "Along the Don is Walking...the 'Peaceful' Atom"]

[Text] The all-union independent comprehensive ecological expedition of YUNOST visited the Rostov oblast this time. Those who participated or provided material assistance were: Anton Gerashchenko, writer; Eduard Mustafinov, director of the Rostov nuclear electric power station under construction; Vsevolod Maryan, editor of the science section of the journal "YUNOST," director of the expedition; Nina Sushkova, inspector of the Tsimlyansk fish hatchery; S.A. Lopukhin, P.G. Strukov and other residents of Tsimlyansk. Also activists and members of the movement "Green Wave" of the cities of Volgograd and Tsimlyansk.

"And we don't put bast sandals on our hands." Russian proverb.

"We, the residents of the city of Tsimlyansk of Rostov oblast, ask the journal "YUNOST" to be our lawyer. The heart of the matter is that..." This letter stood out from the abundant reader's mail, appealing to us by its concern and pain to be defenders not of one person, not of ten, but of millions, and the River Don with them. "Who will hear our SOS signal? Who will save us from the specter of Chernobyl? From the grasping, suffocating tentacles pulling from the time of stagnation?"

While our social, economic and medical sciences have not reached a unanimous opinion on which indices should be decisive in defining the quality of people's life, we decided to begin our own analysis in Rostov oblast from a concrete index not subject to conflicting interpretations: the mortality rate. And, honestly speaking, the data presented by the USSR State Committee for Statistics shook our idea of the Cossack Don as a stronghold of physical and moral health. It turned out that of the thirty largest cities of the country Rostov is among the three "leaders" in the number of deaths. The so-called natural growth per 100 persons (the difference between the number of deaths and births) is only 2 persons. It is worse only in Moscow and Leningrad. In the death rate of children who die before the age of one, Rostov is right behind the cities of Central Asia and the Caucasus, occupying eighth place on this sad list.

The "YUNOST" expedition had to alter its plans set long in advance and, changing its itinerary, set out immediately for Rostov. It could not even be stopped by a genuine disaster unexpectedly falling on the heads of

the journal's special correspondents: we lacked the already meager editorial equipment we had: dictophone, cassettes. We were simply robbed. The first day of our arrival...

The city presents us its ecological business card right at the train station square. The Temernik River, which intersects Rostov, is one more stinking and lifeless monument to the criminal senselessness and suicidal patience of our time, which will go down in the nation's history (together with other gloomy epithets) as the epoch of ecological genocide. The number of dead rivers, lakes, forests and natural monuments is already up into the tens of thousands. We repeatedly are convinced that the Red Books of the USSR and the union republics, published with such difficulties, are only a small chapter of the yet unwritten huge Black Book of crimes against the nation's nature and human health. Yet today as well the crowds of arriving and departing passengers each day cross the bridge over the Temernik at the station without glancing at the river. Though some people do not ignore it, judging from the impressive amount of bottles and packages thrown into the river over the years from roadside stands. But for most Rostov residents it's as if this river did not exist until recently. Oh, they heard that each day the city's enterprises dumped 200,000 tons of all sorts of dirt and refuse into the Temernik, which means into the Don as well; oh, they knew that it's not safe to be on its shores (no one has thought of swimming in it for years now); oh, they smelled its stench...but it's as though it wasn't there at all. Which is understandable: it's a monument when there is one, but when there are thousands of them, all alike, it's a gray, undistinguished background. It contains many dangers. And it is frightening not only that people learn not to see beyond its haze the variety, brightness and uniqueness of a sensible existence, but also that sometimes they fail to notice against this background the mortal danger approaching.

Evidently the "city fathers" considered this in making the decision to build right in the central part of Rostov on the Temernik River a refuse incineration plant. Such an ecological and public health surprise for their fellow citizens. And what of it? Rostov citizens drink water taken from sites where the maximum allowable concentrations of harmful substances have been exceeded many times, and nothing happens; they keep quiet. If a chemical plant stands in the center of town, the nearby residents wash off their windows in the morning a layer of who knows what, they tolerate it. Up to thirty thousand automobiles a day drive along some of the city's streets (according to research done not by us, but unfortunately by the Germans, the poisons emitted by only six thousand vehicles travelling along one road per day increases the chances of its residents contracting cancer by nine times); already 130,000 cancer patients have been recorded in the oblast; the number of cancer cases is growing rapidly, but if you do anything, they are silent. So that "everything is in order" with our background. We are building the refuse incineration plant right in the center "for the public good": it's cheaper to bring it in

than to carry it out. So what if 200,000 persons live in the Temernik hollow and poisonous smoke travels along this natural pipeline through their houses? People breathe the emissions of a plastic products plant and the plastics shop of a watch factory; though invisible, they are highly toxic, creating a carcinogenic cocktail from the burning of over 200 types of plastics found in the refuse. True, it is still unknown what kinds of poisonous substances form when they are mixed, but let science figure that out, it will study and report. But for now... If people cannot live without creating refuse, then they will have to be patient, we'll burn it under their nose.

Yes, the Soviet man is patient. Are such records noted in the Guinness Book of Records? It's true that our lives are meager and short, but we'll lay odds on long suffering against anyone else. What are they against us without our social and ecological background?!

So the people of Rostov were patient, until the first whiffs of perestroika and glasnost reached them. They woke up when eight of the twelve million planned for building refuse incineration plants had already been spent. And not someone else's money, but their own, which made it worse.

But...people want to live. And Rostov started grumbling. They collected 25,000 signatures against the plant, they banded together, exerted pressure, and won the first victory, very important for public self-awareness. Our people are gradually learning the methods for combating their own "servants," but there are still few of us who recognize the need to start with ourselves, with our own work collective, with our own responsibility for the impending catastrophe. After all, of the 25,000 who signed the appeal most are workers, closely connected with other enterprises polluting the city. It's easy to find justification: "The system is guilty of everything." But all of us are not screws, but the flesh of this system. If entire work collectives, regions and zones begin to fall off of it, will it survive long?

We also are thinking about another detail in the Rostov "garbage saga." We have long consoled ourselves with the wisdom that "beyond the sea a heifer is a quarter-kopeck, but the ferry there costs a ruble," and refused to take from abroad anything better, sensible, necessary: we've been around, we'll patch up a couple holes, pull our belt tighter and show them a thing or two. So here we are showing them, and they're not laughing, and we are sad, and how expensively. And what have we come to? It's not advantageous for us to take the best "from there," but it turns out that it's very profitable for them to take "from here" not a heifer, but...our garbage. There is a plan by which the Spanish have agreed to build a refuse processing (not simply burning) plant near Rostov for free. And what do they get in return? Trifles: all the scrap metal and valuable materials which we, with unique beggarly luxury, throw onto the scrap heap; they will take to Spain everything worthless to us and, it turns out, very attractive to them. Evidently, for the directing municipal managers this idea was the apex of national

business: we give them some kind of miasma; and they give us—ha ha, a new little plant (or plants?). We really put one over on them, huh? And we don't need to rack our brains. But we cannot view these projects as something other than another national disgrace (experienced, by the way, by even the poorest developing countries, to whose level such decisions will probably bring us), as a new insult to our dignity. First oil, coal, lumber, technology, the leaders of the nation's cultural renaissance, and now garbage. What else should we scrape the bins for, in order to gain the dubious right to call ourselves a civilized country, a superpower?

The Don still retains the title of "the purest of the major rivers of the European part of the USSR." True, this refers to the middle and especially the upper course. This is a strange formulation. Sort of like "a poultice for the deceased." The purest must be chosen from the pure. But there are none of them left. But the dirtiest of the dirty. Here one can agree: the Don is not yet the worst, there is still something swimming and reproducing in it. But not thanks to the efforts of people; just the contrary. This is nothing to be proud of.

Here's what the elderly Cossack Ivan Nesterov told us, a former head of a former fishing crew of the Staryy Don village (neither the crew, nor the village, of which there were many thousands in the past, have existed for a long time)—they were not for the long term. He spoke with the hidden sorrow of a morally healthy person not yet become wild from "civilization."

"Many years ago something unknown came out at the Voronezh atomic plant, somewhere up above Veshenskaya. They scratched under their hats and let out some kind of unneeded water into the Don. It was winter. We put our nets under the ice in winter as well. We take them out one day and we don't believe our eyes: nothing but sterlets and other sturgeons. Honest mother, what is it that pushed up to the ice? We started to cut airholes, and it's pushing and pushing, trying to get up onto the ice. It was frightening, of course; we forgot about everything. But we didn't want to lose it: you could see that it felt sick in the water, it was begging to come to us. We pull, and pull...we hauled up seven annual plans of this fish. I was already ready to get a medal. In the spring the ice broke, and in the inlets and channels there's all kinds of fish! White. Dead. The floodwaters took them away, and since then we've had no sturgeon. Then they thought quickly, and released some kind of fish with a funny name, bester or something (a hybrid of beluga and sterlet). But the way it grows, they're all little."

In the city public ecological center we were told that the so-called discharge of water near Rostov is 5 to 6 times less than the total quantity of **unpurified** waste in the basin of the Don and Northern Donets rivers. In other words, when it gets to Rostov the water has already been processed 5 to 6 times in various enterprises. Knowing this irresponsibility towards nature and man, and the quality and low capacity of purification facilities, one can imagine what the "purest river" is carrying. It's been

forbidden for years in the oblast to drink unprocessed water from the Don. People do not drink, but...continue to poison with their own hands the former provider-fountain "grandfather quiet Don," or rather, what's left of it.

But if water pollution is only visible from the shore, Rostov oblast residents can see the pollution of the air basin from space if they want. Not from an orbital station, of course, but from photographs taken from there. On them one can see something completely unbelievable: a black cloud stretching from Novochoerkassk all the way to Kiev. This eclipse is a defect not of the film, but rather of our public awareness. That's how the train of smoke stretching hundreds of kilometers from the Novochoerkassk state regional electric power station looks from orbit. But people live and die under it! This one polluter alone each year dumps on each resident of the oblast 100 kilograms of substances which hardly improve their health. Every industrial enterprise in the oblast contributes to its own suffocation, and there are around 500 of them.

We should also recall that the Rostov oblast has coal. If any of our readers have not been in the mines, we envy them. They're horrible! Flaming and self-igniting gigantic waste piles, black dust, getting into everything living and not living, some sort of landscape after a battle of light and dark forces, where the dark forces have won. Once you've seen it you can never forget it no matter how much you want. And to live here all your life?! And hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens have been living here. They've gotten used to it; for example, in Novoshakhtinsk (and in other mining towns, of course) they don't buy their wives and daughters white furs: they're expensive and pointless, since after all they get grey and black right away. But the thirst for life and dignity has not been completely eradicated in our people. Last summer the miners stood up to their full height, grabbed with their permanently blackened hands their "servants" who have lost their vigilance and sense of reality, shook them until they lost their breath, but... It's not by chance that economics and ecology share the same root. The former used to beat the breath out of the latter. Now ecology could turn out to be the epitaph of our cannibalistic economy. So that this not happen, the miners themselves (and not only them, of course) must tear the coal veins out of themselves, shovelling what was piled up during the days of "developed socialism," which inevitably means losing something in economically providing a standard of living.

But let us dwell a bit longer on the space pictures. In the north of the Rostov oblast the Don suddenly changes from a thin blue thread into a long blot with ragged edges. This is the Tsimlyansk water reservoir, the country's largest artificial fishery reservoir, 250 kilometers long. At its southernmost point, where the Don turns back into a river, are two cities, Volgodonsk and Tsimlyansk, with a population of 250,000. Further down the river live two million more. From the ecological standpoint this is a very vulnerable place: water intakes for

people and irrigation, fisheries, recreation and health treatment areas. And most importantly, of course, the condition of the Tsimlyansk reservoir largely determines the ecological equilibrium of the entire lower Don region. All it takes is to place a dangerous industrial facility on it, and the equilibrium (already very unstable) is disturbed, and will become a catastrophe in case of an accident.

And such a monster has been built. Not just on the shore, but on the reservoir's surface, separated from it by only a dam.

The Rostov nuclear power plant. It is the last drop overfilling the cup of people's patience. "Emotions, not facts," the bureaucracy and technocracy said as one to the "timid" oblast population. "Democracy is fine, but specialists must make the decisions..." But without a healthy legal mechanism for making the social and economic decisions of greater importance to the people, without true people's power in the local Soviets, without widespread public awareness the ecological situation cannot be resolved. As before, in each conflict with the concerned public of a given region the technobureaucratic alliance will play a dubious trump card every time: "By your stubbornness you're only pursuing your local, egotistic interests, you're blocking the growth of the country's economic level, you're putting the weight of the struggle for a bright future onto the shoulders of other regions." But let's look at the result to which blindly following this bureaucratic logic for years has led. The country has not a single populated area which could even conditionally be called ecologically well-off. So how can you talk about shifting something to someone else's shoulders? Literally everyone is tied together by the system of mutual poisoning. And an army of "qualified specialists" has formed in this struggle against their own people. Let's look at the results of their uncontrolled and irresponsible activity in Volgodonsk, under whose walls is being built the Rostov nuclear power plant (why is it called the Rostov plant, by the way, if it's 300 kilometers from here to Rostov?).

The small Don city of 30,000, with a settled way of life and strong local, Cossack traditions, no better or worse than other such quiet provincial Russian settlements, was awakened by one of those noisy, pompous and senseless "constructions of the century," with which our government in the time of stagnation used to cheer itself like a very sick economic and ideological drug addict. As the correspondent of a very industrial newspaper put it, "only a lazy journalist did not earn his pants" in praising the Atomash, just like the Balakovskiy plant and other nuclear power plants. Some publications even introduced permanent rubrics, to convince the Soviet people with their publications that they will go straight into the age of prosperity with such and such a giant plant for producing equipment for the "peaceful" atom. Let's sum up the results of this propaganda twaddle. The plant was built on sagging soil. Huge sums are being spent combating its "self-destruction." At a design capacity of eight VVER-1000 reactors per year there have not yet been

eight produced in the entire history of "Atomash." It turns out that the country just doesn't need that many. The enterprise is running at less than 45 percent capacity. The technological processes turned out to be scientifically unsubstantiated. For lack of a sensible nuclear strategy the plant, like an exhibit of expensive imported equipment, is at a crossroads. And with it Volgograd, in which 230,000 persons from all over the country are living. An immigrant people usually is without roots (we now no longer have illusions about the true builders of "shock Komsomol" construction projects); the social balance has been disturbed, age-old Cossack traditions have been swept away, the full spectrum of ethical and moral problems has appeared. The city has some 30,000 single mothers, in only six months of last year teenage crime was up 300 percent, racketeering is flourishing, there are frequent fights among gangs of youths, and nationalist clashes have become more frequent. The bureaucratic tactic is well-known: in putting on the back of some city the next giant enterprise, public opinion is "sweetened" by promises to improve the city infrastructure, provide heat, sewage treatment, roads, and so forth; in other words, to solve the age-old problems of any of our cities, which the poor and suppressed local Soviets could never overcome with their own resources, and cannot today. We know how much these promises are kept, after the bureaucracy has met its goal. New problems are added to the old. In the end, the present Volgograd's needs are not met: for housing, by 21 percent; children's facilities, by 26; schools, by 37; hospitals, 56 (!); and cultural facilities, movie theaters, restaurants and cafes by 86 (!) percent. A third of the city's children cannot study normally; over half the population lacks prompt and effective medical services; practically the entire city population lacks civilized leisure! Add to this the story of the collapsed nine-story apartment building, after which 300 new apartment buildings, designed by "specialists" on the sagging Volgograd soils, were put under permanent monitoring. Is it any surprise that people have no faith left in the "competent organizations," which have presented them such a miserable and dangerous existence?

And against this background have already been invested one billion, 200 million rubles in the construction of the Rostov nuclear power plant, whose dark profile on the horizon reminds people that all their present suffering is still a trifle compared with those possibly lying ahead. And for that kind of money Volgograd, and neighboring Tsimlyansk, and half the oblast's populated centers could have finally been made into a residence worthy of being called civilized.

But "specialists" consider our fruitless cries and confusion to be nothing more than childish naivete and economic idiocy. "And where will you get the energy which is already in short supply everywhere, and the heat, the light? How will you ensure the planned growth of the oblast's economic potential? You bring on yourself regional full cost accounting, but didn't think about the fact that you get up to 20 percent of your electric power

from the Ukraine; have you decided how you're going to warm yourself in the winter? So you still haven't heard that we have no alternative to nuclear energy?"

These are the basic arguments of the "atom supporters," and of central and local authorities with them. Why can the oblast's population not be calmed down, why will they not accept official reason—100,000 signatures have been collected in Rostov, Volgograd, Tsimlyansk, Novocherkassk and other cities on a demand for an independent social-ecological study of the Rostov nuclear plant, and a regional referendum on this problem?

The bureaucracy not only remains silent and stalls, hoping to carry out its projects before people mobilize; it also attacks, waving obedient administrative authority like a club, beating people's hands and discrediting activists. But this only makes the appeals for help louder. To whom are they directed? To the lord from Moscow who judges all? To the deputies from public organizations, who applauded, stamped their feet and cheered for the "Moscow fraction"? To the local authorities, using the police in their dialogue with the public on environmental protection questions? Of course not. The residents of Rostov, in inviting the journal "YUNOST" to be their advocate, are appealing to the nation's public opinion.

So let's look at this imaginary trial in which the oblast society is accused of incompetence on at least four points. As the prosecutor we appoint (true, without asking his permission, for which we hope we will not be harshly judged) the director of the Rostov nuclear plant being built, Eduard Mustafinov, the recognized leader of the oblast's "atomic" forces. And an eminent and distinguished person for them. He was the head construction engineer for the Armenian nuclear power plant. Its reactors started up under him. So Eduard Nikolaevich lived through the terrible catastrophe of Armenia as his own, though at a distance. And what if it collapses? No, it held up, which means it was well built. True, its region was shaken less than those which suffered most, but they decided even so to remake it into a thermal power plant. He has participated in designing many nuclear power plants which are still in operation today. He appeared in the Rostov oblast in 1977 as the head engineer of the Rostov nuclear plant project. He himself chose the construction site. Of many versions he chose the most economical, the shore of the Tsimlyansk sea, in order not to spend money on digging canals and a man-made cooling pond, or building cooling towers. In doing so, the reservoir lost the main spawning grounds of the valuable Don fish. But who then thought about fish? It was still nine years to Chernobyl, so it seemed almost a blessing to put the power plant between two cities (13 kilometers from Volgograd and 10 from Tsimlyansk). And the decision was made by numerous official commissions and agencies. So we won't particularly criticize comrade Mustafinov that he bears responsibility for "mining" the Don, for the fact that the basin of the great river and the millions of people living here have become hostages to



nuclear power. The nuclear authorities were so sure that they were infallible and accident-free that they named him director of the nuclear power plant being built. Very convenient: you design it, you build it. Except that mutual monitoring of the designers and builders is somehow overlooked. Who should director Mustafinov ask about design faults? It turns out, himself. And who should former head engineer Mustafinov ask about violations of the design indices during construction? Himself again. So Eduard Nikolaevich is in a surprising position: all of us, both competent defenders of nuclear power and its incompetent opponents, set great hopes on you. In case of a cataclysm the first person to ask will be you (but who will be left to ask?!). So don't slip up on reliability and safety. That is, if the plant despite everything goes into operation. But even so, maybe beforehand the question could be resolved in a friendly manner and the regional referendum demanded by the public conducted? To our question, E. Mustafinov, an energetic person, hard-working, evoking genuine sympathy by his conviction, a big man in size and in technical thinking, still young, answered with questions.

[Mustafinov] "Show me where it's written in the Constitution that a referendum is a legislative decision? So does that mean that if the people vote against, construction is stopped? A referendum is only an opinion, which the government can listen to or not listen to. It's all playing at democracy, you understand." "No, we do not understand, though we realize that for the people's opinion to be decisive more than one more battle must be fought with the command-administrative system. One such "battle" took place in Rostov during a meeting in Theater Square on September 3 last year. Or more precisely, a beating. In breaking up the gathering of opponents of the Rostov power plant construction, organized by the Don People's Front, militia and special division forces were used against the three thousand participants in order to repress people singled out in advance. Six of them were later tried and fined by a one-man court for the same old reasons and without hearing defense witnesses. That was the "dialogue" of the authorities with the public.

From the statement of the deputy chairman of the Rostov Public Ecological Center, F. Yalaletdinov, and acting head of the oblast internal affairs administration to militia colonel M. Fetisov: "I firmly request that during our ecological meetings you not unleash young men with wild eyes against the people. How they hate us! Only because we want to leave our children a living Earth! People dispersed quietly and peacefully. Why this brutality?"

We provide this information for those functionaries who, hiding behind the unconstitutional decree on meetings, really think that the public has been seized with some kind of unknown, senseless aggressivity and passion for shaking "the foundations." This decree again and again places the people in the position of the defendant. A simple political trick. But we have no doubt that its outcome will be tragic (and for the nomenklatura

as well). So the first count of the "indictment" against the public: people do not comprehend the state's energy policy, they do not understand that we stand on the threshold of an "energy famine."

[Mustafinov] "Our country has set for itself the task of living twice as well by the year 2000. In other words, by that time we must build an economy equal to two of the present-day Soviet Unions. This means that we must consume energy at least at the level of the top ten developed countries. Today we are twentieth in terms of energy consumption per capita. Each Swede, for example, receives five times more electric power than a Soviet person. Moreover, the Western countries have reached a stable level of industrial production. They don't need to develop it further in order to live better. They live well already. That is why their electric power production is stable. We must double our power output to meet our plans. Even if we achieve a 50 percent increase through conservation, we must still somehow find the same amount again. One often hears that the alternative to increasing the power potential is energy conservation. But let's be realistic. Today, we cannot conserve more than 3)5 percent. To save more, industry must be switched to new technology. But this requires huge expenditures, new capacity and materials, more electric power, and mostly time, at least 10-15 years." "It's much simpler not to invent anything new, but to direct money where it's planned, to what is already conceived and set: to raising the proportion of nuclear power plants in the country's total energy balance. The realism of yesterday, proclaiming the patching of holes to be the acme of perfection.

Let's listen to other opinions about the realism of development of our power industry. They were expressed at a "round table" on problems of the Rostov power plant, held in Volgograd by the senior scientific associate of the Institute of Biology and Geophysics of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. Shepelev, laboratory director of the Institute of Mathematics of the Siberian Branch B. Gavrilko, and candidate of technical sciences from Rostov I. Kovalev.

The arguments of the "antinuclear opposition" are convincing, that the third energy program adopted in October 1988 was just as far from realism and from the economy's needs as was the preceding one. By the year 2000, the administrative power clan proposes to put on line 200 million kilowatts of new power capacity (60 at nuclear electric power stations, 70 at thermal electric power stations, and 70 at hydroelectric power stations). This means that each year we must put into operation 20 million kilowatts' worth of new stations, plus modernizing 10 million. The utopian nature of such decisions is indicated by the fact that in the last 30 years the country has not managed to bring on line more than 10 million kilowatts of new power capacity a year. The costs planned for realizing this program are comparable with the material losses of the USSR from the destruction in the Patriotic War (700 billion rubles). Such complacency on the part of power "gigantomaniac specialists" will



lock up the capital investments of several economic sectors and deprive our economy of the freedom of maneuver so necessary for perestroika.

And now let's compare what is proposed to be spent with what is planned to be done. The gross national product of Japan, for example, is today estimated at around 3.7 trillion dollars. Ours (according to various estimates) is from 0.7 to 1.3 trillion dollars. Producing three times more than us, Japan uses three times less electric power. We are almost four times behind the USA in this index. It is suggested to us that we "build two Soviet Unions," that we double electric power output, without changing anything in the principles of extensive development. This means that without even reaching Japan's current level by 2000 we will have to use six times more electric power than it does today.

"There is no alternative to nuclear power..." People say this who know perfectly well that the export of our fuel abroad now amounts to 418 million tons of fuel equivalent, and it is growing at a frightening speed. The amount we sell would suffice to not build 100 new nuclear power plants. If we consider that 42 reactors are presently in operation in the country, and that this is about 9-10 Chernobyl-type nuclear power plants, then cutting our fuel exports by only 10 percent would save us from our own still-dangerous nuclear power and the growing public indignation resulting from the "specialists'" lack of desire to consider public opinion.

"The country needs hard currency..." is the main argument of competent high officials sanctioning a squandering of national natural resources unprecedented in the history of our country (and perhaps in that of the civilized world). As a result, we have a chronic shortage of hard currency, and supplies of natural resources are being exhausted catastrophically. We are offered nuclear power as something supposedly independent of natural resources which will not last for long. When we talk about conservation, this of course is not a call to exist on the brink of freezing and in darkness. It is a worthwhile means of existence for a people which respects itself, values its resources and firmly controls its own future. It has been calculated that replacing only half of our incandescent bulbs with second generation fluorescent lights, as was done long ago in the West (they are four times more efficient), would yield a savings equal to half the power output of all our nuclear power plants. When the USA decided to drastically conserve power in 1973-1978, computers were used to determine two basic directions of conservation: reductions in automobile weight, and the heating of houses and public buildings. This allows a power savings of 95 Chernobyl-type nuclear power plants or replacement of ten times our present nuclear power. The USSR is "unique" in many respects. In particular, only we use central heat supply. Our country prepares for each winter as for a fight for survival. Vast labor, material and financial resources are spent to maintain this Cyclopean system in an accident-free state. Yet even so an integral part of our life is permanently dug-up streets and interruptions of heat

and hot water (or complete outages). But the efficiency of fuel use in centralized heating is only 9 (!) percent. The whole world uses local hot water boilers. The Americans put them right inside buildings: full automation, gas, minimal servicing, and efficiency of 100 percent. Using hot water boilers in place of central heating would save us 33 nuclear power plants, equal to replacing three times our present nuclear power. The domestic power complex absorbs (while literally throwing the greater part to the wind) 58 percent of everything produced for the country's industry. Think about this number; it is a huge piece of the hardly filling national pie.

But let's return from the theoretical sphere to the shore of the Tsimlyansk water reservoir. In the near future, we will have dozens of new nuclear power plants imposed on us; let's see what methods are used to build just one of them, and how it affects public opinion.

Remember: the Rostov nuclear plant was designed in 1977, long before Chernobyl, during the years of stagnant complacency, when the pillars of nuclear energy maintained: "A reactor is just a boiler, and the operator a simple stoker." After the 1986 tragedy, new "Regulations on Siting Nuclear Power Plants" were created.

#### Rejoinder from the "court house":

[P.G. Strukov, resident of Tsimlyansk, retiree]: "Comrades, what I believe to be the most important of the "Regulations" has been violated. According to them, a nuclear plant of over one million kilowatt capacity may not be built closer than 25 kilometers to a city with a population of over 100,000 persons. Volgodonsk has over a quarter-million residents, but the Rostov power plant is 10 kilometers from its edge, and its rated capacity is six million kilowatts. What do we have to do for them to remove it, go on a hunger strike, or rally around a bonfire?"

Another point of the "indictment" against the public: construction of the cooling pond directly on the reservoir's water area will cause no problems.

[Mustafinov] "I see no danger in the fact that the cooling pond is separated from the Tsimlyansk reservoir by only a dam.

"But according to the new "Regulations": "If a nuclear plant is situated along the shoreline of public use water resources, the distance from the shoreline of these resources to the nuclear plant must be at least one kilometer." The Rostov nuclear plant stands right on the shore, and its cooling pond is part of the reservoir!

["Defense witness" N. Sushkova, inspector of the Tsimlyansk fish hatchery] "The cooling pond took away from the reservoir two thousand hectares of shallow waters where the main spawning and feeding areas of the Tsimlyansk fish are located. The harvest of this unique fish has dropped by half. But the situation will be even more frightening if the nuclear plant goes on line. The Tsimla is already contaminated by blue-green algae. The

plant is not yet in operation, but the cooling pond is supersaturated with this disaster: a closed area, shallow water, the water heats up easily, so the algae grow without limit.

"The third point of the "indictment": people do not understand that the quality of construction of nuclear power plants has never been so carefully and efficiently monitored.

A question to E. Mustafinov: "Can you guarantee that the quality of construction will ensure the ecological safety of the plant's operation?"

[Mustafinov] "I can. We have very high requirements on the design and execution of the work. For the first time in our country, the assembly of the reactor vessel has been performed at "Atom mash" under our supervision. We're confident about the reactor today."

It turns out that previously reactor purchasers were unable to supervise the reactors built for them. Take what you get. And the Rostov nuclear plant apparently is in luck, if only because "Atom mash" is nearby. And what does it mean that "We're confident about the reactor today"? Does that mean that we should not feel the Tour prior confidence in the 42 reactors in operation in the country's power plants?... We admit that in our imagination the construction of a reactor block has been wrapped in elements of science fiction: sophisticated unknown mechanisms, filigree precision, automation, the sharp eyes and concentrated faces of superspecialists performing a technological ritual. But upon approaching the Rostov power plant block being prepared for startup, stepping over the first puddles filled with construction trash, and walking around the piles of scrap metal already sinking in the mud, we felt ourselves to be on one of our "own" Soviet construction sites, disordered and spreading off in various directions. A careful attitude towards his job was visible only in the guard, who studied for a long time the paper allowing us to enter the hermetic shell of the reactor hall. Walls covered with writing, water dripping from the ceiling, the usual warnings of our guide: "Watch your legs"; "Watch your head". But perhaps the strongest emotion awaited us when we went up to the block's dome. The stinking darkness of the stairs, the caution as on a minefield. The appearance, or rather the stench, of the extent to which the workers secretly foul their own work, erased, honestly speaking, at a purely emotional level, all the plant management's assertions about the high quality of work performance.

And here is evidence free of unnecessary emotions. "So what, an ordinary construction site," says A. Novogrenko, rock climber and assembler, who has worked over a year on construction of the first block of the Rostov power plant. We will give only a few of his many examples of poor work organization, design violations and downright poor work.

"Several different 'companies' worked on the assembly. We got in each other's way, one firm's alterations forced

others to make alterations as well. And the people are different: one, gritting his teeth, keeps on trying to do better, while another, whistling, puts on a decorative weld and that's it. The welds are polished and painted with five layers of special enamel, just try to tell them apart... Our managers forced us to violate the correct assembly sequence. Because of additional cutting and welding with a lap this increased the metal content and weight of the structure and caused a change in the structural parameters: rigidity, strength, and ultimately reliability. The distribution of the load in the structures is different from the design and...unpredictable. Worst of all are the frequent—several times a day—interruptions in the electric power supply. When welding third class reinforcing rods by the bath method a loss of power causes a flaw, although it's very hard to detect. Or a crane is used to place an ice-covered structure onto hot joints: the ice hisses, steam billows up, and the joint gets red hot. And the builders poured the concrete in layers, which means sometimes a layer of ice and a layer of concrete... The high transport aisle covered with a thick hermetic plate is designed to carry the reactor on a special carriage, turn it and lift it to the dome where it's installed. During assembly, the distance was not maintained between the floor and the ceiling, enough so that the reactor could not be turned and placed into the shaft. After discussing all the possibilities for remedying it, they decided to do it the simple way: powerful hydraulic jacks were brought in, pillars of pipes were made, and the ceiling was pushed up as far as needed... We had one Vitya, small and thin, an invaluable worker: only he could climb up onto certain series of wall panels, and that only by stripping to his shirt. Imagine: metal and concrete around, 20 below zero with a wind, and someone has to climb into this hole, tighten bolts, take joint scarfs and put them into place, cut, grab and weld a blind just centimeters from his knee, waist or shoulder. A trained body does not flinch when slag burns through clothing, only the skin around the burn trembles, and the lips grimace..."Can we really trust the quality of such assembly? A. Novogrenko is sure we cannot.

And the final "indictment" of society, in our view the main one: specialists, not dilettantes, must decide the fate of scientific and technical decisions.

[Mustafinov] "The journal "Yunist", like "Noviy Mir", is no longer popular here. Because in your pages lawyers and writers have suddenly become nuclear specialists. It's gotten to the point where your author B. Kurkin understands physics better than the chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency Blix and any academician. Now they've latched on to G. Medvedev, but he's incompetent (G. Medvedev worked for 40 years in the Ministry of Atomic Energy system; allow us to ask, who should then be considered competent?—editors). I'm not against letting anyone speak his mind, these days anyone can say what he wants, without, by the way, answering for anything. We don't know how to call someone to account and bear the responsibility... But, understand, the job has to get done! And the priority in

technical fields should lay with the specialists. You can't heat and feed the country with emotions.

"The management and builders of the Rostov nuclear power plant, besides dark pictures of economic collapse if nuclear power is eliminated, also use this argument: 'Our country has experience in the refusal of leading technologies, of the achievements of science, which were declared to be the work of wreckers and their creators 'enemies of the people.' We are firmly convinced that certain people benefit from the noisy campaign and the 'public activity' directed against the Rostov power plant. This group is artificially whipping up fears about the plant, and on this wave is trying to create popularity for itself and to gain political capital...' As we can see, society is thus scolded: genetics and cybernetics were destroyed in their day, isn't it time to calm down? And they point to the true 'enemies,' the 'political capitalists.' And what kind of times are we in now? Isn't it naive to still turn everything upside down like this and cry 'Sick him!'" The destruction of advanced science, organized by the Party-state apparatus and conducted by selected "specialists" from science, is now "hung" on the people. They, dark and insatiable, today thirst for the blood of nuclear specialists! An effective idea of the technocracy. But the situation is such that the country's present leaders unfortunately continue to unconditionally believe in the panacea of nuclear power with first-generation reactors. And they don't allow it to be criticized. The people of Rostov were forbidden to hold a Chernobyl Memorial Day. And militia truncheons protected the interests of nuclear power.

#### Reponse from the "courtroom":

[A. Shestakov, docent of the Novocherkassk Polytechnical Institute] "It's time for management to understand that the problem of nuclear power has not only a scientific and technical side: there is also a moral and social side. And here the most correct evaluation can only be given by the people, who in the greatest measure have a healthy instinct for self-preservation. If the Rostov nuclear plant goes into operation, then millions of people living along the Don and the Azov shore will lose their peace of mind. The moral aspect is inevitably transformed into an economic one: a deterioration in the social state of health and a drop in working ability.

But the fact that the nuclear service is being restructured is indicated by the following new aspect of its activity. Before, it was considered unpatriotic to mention the possibility of a disaster. Now, go ahead. There have even been survival classes around the Rostov power plant. Evidently so that people can become accustomed to living in permanent fear. Actions according to cheerful signals have been worked out (official lyrics have not yet come to an end): "cucumber": disperse and take shelter in trenches; "branch": a nearby evacuation; "broom": a distant evacuation... With 50 kilograms of baggage per person... "So that's how we now will have to live with the

'ecologically cleanest' power," the writer Anton Gerashchenko expresses the fears of the residents. The Tsimlyansk pensioner S. A. Lopukhin is more categorical: "Other than these survival 'instructions' we were given no means of individual protection, or radiation level measurement instruments. So people are supposed to sit by their radio day and night waiting for the danger signal? Clearly, we are still completely unprepared for this...

"The "Defense Witness" F. Yalaletdinov, deputy chairman of the Rostov public ecological center: "Survival must no longer depend on the decisions of technocracy. It's time for us to finally understand that the people are competent in the most important thing: how to survive and live."

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#### Commentary on Results of First Chernobyl Union Congress

90WN0194B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by N. Sevidova: "Our Aroused Reason Boils...Comments From the First All-Union Congress of Chernobyl Movements"]

[Text] In the unprecedentedly heated atmosphere of the nation's current political life, the First Congress of the Chernobyl Union seemingly got lost. The program Vremya devoted just one sentence to this event. At the same time, the Chernobyl movements have the right to count on increased attention to their problems. Certainly, it is not merely a matter of the corporative interests of the very large detachment of liquidators [persons involved in clean-up procedures] as over 600,000 of them have passed through the Chernobyl Plant since the accident. Although the questions of medical research, aid and social protection for this contingent as before are not being settled on the proper level or are being settled very slowly.

But in principle they are solvable. Not all at once, but they are solvable. It is possible to expand the network of radiological centers and expert councils throughout the nation and have them handle not the 2,500 patients a year as is the case now, but as many as need this at present and as many as will need this in following years. It is possible to raise the level of medical equipping at these centers, the level of medical services for the liquidators and it would be possible with a certain tenacity and efficiency to find funds in order to pay material compensation for the persons who have lost their health and provide a dignified human level of existence for the disabled. Yes, undoubtedly, this would entail colossal difficulties, but these very goals are concrete and tangible. It would be possible to work out some strategy of actions, pool the funds and efforts of the state and the public, seek aid from foreign organizations, firms and

charitable societies. All of this is still being done haphazardly but there is some progress.

But I still have a hard time imagining what strategy can be worked out to eliminate the consequences of the disaster on a territory of 24,727 km<sup>2</sup> and on which live some 3,800,000 persons. The Polesye is not merely a territory. It means too much for the Slavs, and here began Kievan Rus, the Russian state, here lie the roots of the culture of the three peoples. We should save for the following generations at least the icons, the utensils, articles of applied arts and examples of wooden architecture! The pompous Lenin Museum in Kiev should be turned over for these priceless but now lethal exhibits. These were the proposals made at the congress. The scientists even thought up how to neutralize the terrible radiation from these exhibits.

It is possible to put a protective cover on grandmother's carved chest or spinning wheel but what are you going to do with grandmother herself, where is she to be hidden? People continue to live in the radiation-contaminated areas and carry out economic activities, they grow agricultural products, consume them and ship them out. It is possible to close off a 30-km zone around the Chernobyl Plant, to barricade all roads, put up barbed wire, evacuate everyone down to the last old woman and set up patrols. But it is impossible to evacuate entire oblasts! And in this same Bryansk area which until recently they did not understand that because of the accident, as was ascertained, on individual and very extensive territories, the level of radioactive contamination is even higher than in the 30-km Chernobyl zone. It is essential to evacuate at least the children. Are they to be separated from the parents? And for how long? It is essential to halt lumbering operations, the planting and bringing in of crops, the keeping of livestock and the growing of vegetables. But how are the stoves to be heated, what is there to eat if the stores are empty and how can people live without their usual job?

For now, no one has answered these questions and life in the contaminated areas continues virtually in the former manner. The result is that the level of contamination by radionuclides of the Belorussian population, as research by scientists has shown, is leveling out. But in no way toward a decline. Whether there are any consequences for the other, even the most remote regions of the nation, we do not know as yet as the products are being dispatched from the contaminated areas there. Only in individual instances have the products been blockaded en route to the shelf. The hope is that the share of dirty products in the total kettle of the nation is slight and will not cause harm. But in all regions of the nation the same exposed clean-up personnel reside and for them even an insignificant additional radiation dose is fraught with the most serious consequences. And even for a completely healthy person this dose may mean something as in our age of total pollution of the environment, the human organism is already under destructive effects from all sides.

Does this mean that we should freeze deliveries from the dirty oblasts? But we can understand those who reason like one of our readers: It is better to have radioactive butter than no butter at all. At every step we are confronted with the choice of not better and good or bad and good, but rather between bad and none at all. It is the plight of the impoverished. For this reason, the state program for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Plant as adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet was criticized at the Chernobyl congress. As were the activities of the congress itself. But it has still done certain things.

Generally speaking, there were more than enough inflammatory speeches, hysterical comments, protests and sharp gestures at the congress. Even the procedure of electing the presidium was very tense. The boiling up of passions in the audience was understandable as this was a natural response of persons who are desperate, irritated, insulted and deceived. Unfortunately, emotions at times prevented the congress from working constructively. Moreover, from the very outset there was a certain opposition of the Moscow and Ukrainian Unions which claimed the role as the center of the Chernobyl movements and the "interregionals" held a special position. Friction also arose over defining the structure of the Union and working out a further strategy for its activities.

Many surprises arose in the course of discussing the financial question. As is known, in May we successfully held a TV marathon devoted to the question of Chernobyl. Some 76 million rubles of contributions were collected. The congress delegates were hoping that the Chernobyl Union would have the right to spend these funds. However, it turned out that the money belonged to the organizer of the TV marathon, Peace Fund, and only it has the right to determine where the money is to be put. The account holder of the TV marathon is not obliged to report on expenses to the Chernobyl members. For now, it is totally unclear for what, for example, the foreign exchange portion of the deposits on this account have been used and there was no intelligible reply where the organizers intend to spend the millions of rubles. In any event, the peoples of the Baltic are not to receive a single kopeck from this amount and that has already been finally determined. At the congress a decision was adopted to put under Union control all measures being carried out in the aim of providing charitable collections under the slogan of aiding the Chernobyl victims as well as the production of articles with the symbol of the Union. The congress also examined other opportunities for obtaining money for the accounts of the Chernobyl movements. This would mean creating their own economic and commercial associations, cooperatives and joint enterprises and the profit from these would go for the needs of the Chernobyl victims. Even now it is clear that the amounts will be so large that it is impossible to rely solely on charity. As for the state, it is simply not in a position to seek out billions upon billions of rubles from its own budget to eliminate the consequences of the

Chernobyl disaster. Incidentally, it is no longer a question of elimination and I feel that this term from the optimistic announcements from the Chernobyl Plant in 1986 should be abandoned. At present, we can speak solely about the maximum mitigation of these consequences or easing the plight of the victims or the tactics of survival in the contaminated terrain. The congress unanimously viewed the emergency at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant as a national disaster and turned to the world community with an appeal to provide immediate aid to our nation for this reason. It can only be regretted that the government itself did not do this 4 years ago.

### **Allegations of Radiation Hazards at Uzbek Ore Mining Works Explored**

90WN0194A Tashkent KOMSOMOLET  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 7 Jun 90 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Rukhmalev, member of the USSR Journalists' Union: "Chernobyl in the Kyzylkums"]

[Text] It is no secret that Navoi is among the cities with a bad ecological situation. Here the main polluters of the environment are the production association Navoiazot [Navoi Nitrogen], the electrochemical and cement plants and the hydropower plant.

The mining-metallurgical combine also does its bit. For long years, this enterprise has been considered "classified" and has been beyond the reach of glasnost. Now the secrets have been removed. More and more frequently information appears in the press on this unique enterprise the subdivisions of which are located in four towns: Navoi, Zarafshan, Uchkuduk and Nurabad. In truth, the information on the activities of the miners and their impact on ecology often is of a contradictory sort. Recently, for example, the respected republic journal MUSHTUM published a letter from M. Mardiyev to the combine director and USSR People's Deputy N. Kucherskiy. The author of the article stated that supposedly the ore mined in the Kyzylkums "creates a radiation background here comparable in the future with the background of Chernobyl." Naturally this could not help but cause panic among the public. In the local authorities, the newspaper editorial offices and the corresponding services of the combine, the telephones began ringing from alarmed inhabitants of the region.

We turned for an explanation to the Chief of the Central Scientific Research Laboratory of the Mining-Metallurgical Combine V.Ye. Latyshev. He is a candidate of geological-minerological sciences and a member of the USSR Nuclear Society. One of the tasks of the service which he leads is to monitor the combine subdivisions for the ecological state of the work area and for discharges into the atmosphere.

"Along with us similar monitoring is carried out by special laboratories from the subdivisions and by the sanitary-epidemiological center of the combine's Central Medical-Sanitation Unit," said Valentin Yegorovich [Latyshev]. "Independently of one another, they perform

periodic measurements of the gamma background using instruments such as radiometers and the taking and analysis of soil samples for the content of radioactive elements. The results of these measurements are compared against the background values. The background points are located a great distance away from the cities. In particular, for the town of Navoi this is the areas of the stations of Ziatdin, Malik and Khazara. This excludes the influence of the enterprises on changes in the background points. The Navoi Mining-Metallurgical Combine," continued V.Ye. Latyshev, "produces raw materials, including radioactive elements. For this reason, systematically, from the very moment of the establishing of the enterprise, we have been engaged in studying the radiation situation at the industrial sites and in the housing areas of the adjacent territory. Let me point out that radioactive elements are widespread and ubiquitous in the earth's crust and are present in various contents in virtually all rock and soils. For this reason, on any territory and at any point of the surface there is a natural radioactive background which is composed of the power of the dose of the gamma radiation of the rock and soil and cosmic radiation.

"For the town of Navoi the last measurements were made in August of last year. None of the 550 studied points which covered the entire territory of the town had an exceeding of the natural background which is 15-20 microrentgens per hour. Analogous measurements were made previously in 1968, 1974, 1982 and 1986. The radiation situation according to all the previous measurements was also normal and did not differ from the background. There was the same situation in the towns of Zarafshan, Uchkuduk and Nurabad."

[Rukhmalev] Valentin Yegorovich, are you studying the radiation situation solely with your own forces? Or have you turned for aid to the leading research institutes of the nation?

[Latyshev] Undoubtedly, such enormous and responsible work is beyond the power of us alone. And for this reason we have also needed the support of authoritative specialists. Their experience, advice and recommendations are very important.

"In 1988, the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Chemical Technology carried out an aerial survey in Navoi by taking air samples and analyzing them for radioactive elements. They did not discover any excess in terms of the content of radioactive elements. Last year, analogous work was carried out by specialists from the Leningrad Institute for Maritime Transport Hygiene. No deviations from the standard were detected."

[Rukhmalev] The town dwellers are particularly concerned by the tails storage at the hydrometallurgical plant in Navoi. What is the radiation situation here?

[Latyshev] The sanitary-protective zone around this tails storage is about 800 m deep and according to the data of periodic surveys completely protects the territory beyond it from pollution. Within the sanitary-protective

zone lies the plant's subsidiary farm where they grow and sell to the enterprise employees potatoes, onions, carrots and melon crops. The products have been inspected for pollution. There was no exceeding of the standards.

"The combine possesses all of the necessary equipment and skilled personnel for the ongoing survey of the territories in the zones of their subdivisions. There should be no reason for alarm for the inhabitants of Navoi and the other adjacent towns and population points over the question of the radiation situation.

"We, in turn," said V.Ye. Latyshev in conclusion, "are endeavoring to put the information on a level necessary and accessible for all. For this we will use local television, the press and meetings between specialists and residents. On the questions of radiation safety for the public, it is essential to have a correct, competent approach based upon a knowledge of the essence of the problem and reliable information. Only in this instance can we count on trust."

#### **Pollution Statistics for Azerbaijan Summarized**

*90WN0193A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY  
in Russian 15 Jun 90 p 4*

[Article by A. Aliyev, chairman of the Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee: "On the Ecological Situation in the Republic"]

[Text] In recent years in the republic in the aim of improving the ecological situation, conservation activities have been somewhat intensified. In 1989 alone, over 100 million rubles were spent for protecting the environment (including expenditures on forest management), and this was 22 million rubles or more than 1/5 above the 1985 level. During the current five-year plan, in comparison with the previous one, the annual average volume of these expenditures has increased by 11 percent, including by 19 percent for capital investments. Some 1.4 percent of the total investments for the national economy was spent on environmental construction in comparison with 0.7 percent in 1985. However, at present the share of all conservation expenditures in the gross national product of the republic, as in previous years, is just 0.7 percent. The allocated funds as before are significantly underutilized.

In 1989, stationary sources in the republic discharged into the atmosphere some 925,000 tons of harmful substances (in 1985, 914,000 tons), or 11 tons per unit of area and this surpasses the average Union indicator by almost 4-fold. The pollution level of the air basin in the republic industrial centers remains high, particularly in Baku, Sumgait and Gyandzha. As an average per inhabitant of the capital, 1.8-fold more harmful substances is

released into the atmosphere than the Union level and 1/4 more for Sumgait. In these cities, the content of certain harmful substances in the atmospheric air surpasses by several fold the maximum permissible concentrations. Over the last 4 years, according to the estimate of the USSR Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology], Sumgait has twice been among the cities of the nation with the most polluted air basin. The high degree of polluting of the air basin by the industrial enterprises has been caused by their poor equipping with scrubbers a significant portion of which in addition operates inefficiently. As a whole for the republic, up to 1/2 of the harmful substances generated by the stationary sources is recovered and processed in comparison with 77 percent as an average for the nation. The bad ecological situation in the industrial centers is one of the main causes of the high sickness rate. For instance: the sickness rate of the urban population with malignant neoplasms is 4-fold higher than the rural and the mortality rate for this factor is 1.5-fold higher.

The situation is no better with the water resources. With an acute shortage of water in the republic, around 1/4 of the water intake is lost in transporting. In agriculture which is responsible for over 2/3 of the republic water consumption, some 26 percent of the water is lost.

The republic is not doing enough to introduce the recirculating and successive reutilization of water which provides a substantial savings in water and a reduction in the polluting of bodies of water. The share of this water in total water consumption for production needs is just 37 percent, while for the nation it is 72 percent, Armenia 84 percent and Georgia 47 percent. The question of preventing the polluting of the republic bodies of water is being slowly solved.

Last year some 291 million m<sup>3</sup> of polluted waste was discharged into the basin of the Caspian Sea. Here the content of a majority of polluted substances in the Azerbaijan waters of the Caspian Sea significantly surpasses the maximum established concentrations.

Serious attention must be paid to the measures of protecting and improving the land, for at present 44 percent of the entire republic's area is afflicted by erosion, some 2/5 of the irrigated farmland is salined and 20,500 hectares have been disrupted by the oil production, ore mining industries, construction and other types of work and require recultivation. However, in maintaining the rate of work established in recent years for recultivating the land destroyed prior to 1990, more than 20 years will be required.

For improving the ecological situation existing in the republic, we must significantly increase expenditures on environmental protection. In the long run, the capital investment volume for conservation measures should be increased by 4-5-fold.

### Goals of Azerbaijan Greens Movement Explained

90WN0193B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY  
in Russian 15 May 90 p 3

[Article by Dzh. Guseynov: "The Greens Are Beginning...."]

[Text] "Our mineral wealth has been bled white, the land has been poisoned and turned into a garbage dump, the seas are being suffocated by sewage which is released in millions of cubic meters while the air pollution in industrial centers is becoming the cause of numerous illnesses.

"The question of the need to join all the forces of society favoring the protection of the unique nature in Azerbaijan, the environment, the health and life of the citizens has become unusually acute.

"We who currently live in Azerbaijan bear responsibility to ourselves, to our children, to our grandchildren and future generations for protecting the basic conditions of life."

This is an excerpt from the program of the Azerbaijan Greens Movement the constituent congress of which was held on 6 May in Baku. During the meeting in the auditorium, not everything was quiet and boring. Scientists and public figures, workers and peasants spoke with pain about the catastrophic state of nature in the republic, they named specific facts and guilty parties in the destruction of nature, and offered ways and forms for carrying out the difficult tasks of the rational use of natural resources, reducing the pollution of the environment with foreign chemical substances, radiation and noise.

Of course, there were disputes and debates. But a majority voted in favor of creating an independent social organization which would wage an uncompromising struggle against the bureaucratic-consumer attitude toward nature, against the monopoly of the ministries and departments, against their gigantic expensive and resource-wasteful programs leading to the destruction of the natural and cultural-historical environment and not considering either the economic, the social or cultural interests of the population.

One of the important tasks of the DZA [Azerbaijan Greens Movement], as was emphasized at the congress, is to instill ecological awareness in the republic population, and to form relations between man, society and nature which are based upon a mutual harmony.

The Azerbaijan State Committee for Protection of Nature (Goskompriroda), the Republic Ecological Union and the Sumgait Ecological Movement offered to provide aid and a desire to collaborate with the DZA.

The basic backbone of the movement formed a year ago under the aegis of the ecological club with the coming together of the youth, the students Rufat Karagezov and Elman Abdullayev and the young scientists Leyla

Aliyeva, Ismail Rustamov, Bakhar Gadzhi-zade, Farida Guseynova and many others.

"Everything began in March of last year," recalled Ismail Rustamov, one of the initiators of the movement and a member of its current board. "Initially we called ourselves an 'ecological club' under the Baku Arts Center. We are very grateful to the center for the fact that it immediately supported our idea and providing meeting rooms. Like-thinkers assembled and we ardently and passionately discussed the problems which had built up in the republic over the long years of the utilitarian approach to nature. In the disputes, we outlined the ways and forms of our further activities.

"Then we began to carry out various actions and measures in the defense of the environment. Much, in truth, did not turn out well for us, initially no one supported us and took us seriously. For example, in September of last year, we conducted two actions to collect signatures for an appeal to the republic Council of Ministers with a demand to halt the construction of the reservoirs in Tazskiy, Kazakhskiy and Lenkoranskiy Rayons. As a result of this, valuable varieties of trees would have been felled. Enormous areas of forests and fertile soil would have been doomed to covering by water. But still we have not received an answer to the appeal which was signed by more than a thousand persons."

The Greens have realized that without a broad, strong republic-wide movement, it would be hard to fight against those who were fighting nature. The organizational preparations began for the future movement. And then there was the first practical action. On 26 November, on the street an "ecological" protest march was held against the supposed "cleaning" of the bay. The data of an independent ecological expert evaluation showed that the silt which was collected from the bottom of the bay was then dumped back into the sea in the area of Nargin Island. This silt contained toxic concentrations of industrial waste. This project, if one can call it so, for cleaning up had been signed by the Committee for the Protection of the Environment.... The declaration of the Greens was momentarily responded to and they were even invited to a meeting with the ecological commission of the Baku Soviet. It was promised that this question would be raised at the next session of the Baku Soviet and the fellows would be provided with an opportunity to speak. However, 5 months have already passed....

On 4 December, the activists in the movement participated at the Greens Congress in Moscow where they prepared a stand describing the state of the environment in our republic and showed a documentary film entitled "Dead Zone" about Sumgait. A number of proposals from the report of Akif Abbasuliyev who spoke on behalf of the club was incorporated in the congress resolution.

Strong professional contacts were established with the Socioecological Union of the nation and with the Greens Movement in Georgia. This summer they plan to hold a



working expedition up the Kura together with the editorial personnel of the Georgian youth newspaper. The activists are participating in preparing a collection of articles and documents on the ecological situation in the Soviet Union. A chapter on Azerbaijan has been prepared by Elchin Atababayev, a member of our movement's coordinating council.

What tasks have been set by the Greens? In the first place, as is apparent from the program and the bylaws of the movement adopted at the congress, they are against the monopoly of the administrative-command apparatus on taking decisions related to questions of the republic's socioeconomic development, on the collection and dissemination (or more accurately "concealment") of information on the state of the economy, nature and the health of the people and on supervising the observance of current legislation.

"As a counterweight to this," concluded Leyla Aliyeva, "the movement intends to collect objective information on the ecological situation in the republic and on the basis of this establish an ecological data bank available to anyone who so desires to use it. Using our own funds, we are organizing field laboratories and technical inspection over the sources of polluting nature. We will discuss all draft documents relating to the construction of natural and economic projects which can cause harm to nature, we will call in specialists for the public expert commissions, and seek to make provision in the nation's legislation for the right to bring suit in court and arbitration against institutions, enterprises, ministries and individuals who violate the natural background, pollute the environment and thereby harm human health."

And so the Greens are beginning and we are very hopeful that they will win. Certainly each victory of theirs is your and my health and possibly our lives, as well as the saved unique nature of Azerbaijan with its forests, steppes, lakes and the Caspian.



**Russian Writers Union Addresses RSFSR Deputies***90UN2237A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 22, 1 Jun 90 p 2*

[Address by Board Secretariat of RSFSR Writers Union: "To the People and Deputies of Russia!"]

[Text] Dear Fellow-Countrymen!

A time of testing has arrived for our country, for the Motherland.

The heavy freight of past mistakes, multiplied by the unsuccessful attempt to accelerate on the steep turn of perestroika, has led to a crisis-type situation. Interethnic conflicts, the extremely acute problem of refugees, massive attacks on the party, the army, and the bulwarks of socialism have become a reality.

Multinational Russia has turned out to be in a particularly difficult position.

For centuries Great Russia has been uniting and gathering peoples. But nowadays certain well-known political forces, grouping themselves around the so-called "Democratic Russia," are leading toward a split, a dismemberment of the RSFSR into regional "appanage principalities." They have cleverly put the term "United States of Russia" into circulation. Denigrating Russia's contribution to the powerful outlying areas, playing on nationalistic-patriotic feelings, and covering themselves with pseudo-critical, demagogical phrases, the leaders of these forces rush to power without wishing to take into account the fact that it is precisely in the Russian Federation, which has considerably granted its own spaces for erecting the industrial giants on which the industrial and defensive might is based, that the potentially explosive economic, ecological, and social situation has evolved and taken shape. The Russian land and its peasantry are exhausted; they have been driven to an extreme. For the sake of the All-Union advantage and profits, they have generously, too generously multiplied Russia's natural resources and wealth, as well as its spiritual and intellectual potential.

Russia's material self-sacrifice is well-known throughout the entire world.

Certain "politicians" and demagogues have purposely sowed the seeds of discord among the peoples, ascribing "imperialist ambitions" to the Russians. The culture of Russia's peoples is being subjected to constant, unceasing attacks. These same forces are imposing a suffocating mass culture upon us. A slanderous campaign against Russia's best minds—writers, artists, leaders in art, science, and people's deputies—is inflicting merciless blows on self-awareness.

It has already become difficult for the Russian Federation to oppose the coordinated, aggressive onslaught of the "liquidators" at home and abroad. The crisis of power has not passed it by. The absence of Russian mass

media has allowed the unseemly bold radicals, who have seized the press and television, to distort the public consciousness, as well as to destroy the people's moral and spiritual values.

We are excitedly living through or experiencing your initial successes and failures in your parliamentary careers.

We greet the ardent, unified breakthrough with which you, our deputies, voted for Russian sovereignty. We expect from Russia's people's deputies wisdom and a genuine concern for the people's well-being. Don't cave in or knuckle under to the provocations of certain overly ambitious "politicians."

Russia does not need temporary favorites, leaders with a scandalous type of fame who are striving to sit in the saddle of power. Russia needs firm, intelligent, reliable leaders who profoundly understand the tragedy of their own people. Only such leaders will find the path of reconciliation and creation. They are among you. Nominate, promote, and defend them. Seek out ways of agreement and accommodation with all forces which are capable of defending Russia's interests.

As our deputies, you are charged with promoting Russia's interests, along with the aspirations and hopes of its numerous peoples.

The peoples are anticipating the political independence of the RSFSR, economic independence, authoritative organs of administration, and Russian mass media. Russia needs its own Communist Party, founded before the 28th CPSU Congress.

Do your work with the thought of Russia!

Russia is with you!

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**Difficulties Faced by Anti-Stalin 'Memorial' Society Detailed***90UN2387A Moscow NARODNYY DEPUTAT in Russian No 6, Jun 90 pp 70-72—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY*

[Article by Karina Musaelyan: "A Difficult Path for the 'Memorial' Society"]

[Text] The summer of 1987. The year before the 19th Party Conference. The new political thinking has already been proclaimed, along with the turn toward common human values, and a course directed at restoring historical and social justice. But the administrative-command system, once again and as usual, have renovated its terminology in accordance with the "current moment," is in no hurry to implement this course. And, therefore, the shadows of recent trials of dissidents are still hovering in the air just as before. Mistrust of words spoken from high rostrums paralyzes civic activities: the rather

brief that and the abrupt rollback are still too fresh in people's memories. It is not too complicated to alter the tone of speeches and newspaper editorials. What was needed was some kind of substantive sign, a symbol of the irreversibility of the transition to the new life.

And now young persons began to appear on the streets of Moscow, and then those of Leningrad, Chita, Syktyvkar, and many other cities, gathering signatures for a document containing the following words: "We, as citizens of the USSR request the Supreme Soviet Presidium to permit the creation of a Memorial Society, dedicated to the victims of lawless and political terror.... We are profoundly convinced that preserving the memory of the victims of the repressions is necessary in order to complete our public and state life.... The Memorial Society should become not only the expression of nationwide grief, but also an information-research center, with a museum, generally accessible archives, and a library.... Constructure of such a Memorial would be an action unprecedented in the history of our state; it would express a maturity of public awareness, it would be a significant contribution to the achievement of a non-violent world; and it would do honor to our times...."

These young persons were arrested and fined for violating public order. But more and more of them arose, for the movement, directed at de-Stalinizing society, encompassed the country. That was the way "Memorial" began—one of the many public structures engendered by perestroika. Nowadays it operates in 199 of this country's cities and even abroad.

The founders of the All-Union Voluntary Historical-Educational "Memorial" Society were the USSR's creative unions—the cinematographers, artists, designers, architects, and theater figures, as well as the journal OGONYOK, the newspaper LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and the initiatory group of citizens—those who were the first to go out onto the streets with their appeals.

"Memorial" 's Public Council came to include the following well-known journalists, historians, public figures, and USSR people's deputies: Yu. Afanasyev, Yu. Karyakin, Ye. Yevtushenko, A. Adamovich, B. Okudzhava, G. Baklanov, L. Razgon, A. Rybakov, M. Shatrov, B. Yeltsin, M. Ulyanov, V. Bykov, A. Pristavkin, and many others. A. Sakharov became the honorary chairman.

The circle of "Memorial" 's tasks grew wider as the processes of democratization became deeper. The progressive forces "from above" and those "from below" met each other "halfway," became stronger on this path, checked it over, while keying on each other. Much that seemed "extremist" just yesterday has become a commonplace reality.

"Memorial" is the first public organization which addressed itself to A. Solzhenitsyn, and it did so 15 years after his expulsion from this country. Their message had only one request—that he become a member of the public council. They did not dare to take this step right

away. To some it seemed incautious, politically uncertain, and even...provocational. But they decided to. They received the following reply: "I thank those who elected me for this honor. I dedicated my work entitled 'The GULAG Archipelago' to the memory of the victims of the repressions from 1918-1956, for which I was rewarded by being accused of treason to the Motherland. It is difficult to take part in the public life of a country, while remaining beyond its borders. With profound respect, A. Solzhenitsyn."

No less debate was evoked by the text of the telegram sent in reply to the above: "Thanks for your sincerity. Memorial's Public Council expresses its profound regret that you are still deprived of the opportunity to genuinely participate in our work. We hope that this will become possible in the future. You have many readers in the Motherland who deeply value your contribution to Russian literature." Such a reply to a person whose name and even the titles of whose works used to be pronounced in a whisper seemed a dangerous challenge to many persons. But the telegram was sent. One more step had been taken on the path of civic emergence. Later there were many others.

More and more people have joined in the demands for publication of the novel entitled "The GULAG Archipelago" and the removal from Solzhenitsyn of the charge of treason to the Motherland. Nowadays his works are being openly read in the metro, while the demand for the return of his citizenship is widely supported by public opinion. And there are not many who recall how many sentences and fines were imposed on the party members of "Memorial" or how many were fired from their jobs for this. But someone had to take the first few steps on the new path.

A similar evolution was followed in the history of the abrogation of the "political" articles of the Criminal Code—the notorious 70 and 190, the rehabilitation of repressed peoples, the restoration of the rights of the Greek Catholic Church, the freeing of the leaders of the Karabakh and Krunk committees, as well as the Sverdlovsk journalist S. Kuznetsov.

Nowadays "Memorial" is not merely the return of historical truth about "that" time, but also about the present time, a struggle not merely for glasnosts, but also for freedom of speech, not just a rendering of universal aid to the victims of unjustified repressions, but also the active participation in democratic changes, the struggle against present-day lawlessness, rearing the younger generation in the spirit of humanism and a state based on the rule of law. Moreover, "Memorial" for a long time has not divided repressed persons into the victims of the pre-Stalinist, Stalinist, and post-Stalinist periods.

"Memorial" is the NITs (scientific-research center) which is subsidized by an American-Soviet Fund known as "Cultural Initiative" (the so-called "Sorosa" Fund). It is thousands of meters of magnetic tapes which have preserved the living voices of GULAG prisoners. It is tens of thousands of documents and relics which could

be the pride of any museum. It is expeditions through the Archipelago. It is the first international seminar on oral history. The First All-Union Form on "Destalinizing Consciousness," the First All-Union Festival of School Political Theater. The Permanently Operating Seminar on the History of the GULAG, which is conducted weekly on a voluntary basis by historians, journalists, literary scholars, and public figures.

"Memorial" is also charity-benefit evenings and constantly traveling exhibits, the money collected from which makes it possible to render permanent material help to those in need. It is Sunday work on a voluntary basis by legal advisors to whom persons come from all corners of the country, many types of medical groups—on their free time—therapists and surgeons, cardiologists and psychoneurologists, traveling about when called by former repressed persons and members of their families.

As to the "trends" of the "Memorial" Society, formerly repressed persons are given advice and hospitalized out of order at the renowned Fedorov Microsurgery of the Eye MNTK [expansion unknown], which was literally one of the founders of the Moscow "Memorial," and Hospital No 15 of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences VNOTs [expansion unknown]. Aid is also rendered by the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Neurology, the All-Union Center for Psychological Health, and the Cancer Center.

Searching, charitable, and educational work is carried out under the direction of the SAMI (Soviet Association of Young Historians) Youth Section, whose sponsors are the mass-defense section of the Komsomol Central Committee and the television program entitled "...Up to Sixteen and Older."

"Memorial" is 2,000 letters every month: a vital, intense dialogue with people. It is meetings in the Luzhniki on the days when the USSR People's Deputies are having their Congresses. It is a "chain of memory" around the Lyubyanka Building.

Of course, it would be more convenient for the bureaucrats of ideology if "Memorial" were engaged in just one thing. An historical club or veterans' council would be much more suitable for those on whom the registration of societies depends. Therefore, "Memorial" as an All-Union public organization to this day does not have juridical status, nor, consequently, its own account, a permanent press organ, or room. A four-meter sized room at 2 Chernyakhovskii Street in Moscow, provided by the Union of Cinematographers, does not have enough space for the numerous visitors, and there is not even any place to sit down.

Foreign charitable organizations and private individuals do not understand why "Memorial" refuses to accept as gifts scarce medicines, syringes for one-time use, as well as medical and publishing equipment, along with magnetic-tape cassettes. They do not know that since "Memorial" has no juridical status, it can have the

receipt forms filled out only for private citizens—and the customs duties for this are enormous, far beyond "Memorial's" pocketbook.

"Memorial" could have been registered long ago on the basis of a Decree passed by the RSFSR VTsIK [All-Union Central Executive Committee] and SNK [Soviet of People's Commissars], dated 10 July 1932 regarding voluntary societies; its Paragraph 14 provides for such a possibility for All-Union societies whose boards are located within the borders of the RSFSR. Alas, negotiations have been going on for more than a year.

To be sure, many regional sections of "Memorial" have been registered—in Leningrad, Chita, Vorkuta, Chelyabinsk, Kuybyshev, and just recently in Moscow.

The attitude of the authorities toward "Memorial" has been varied. Thus, for example, in Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka three party leaders took the viewpoint of "Memorial": the two first secretaries—of the gorkom and obkom—as well as the head of the House of Political Education, who even became a member of the board. "Memorial" members in Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, and Kharkov have worked in close contact with the authorities. But in Oryol not a single meeting of "Memorial" was permitted, not even on the anniversary of the mass shooting of political prisoners which took place on 11 September 1941. Or the following example: with the permission of Oryol's leaders, the local newspapers have published an interview with one of the leaders of Moscow's "Memorial"—Doctor of Historical Sciences Ya. Etinger—and immediately banned the next meeting. That is, on the outside, everything is being done to seem "on the level," while, in fact, the restructuring of public awareness is being blocked.

In Karaganda a former staff associate of the Karlag has become the director of the Veterans' Museum! Here too a television story about Malinovka—one of the Karlag's camps—was cut out upon the orders of the ideological section of the party obkom. And in Tselinograd they have their own methods: they founded a kind of historical-educational society under the party obkom, which does not operate. However, its "existence" gives it the "right" to refuse to register the local "Memorial" Society (they say that there already is one), and to badger its originator, M. Chalimov, in all sorts of ways.

In Dnepropetrovsk the oblast-level commission for rehabilitation and affairs of the repressed was joined by the editor of the oblast newspaper ZARYA, who in 1987 wrote an editorial condemning the "wretched, good-for-nothing historians who had spit upon the name of the great Stalin."

And here is a contrary type of example. In Tambov, upon the decision of the CPSU Obkom, V. Sedykh, the deputy editor of TAMBOVSKAYA PRAVDA, was fired from his job. A lack of confidence had been expressed about him for his support of "Memorial" and his attempt to raise in the newspaper pages the most urgent questions of personnel policy. Ye. Pisarev, a deputy

secretary, was expelled from the party for taking part in publishing the bulletin entitled SODEYSTVIYE—the organ of the Tambov “Memorial,” which had been supported even by the Glavlit censor—an unprecedented happening! This censor said that he did not “see anything criminal in it,” and the CPSU Central Committee Commission acknowledged that “everything that has been published in SODEYSTVIYE could be published in the oblast newspaper. The journalist V. Mikhaylov and the LTP [expansion unknown] political staff member V. Sereda were fired; they had been too active in seeking out places of mass burials.

In Brest staff members of the local party and soviet organs stole items from the “Exhibit of Memory,” which had been organized by the local “Memorial.” Subsequently, the first secretary of the Brest Obkom, A. Zelenovskiy, explained that the “exhibit items had been taken for the purpose of familiarization”!

And so what kind of a thing is “Memorial”? Is it a political organization? Or is it charitable—something like the “Miloserdie” [Mercy] Society, but with a restricted contingent of persons to care for (those who have been repressed)? Or is it something like the Scientific Research Institute on Stalinism—because, of course, this would seem to have been mandated by the very name “historical-educational”? Is not its program too eclectic—ranging from scientific research studies to legal-defense activities? Have not its goals become eroded: from creating a Memorial to the victims of lawless acts and political terror to building a democratic state, based on the rule of law? Has not its activity become too dispersed—ranging from strictly, narrowly practical aid to those persons in need of it to the election campaign struggle?

“Memorial” receives kicks from both the right and the left. From the left: “You are beginning to play games with the authorities,” “You are not radical enough,” “You are searching for yesterday,” “You are getting bound up in the camp of the broad front of sociopolitical forces.”

And from the right: “You are playing politics,” “You are not loyal to the authorities from whom you expect registration,” “You are going beyond the framework designated in your title—your task is to care for the former prisoners of the Stalinist camps, to place memorial tokens on the burial places, and study history.” And, finally, the most terrible thing: “There are several representatives of the Democratic Union among the members of ‘Memorial!’”

Reproaches and rebukes!... But perhaps precisely because “Memorial” was before prior to many other organizations it is “doomed” to a longer life: its broad-based program—the de-Stalinization of society and consciousness—was designed and intended not for some sort of specifically limited segment of historical time and sector of geographical space. The political transformations which all the other progressive forces set as their

goals are carried out much faster than the totalitarian consciousness of society changes. Civil liberties and economic successes are achieved earlier than the spirit and the reason are liberated from the shadows of the past.

The shadows of the past often proceed in places among the most radical of the radicals and the most democratic of the democrats. Is it not from there, from the past, that the furious, deaf irreconcilability of yesterday’s dissidents, who subject to ostracism today’s “dissidents,” those who defend the ideas of communism and the one-party system, who advocate the iron fist of a democratic president for the period of the transition to a balanced market, while so far destabilization continues in the country and ethnic conflicts multiply? Another “democrat” does not take the trouble to analyze the argumentation of his opponent and brands him as an “apparatchik,” just as previously people were branded as “anti-Soviets.” Certain members of “Memorial” are also guilty of this sin; they are children of their own times. But “Memorial” as an organization whose principal goal is liberation of the spirit is for the “piecemeal” perception and reception of an idea, a phenomenon, a person, and it is against total “deafness.”

The shades of the past are overtaking us, like the Greek Furies, the goddesses of fate. To this very day, many persons, including certain members of “Memorial” itself, find it hard to understand that the “executioners” Yagoda and Yezhov must also be considered as the victims of unjustified repressions. Yes, they were executioners, but they were not Japanese or British spies, and, from a legal point of view, they were repressed unlawfully. Because, of course, they were condemned not for what they should have been condemned—for crimes against humanity—but rather for that in which they were not guilty. We are building a state based on the rule of law. So let’s evaluate everything from the viewpoint of the law and rights.

A people which is abandoning its beliefs in certain idols and ideals “on the run” without thinking of the ruinous consequences, creates new ones. While at one of the meetings held in Luzhniki, I saw a woman with a fanatical gleam in her eyes advancing to the rostrum where Yeltsin was standing and raising a little girl with flowers toward him; other mamas also pushed through the crowd with flowers, while the crowd chanted “Yeltsin! Yel-tsin!” And I became terrified. Swimming before my eyes were pictures of other mamas, children, and flowers, another man on the rostrum, and the same kind of fanatical crowd, the same old story. I am not against the respect which people have for Boris Nikolayevich, but I am against to such forms of expressing it. The past stretches its tentacles to us through the decades, and we cannot fail to note that we are again in the deadly embrace of an octopus.

When we insist of paying back the debts owed to victims of repressions by the state and the party, is this an historical, humanistic, or political campaign? Is it really

extremism to demand the practical implementation of a course aimed at restoring social justice, proclaimed from the rostrum of the 19th Party Conference? Those before whom the state and the party are guilty, those people with crippled fates, who have lost their loved ones and close friends, their health, and property, who have been waiting for the return of the things promised to them since 1956, are departing from this life. They cannot wait any longer! Is it political extremism or a moral imperative of perestroika which calls for a materialization of Repentance?

It seems to me that it is precisely the fear of this very Repentance—but a genuine one—which resides in the sould of every person who hinders in every possible way the registration of "Memorial," thus flouting not only the law, but also the national memory.

### **Moscow Filmmakers Form Independent Union**

90UN2244A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 25, 23 Jun 90 p 11

[Article by S. Grigoriyev: "About It..."]

[Text] Last Tuesday Moscow cinematographers formed It at their constituent conference. I cannot give a name yet to the thing which was established. The conference participants failed to reach an agreement themselves: whether it is the Moscow organization of the USSR Filmmakers' Union, or the Moscow Filmmakers' Union, or the Moscow Union of the USSR Filmmakers... The crux of the matter is that the matter is clear: the 3,000-strong body of the capital's filmmakers has been finally given an official "shape" of an independent creative and public organization.

It established its statutes, which were passed following a heated debate. Its natural right to its own finances, press, and its share of Moscow's real estate (I am referring to the House of Filmmakers, but this is my own opinion). Independent international contacts. The "horizontal," equal principle of relations with republican filmmakers' unions. As to the Russian Filmmakers' Union... Well, I think that the election of Sergey Solovyov, cochairman of the Russian filmmakers' union, head of the Moscow union (I hope it is going to be a union) by concerted effort forms a wonderful foundation for a harmonious, reasonable, and friendly coexistence and cooperation.

P. Finn and I. Gostev have been elected S. Solovyov's deputies. I think that the 60 elected council members and 18 people who are to sit on the working bureau will help their organization win prestige in no time.

### **Bolshoi Theater Hunger Strike Assessed**

90UN2244B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 25, 23 June 90 p 8

[Unattributed article: "Protesting Against Protest"]

[Text] Classified... "Declassified."

An open party meeting of the opera company at the USSR State Academic Bolshoi Theater was held several days after a group of the members of the Bolshoi Theater's party committee, headed by its secretary Yuriy Grigoriyev, began and ended their hunger strike. Discussion of this sensational event was one of the items on the agenda.

The company performers who attended the meeting approached our editorial board with a request to publish an abstract from its minutes (the text is published in an abridged form).

At the beginning, Yu. Grigoriyev gave the reasons and motives behind the hunger strike, reiterated his statement to mass media and the appeal issued by its participants. Answering questions, he said that he learned in a roundabout way, through a messenger, that he had not been re-elected for another term by the competition-certification commission and that it was planned to sign a contract for his further work at the theater. He sent his protest to the procurator's office in connection with the failure to elect him, but it did not play a decisive role in going on a hunger strike. The party committee did not know that it was going to take place.

So, let the Communists have their say...

**I. Morozov, secretary of the party bureau, and an opera soloist:**

I'm personally against strikes, hunger strikes and other similar action. They cast aspersions on the good things done by the collective. They called the theater yesterday to say that they were joining A. Yeyzen's hunger strike, although the latter did not even think about going on a hunger strike. I think that our re-election system is not right and that we have to change it. But I do think that the party committee did the wrong thing.

**Ye. Nesterenko, opera soloist:**

You and I are to blame for the opera's artistic council being idle, and not the directors who have been blamed.

It is a natural process for one to retire; one has to leave some day. Are we going to hang out the flags of mourning each time? The people who have quit the theater, the people you have named, have done it for very different reasons: one did it because he really did not mix well with the collective, another wanted to make a "fast ruble," or rather "a fast buck," still another because he just could not work any more. So, one has to be very circumvent in leveling such charges against the directors.

**G. Pankov, producer:**

I did not like the action taken by a group of party committee members. Has the present situation at the theater shaped up only now? Or maybe it is Yu. Grigoriyev's first year on the party committee? It all had started long ago, and reached the boiling point six or seven years ago when B. Pokrovskiy was forced to quit the theater, not without the bidding of the party committee, headed by Yu. Grigoriyev. Now we invite him to

our productions, we have invited him three times already, and we shall probably invite him in the future as well. At that time, however, there was consolidation with the soloists who were not pleased with B. Pokrovskiy's work. We supported his victimization, some by word and some by silence. Then the chief director and the manager got into bad books. The party committee went into action again, while all of us Communists stood by it, either speaking up or keeping silent.

Like a mirror, the Bolshoi theater has always reflected the political system - as soon as the system went to pieces, the Bolshoi theater started to fall apart as well. Why is the party committee group accusing Kokonin, Zakharov and Lazarev?

If our party committee, elected and supported by the entire collective, is so truthful and good, why did not it work for the good of the theater, enforcing a moral climate and production-creative discipline, but rather fanned passions? One person was fired, another was replaced, the artists began to quit en masse - all this happened during Yu. Grigoriyev's tenure of the party committee. Why has it been decided to proclaim a symbolic hunger strike, both shameful and ridiculous, now? It is very easy now to stir the public opinion and pit people against the Bolshoi theater, using the opportunities that have opened up. Comrades, stop badgering each other at last and buckle down to creative work.

**V. Zakharov, first deputy general director of the theater:**

Yu. Grigoriyev is the leader of a huge party organization at a huge theater, an experienced person. His action is the result of a purposeful policy; it was dictated by the desire to strike at the right time. When the theater was preparing "Mlada," the party committee called that well remembered press-conference. When it was "Life for the Tsar," negative articles about the theater appeared in the press. When they staged the "Maid of Orleans," a hunger strike was announced. They do not know who Grigoriyev is, but people have heard about the hunger strike at the Bolshoi, so they keep calling: "Performers are too well off. What else do they need? Can't they see what's going on in the country?"

Party committee secretary Yu. Grigoriyev has never offered his help either to the managing or the artistic directors at the theater in dealing with the problems that the theater faces, in trying to change some things and to carry out some transformations. The system existing in theater collectives is outrageous; it prevents us from doing work and from dealing with organizational problems on our own. Why have Atlantov, Shemchuk and Piavko quit the theater? They are not satisfied with the present system, and we cannot offer another one. Let us switch to a system of contracts which can guarantee the observance of performers' interests, give them work, increase their salaries and allow them to take care of their working time. Yu. Grigoriyev is trying to discredit this system, instead of trying to understand it, approach

respective departments together with the theater management and try to prove that a different regime should be created for the Bolshoi theater.

We cannot invite anyone to work in the theater. We accepted young soloists, but they do not have a place to live. Who is not providing them with accommodation? Mossovet [Moscow City Council]. One asks for accommodation, but they demand a residence permit, one asks for residence permit, they demand accommodation. Has Yu. Grigoriyev, secretary of the Bolshoi theater party committee and member of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, sounded an alarm or helped solve these problems?

The state has no money. The directors are exploring the ways of making money themselves. They signed an "Agreement on consortium." Yuriy Aleksandrovich, you started saying that it had been signed behind the collective's back and is of a binding nature. They have finally explained what consortium was about, on what conditions it would operate, and calmed people down. We have been offered to sell the boxes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a total of ten seats. Then we would be able to raise salaries for everyone. But we have not been allowed to do this. It is becoming more difficult to stage new productions, it is hard to provide material incentives to the workers both in the workshops and at the theater. Everyone would have supported you had you demanded that the government assign a special status to the Bolshoi. What has happened is nothing but mud, which has been slung at the theater once again.

The meeting was also addressed by performers N. Mayboroda, A. Dzhalaridze, Ye. Raykov, and director G. Ghelovani, who denounced the protest action undertaken by the group of party committee members at the USSR State Bolshoi Academic Theater.

**Central Committee Proposals on Culture Policy Published**

*90UN2380A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian No 26, 30 Jun 90 p 3*

[Theses of the CPSU Central Committee Ideology Commission: "CPSU Cultural Policy Under Current Conditions"]

[Text] As reported in the press, the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee's Ideology Commission discussed the party's cultural policy under current conditions. Leaders of ideological organs, scientists, cultural figures and party employees took part in a lively discussion. SOVETSKAYA KULTURA provided a detailed account of the meeting in its June 2 issue.

Today, on the eve of the 28th CPSU congress, the newspaper prints the theses of the Central Committee's Ideology Commission on the party's cultural policy, which incorporate proposals and comments expressed at its meeting.

1. Current activity embodies V.I. Lenin's conclusion contained in his political last testament, which stated that under conditions when the issue of political power has already been solved, the principal activity of soviets and the party should focus on "cultural issues", since it is precisely the "level of cultural development of the entire mass of the people" that is both the indispensable condition for successful socio-economic and political changes and the embodiment of the main goal of socialism, i.e., the development of the person.

Despite the controversial quality of the policy of the Soviet state and the communist party, our country has progressed far beyond being one of the most backward states in Europe as far as its people's educational level is concerned and has overcome the centuries-old alienation of the masses from achievements of literature, art and science.

At the same time, vulgarization of socialist theory and ambitions of the authoritarian bureaucratic system gave rise to the idea of creating in our country a certain "most progressive culture in the world." That goal, being anti-thetic to Lenin's views on the nature of cultural changes under socialism, led in essence to a situation whereby Soviet culture was being put in opposition to intellectual processes under way in the world, the domestic and international cultural heritage and national cultural traditions. The consequence of this was separation of cultural policy from the true needs of the people, destruction of a large number of historical monuments and the desiccation of the roots of ethnic cultures.

The authoritarian bureaucratic system tried to subjugate culture to its interests, built a powerful machinery of relentless administrative control over cultural life in the country and illegally destroyed, morally oppressed, jailed and exiled abroad the undesirable among the intelligentsia. Education, literature, art and science were reduced to the level and quality needed to be a tool of voluntarist policies. The bureaucracy financed culture on a left-over basis, and as a result the spiritual life was put on a starvation ration to make sure that the intelligentsia and other spiritual forces were fully reliant on the authorities and had no possibility to free themselves from their yoke. All this inevitably caused a crisis in culture, lack of culture on the part of a large part of the population and cultural backwardness of the country.

2. Perestroika opened the way for a cultural renewal in our society. Thanks to efforts by democratic forces, culture shed the shackles of the dogmatic ideology and administrative tyranny and is starting to breathe freely. Our cultural heritage, in its entirety and in all of its multifaceted manifestations, is returning to our spiritual life. The intelligentsia received freedom to create to an extent unknown previously. The potential of the cultures of the USSR peoples is rising and gaining strength. Cultural initiatives from below and cultural movements and associations are coming to life. It can be said with certainty that culture is resuming its function in society.

This raises the need for theoretical landmarks for the emerging processes of cultural renewal.

We must cleanse the truly scientific socialist ideas on culture both from the vulgarly dogmatic layers attached to them in the past and political speculations related to culture which have emerged during perestroika. This is all the more important since recently in the mass media and in some theoretical publications the entire theoretical and practical activity of the CPSU has been sometimes called "anti-cultural in its very essence", the very idea of socialist alternative in the area of culture has been subjected to wholesale rejection and ideas have been expressed about the need to "free" culture of the influence of the communist ideology.

The intelligentsia has played a constructive role in developing perestroika. Many still remain its important moving force. At the same time, certain groups among cultural figures have tried to assert themselves by nihilistically rejecting both our entire history and its current perestroika stage, have been drawn into disputes, are sinking into the morass of commercial art and fall into the occult, religion and apathy. Nationalism is often presented as a sign of true patriotism of those active in ethnic cultures, who supposedly are called upon to stand up to the "un-ethnic" internationalization of culture imposed by the communist ideology. At the same time, notions spread that the new way of thinking and the dialogue of cultures in the modern world threaten the originality of ethnic cultures, lead to their westernization and hurt the "patriotic memory" of the people and the "special" role of our culture in world civilization.

Yet, despite diversity of opinion on methods of spiritual and moral renewal of our country, the understanding of the role of culture in society both as a measure of its humanity and democratization and as a universal means of "making man more human" is gaining strength and stature in social consciousness. Hence, the essence of perestroika corresponds to the essence of culture in its truly socialist sense. This is the reason why **cultural issues must become the focus of the CPSU as a party of perestroika. This spells the need for a new CPSU cultural policy.**

3. The philosophy of perestroika and its goals and character define the basis for a new concept of development of culture in socialist society. Such a concept has already been formed for the most part. Its main points include the following:

- priority for general human values in modern socialist society as a condition for restoring soviet culture to the main path of the world cultural development process. This of course rightfully includes interests of various social, ethnic and other groups and layers of Soviet society;
- full return of the cultural heritage into spiritual life as a way to restore the true spirituality and morality of society;



- respect and encouragement for originality and equality of cultures of all ethnic groups on the USSR territory, broadening and improving their free interactions and cross-fertilization;
- guarantee for dignity of the Soviet man by creating conditions for the free choice of cultural values and forms of cultural activities;
- true freedom, legally and financially guaranteed by the state, of the artist's work and encouragement of talent by society, in all forms in which it manifests its originality and initiative;
- unimpeded competitive development of various currents, styles, schools and methods in literatures, art and humanities, and openness of soviet culture to all humanistic ideas past and present;
- elimination of the monopoly of the state, departments, organizations and agencies in all areas of culture, creating conditions for free cultural activity for various social and political movements and other forms of cultural development of society, with a simultaneous increase of the role of the state as a guarantor of free access for all citizens to cultural values and cultural activities;
- broad and free development of international cultural ties for state and public organizations as well as private individuals, ensuring full inclusion of the USSR into the cultural life of the modern world.

Yet, principles delineating, as fully and clearly as necessary, the functions of the CPSU and the Soviet state in the area of culture and defining special qualities of cultural activities of the party under the conditions of the law-based state and the multiparty system have not been developed. Today, the CPSU lacks sufficient scientific resources for its theoretical activities in the area of culture. Party organizations, having moved away from replacing state entities and rejected administrative methods in working with individuals, organizations and departments active in the area of culture have not yet developed adequate forms and methods for practical implementation of the new concept of cultural development. They do not get enough assistance from the CPSU Central Committee and its research departments, educational institutions and publications. The CPSU has not been able to exert enough influence to overcome the "left-over" principle in financing and providing material and technical support to culture and has not made cultural issues a priority in the USSR Supreme Soviet and soviets at other levels. These shortcomings must be overcome at the very first stages of party rebuilding following the 28th CPSU congress.

4. The issue of **relationship between ideology and culture** has a decisive significance in the spiritual renewal of our society.

Ideology and culture are not neutral with respect to one another. The whole of world history shows that in the

end there is no culture without ideology. At the same time, there has never been a single worthwhile ideology that emerged and developed outside culture or ignored it. At the same time, culture is invariably broader and richer than any ideology. However, starting in the mid-1930s, the "official" dogmatic ideology that emerged in our country has placed itself above culture, which is the cause of the drama of the latter.

Under the current conditions of renewal, the CPSU is building new, scientifically based relations between ideology and culture. Naturally, the starting point of these new relations is the renewal of the ideology itself. While doing this, we must get rid of the vicious order of the past, when the ideology would be developed first and after that, based on it, the contents of culture would be overhauled. Ideology can not be rigid or final, and the natural form of ideology's existence is constant renewal, including also by means of constant interaction with changing culture.

We must radically change the attitude on the part of the CPSU to alternative ideological movements and cultural phenomena which they engender. Instead of intolerance and attempts to ostracize them which still persist, ideological struggle must include—and it already does—dialogue, which is the only means for the CPSU to enrich the communist ideology with ideas borrowed from alternative movements on the one hand and to forge and disseminate arguments against error on the other. This is the only way to free literature, art and humanities from the task of serving the ideology—deadly for them and dangerous for society as a whole—instead of enriching it.

5. A special feature of the current socio-cultural situation in the country is its extremely contradictory transitional character.

On the one hand, general ideas about principles and ways to effect cultural renewal have been formulated for the most part. On the other, many stereotypical ways of thinking, old conservative structures of cultural life and bureaucratic methods of organization and management in this area remain important in cultural policy and have retained their force.

On the one hand, the spiritual life of society is being rapidly enriched by works of literature and art, research papers, free debate in the media, renaissance of ethnic cultural traditions, broader participation in culture by the church, more active international cultural exchanges, etc. On the other, the share of leisure time spent by the population nationwide on cultural activities is falling noticeably, attendance at theaters, concert halls, movie theaters, museums, libraries and clubs is declining, mass amateur performance activities are falling apart, counterculture is spreading among young people, employees are fleeing culture due to pauper wages and lack of social benefits and the professional level of staffs as a whole is falling more and more noticeably. To use the language of sociologists, we see a trend toward de-culturization of the lives of a large share of the Soviet population.



On the one hand, the state budget in the current 5-year plan increased its outlays on culture by 48.9 percent, the number of people employed in the field has risen noticeably and material incentives for their work have been created. On the other, the quantity and quality of that work is declining and the number of shows, concerts, movie showings, exhibitions and club productions is falling.

Culture remains financially weak, while funds allocated for its needs are not spent in full, and often inefficiently.

Public opinion is focused on the primary importance of social justice in socialist society, including in the area of culture. At the same time, economic structures have been created and are gaining strength in this area which make the culture of rural residents, children and retirees financially unprofitable for departments and offices.

6. As practice has shown, partial steps that were taken, significant though they were, did not change the existing socio-cultural situation. A breakthrough in culture can be achieved only by a decisive change in the status of culture in society and the state.

The new status of culture must ensure a radical change in the strategy of cultural development in the country, legislative regulation of cultural processes, the drafting of the program of cultural development in the USSR called for by the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies and a significant strengthening of the material base of the spiritual field as a whole.

In the first place, we need to truly raise the status of the cultural figure in this country. In particular, using its right to introduce legislation, the CPSU should propose in the USSR Supreme Soviet to pass the "basic law of the USSR, union and autonomous republics" to guarantee the real possibility for the artistic intelligentsia to freely engage in practical activities not limited by anything but their own moral self-consciousness, living and working conditions that would be respectable and commensurate with their gift and contribution to social development and more secure and reliable copyright and intellectual property protection.

Perestroika laid bare the dramatic consequences of paternalism and protectionism on the part of the CPSU and the Soviet state toward the intelligentsia: the bankruptcy and inconsistency of many "official" writers, artists, musicians, etc. were revealed, while many previously persecuted or "unnoticed" cultural figures received broad recognition. Having rejected administrative management methods in the area of culture, the CPSU and the state have in a large measure lost their common language with the artistic intelligentsia.

Overcoming distortions in relations between the authorities and the artistic intelligentsia entails above all a guarantee of respectable independence for the latter. Only then will the artistic intelligentsia be able to play an active and positive role in society.

In particular, we must decisively and fully remove all restrictions on the right of the artistic intelligentsia for independent association. This includes the character, functions, organizational structures and allocation of material resources by artistic unions and other forms of association of the artistic intelligentsia. It is important to broaden significantly and to define legally the rights of artistic unions, culture societies and associations, provide legal guarantees for their independence and define their relationship with state entities, trade unions and other organizations.

The new status of culture should provide also **material and organizational guarantee for the right of every Soviet citizen to have access to all cultural values and to choose freely forms of cultural activities.**

Our country has not been able to bridge sufficiently the historical gap between culture and the masses. The cause of it is both limited resources in culture and strategic mistakes in cultural policy. As a result, the low cultural level of the population turned out to be a considerable impediment on the path to the economic and political reforms begun in the USSR by perestroika.

Among strategic mistakes in cultural policy was the attitude toward the people as an object of "cultural service", and not the active subject in cultural development. This prepared the ground for the bureaucratization of activities of organs and departments of culture who lost sight of the true cultural needs of the broad masses of the people and no longer responded to demand from below.

Dogmatic growths on the body of cultural policy caused the leveling of needs and cultural experience of the masses, while the uniformity of content and organizational forms of cultural life in the USSR gave rise to alienation in attitudes towards the "official" culture on the part of a large portion of the Soviet people, especially among young people.

Despite the above-mentioned policy of uniformity, spiritual activities and cultural needs of the people became, on the contrary, more and more diverse. Strictly speaking, cultural growth of the people should not actually entail cultural equalization in a sense of similarity of needs and ways to satisfy them. On the contrary, attainment of a sufficiently high cultural level entails natural diversity of content and forms of cultural activities. The higher the cultural level of a society, the more it is culturally diverse, and the broader is the range of cultural manifestation of the people.

But a different process has been under way in the USSR: differences in conditions of cultural life in various republics and regions and for various population types and socio-demographic groups are on the increase. The issue of access to culture is especially acute in some parts of the Russian Federation and in the union republics of Central Asia. The countryside, workers' towns and new cities lag far behind large cities. Retirees and adolescents are culturally deprived.

**Equalizing conditions of cultural life for the entire population must be one of the main goals of CPSU cultural policy.**

7. The process of reforming nationalities policies in the USSR and revising the entire system of relations between the center and union and autonomous republics, regions and oblasts has raised the issue of **new relations among ethnic state entities in the area of culture, decentralization in the area of cultural management and guarantees of ethnic cultural autonomy for the peoples of the Soviet Union.**

Until very recently, the point of view predominated that development of a unified internationalist Soviet culture was naturally tied to centralized management of cultural life and a unified strategy of cultural development in the country. But experience has revealed gaping shortcomings of excessive managerial centralization in the area of culture. Such centralization did not allow special features of ethnic cultures and regions to be taken into account to a sufficient extent, deprived ethnic state entities of their sovereign rights in the area of culture and caused alienation of local management entities, the intelligentsia and the public from cultural processes. The new union compact must guarantee cultural sovereignty of the republics as a necessary condition for truly vital internationalism in society and the state.

The CPSU should view ethnic cultural autonomy as a productive form of preserving and developing ethnic cultures and their free interaction and cross-fertilization. At the same time, ethnic cultural autonomy will probably become a major and complex political problem in the near future. On the one hand, it will spur massive cultural growth of the USSR peoples by tapping the enormous and previously underutilized potential of the masses and the ethnic intelligentsia in cultural life. On the other hand, it may lead to increased nationalism and self-imposed cultural fragmentation of USSR peoples.

The issue of rebirth of the Russian culture and ethnic culture autonomy for the RSFSR peoples is especially important. Solving it in a dynamic and balanced manner will be crucial for the Soviet Union as a whole.

We must develop political principles defining the new role of the center in cultural policy. Political and ideological implications of such practical issues as emerging "ethnic educational systems" and new relations between the state and various cultural movements are important.

Experience of decentralized management in culture both here and abroad shows that results may be ambiguous. For instance, it is already apparent that transferring all decisions in developing and financing systems of cultural organizations to local administrative bodies often leads to negative consequences: systems themselves and means of financing them are scaled down while the emergence of numerous ethnic cultural centers, societies and associations can split regional cultural life along ethnic lines and lead to conflicts when it comes to sharing the material and technical base of culture.

Given all this, the CPSU should pursue in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in soviets at other levels the line of developing and implementing the **all-union, differentiated "state minimum", which will effectively guarantee that the basic cultural needs of the population are fulfilled.** Such "state minimum" can be achieved by introducing quotas in union, republic and local budgets for allocations to culture. Of course, the influence on the budget-making process will be exerted through communists among deputies corps.

8. The difficult economic situation in the country considerably hems in opportunities for bolstering the material and technical and financial base of culture. However, even if the necessary resources could be found—which is something the CPSU must unconditionally insist upon—there is a need for a **fundamentally new economic mechanism in the area of culture.**

Based on the fact that economic mechanisms exert a direct influence on the content of culture and impact the political, ideological and social values of society, the CPSU should try to influence the process of their formation and functioning.

In order to put an end to the monopoly of existing structures, to encourage the initiative and interest on the part of individuals and collectives and to build up as much as possible and to use material and financial resources of socialist society, different forms of property are acceptable in the area of culture, including state, cooperative, private and mixed. For instance, under certain conditions—which primarily include a reasonable tax system and moral control by the public—there is no reason not to permit private or cooperative picture galleries, video rental stores, libraries, theaters, etc.

At the same time, we must retain the leading role of the state in funding culture.

Contributions from enterprises, offices and organizations—both in the form of voluntary allocations to budgets of local soviets and other state bodies or charitable support for cultural entities, and by means of supporting libraries, museums, theaters, esthetic education schools and programs, etc. directly out of their own budgets—can be a significant source of material support for culture. To encourage such charity it is important to create effective incentives, especially using tax policy.

9. The rebuilding of economic mechanisms in the area of culture is directly related to managerial activities there. The new general systems of management in culture and mass information introduced by the government have put an end neither to harmful departmental divisions in culture nor to administrative and bureaucratic methods used by managerial organs. The state of cultural statistics does not meet the needs of managers, who do not get adequate research support.

The CPSU should support the proposal to **gradually build in the USSR a public and state system for organizing and managing cultural life, which would include**

staffing managerial entities on a competitive basis; ensuring elected representation in them by the artistic intelligentsia and the population; establishing union, republic and local congresses of cultural figures and calling regular meetings of people's deputies at all levels who are members of soviets' commissions on culture.

10. In the years of perestroika, considerable steps have been taken to overcome the cultural isolation of the USSR which occurred in the past as a result of the policies of the USSR itself and the cultural blockade imposed on it by Western nations.

Intensive and diverse cultural ties, which include joint production of cultural output, are a very important factor in normalizing and raising the level of cultural life in the USSR. At the same time, such ties are an effective means for attaining mutual understanding and trust among the peoples and bringing about changes in the political climate in today's world.

The CPSU must shape the strategy of international cultural exchanges of the USSR. For this reason, the CPSU Central Committee should initiate the drafting of a new concept of such cooperation with the participation by commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Ministry of Culture, the USSR State Committee for Cinema, the USSR State Committee for the Press, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SSOD [Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations Abroad] and other departments and organizations, as well as by scientists. In particular, the concept should probably review goals and forms of cultural cooperation; make sure that it is oriented not only to the West but to the East; prevent extremes of both narrowly ideological and strictly commercial approaches to cultural exchanges; broaden opportunities for union and autonomous republics, artistic unions and other organizations as well as private individuals to establish independent cultural contacts; reform the activities of the SSOD and raise the share of overall cultural exchanges in such areas as film, television show and theater co-production, personnel training, and cooperation in producing technical equipment for cultural use.

11. The drafting and implementation of the new cultural policy of the USSR and the revision of the content and methods of CPSU activities in the area of culture under the conditions of the law-based state with the multiparty system require **theoretical underpinnings**. Meanwhile, it can be safely said that theoretical work in this area not only did not intensify in recent periods but completely ceased.

To change this situation, attention should be paid, when research and educational institutions of the CPSU are reorganized after the 28th party congress, to theoretical problems of culture commensurate with its role in the renewal of socialism.

It would be useful to include in the program of cultural development in the USSR which is being drafted currently by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers a theoretical article on the place and role of the CPSU in revising cultural policy in the USSR and practical measures by the party planned for the near future.

### Critic Defends Russian 'Patriotic' Writers, Assails 'Democrats'

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[Interview with Vadim Kozhinov, critic, social journalist, and scholar; by Ivan Pankeyev, literary critic: "In the Mirror Right Becomes Left"]

[Excerpts] The name of the critic, social journalist, and scholar Vadim Valerianovich Kozhinov, is well known to the reading public, from his books (more than 10 have been published, and the latest, "The Fate of Russia," has just been published by MOLODAYA GVARDIYA), as well as from his numerous articles which typically stimulate long and passionate discussions. When he speaks of what is happening today, he always firmly relates it to the history of Russia. This is also true of the interview we are publishing here, which was conducted by the literary critic Ivan Pankeyev.

[passages omitted]

[Pankeyev] Could it be true that now too, along with growing nationalist sentiments, this tragic stage in our history is continuing as well, if only partially, and that this is the source of the already entrenched division into the "right" and the "left", etc.?

[Kozhinov] Yes, there is conflict within our society and people have divided themselves up into the "right and the "left," into "democrats" and "patriots," "liberals," and "conservatives." But I am convinced that if any society is to develop normally, there have to be both "rights" and "lefts." Moreover, for society to develop without shocks, these tendencies have to have equal power.

[Pankeyev] If that is the case, then it is also inevitable that there will be a center, in other words people who do not go to extremes. Logic dictates that they too must be a "positive force," but for some reason that has never happened here...

[Kozhinov] It is characteristic of Russia that she has almost never had a strong center. This was discussed by one of our most outstanding social journalists, Aleksandr Tsipko, in the journal NAUKA I ZHIZN the year before last. Now once again we are without a center or at least have only a very weak one and people who take centrist positions are immediately attacked by both the right and left. But, in any event, both the left and the right are essential. If we have only one, as happened here 70 years ago, when the forces of the left ruled, then ultimately we

arrive at a situation where the entire life of the nation, beginning with day-to-day existence and economics, and ending with the highest level of spiritual activity will be destroyed.

[Pankeyev] Isn't that the reason that you cite on the cover to one of your books Dostoyevskiy's words that "the Russian soul, the spirit of the Russian people is perhaps more capable than that of any other people of accommodating the idea of universal human unity.. That is a moral characteristic and who could deny it and argue that it doesn't exist in the Russian people?" However, for the time being the desired unity remains a dream, and reality consists of the opposition between the two camps. You yourself, for example, spoke of the "democrats" and "patriots," and even made some judgments about them...

[Kozhinov] Yes, at present we have a situation where those who consider themselves "democrats" obviously have less to recommend them than those who are called patriots.

[Pankeyev] But, Vadim Valerianovich, there are many people who believe just the reverse...

[Kozhinov] I will try to demonstrate the vulnerability of the democrats. The first reason is that many of the people who head the democratic movement have completely reversed their opinions right in front of our eyes. One can begin with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and member of the Presidential Council. Issue 5 of NASH SOVREMENNİK contains a quotation from the works published by Comrade Yakovlev when Brezhnev was in power. This quote produces a strong impression because it would be hard to find another such rapturous eulogy of the "development of socialism" and all that existed in our nation after 1917. At the same time, it contained a sharp attack on all who permitted themselves to doubt, especially the writers of "rural" prose. These writers were accused virtually of being anti-Soviet. Now this same man speaks from the standpoint of the "left." Unfortunately, this 180 degree turn is characteristic of many of those who are setting the fashion. I certainly don't want to say that everyone in the "left" camp is like this. There are people who previously expressed the same opinions they are expressing now, but they are not the ones who are heading the movement...

[Pankeyev] I understand that all this is very important and perhaps even critical, but I, as a literary critic, am currently no less, and in some sense even more, disturbed by the problems of the literary process and literary life. Although it too reflects the division into this and that camp...

[Kozhinov] Naturally. Well, take for example the organization which claims to represent the democratic camp among the writers - "Aprel". It is perfectly clear that a certain number of unprincipled people are in control of this organization. Who recently represented "Aprel" on

television? The scandalous critic Malgin, for one, who even after the start of perestroika published a book about the "theme of labor in Soviet poetry," and now has published a book about Robert Rozhdestvenskiy, in my view a true hero of the stagnation, who received during that period every possible award, in reward for praising everything that there was to praise. Or—the extremely "stagnant" figure around whom the activity of "Aprel" revolves - Ananyev..

If we are speaking of significant writers in the patriotic camp, then such "weather vanes" are simply not to be found. I am not even speaking of Astafyev, Belov, Likhonov, or Rasputin, who have done nothing for which they can be blamed for. Currently everyone has taken to attacking Yuriy Bondarev in print. But, if you gather together all his works from the time of stagnation, you won't find anything like what Ananyev was writing at that time. I well remember that at one of the "stagnant writers congresses, Bondarev spoke in a way that clearly displeased the members of the Politburo who were present, since his speech, devoted to the problems of spirituality, did not accord with the "established" rules. It is even more ridiculous to see Bondarev as a Stalinist, since he published one of the first "anti-Stalinist novels, "Silence."

The people who currently are the foundation of the patriotic movement in literature, 20-25 years ago understood and, to the extent permitted by the censor, said what is now being said openly. This is clear in the works they published as early as the 60s. [passage omitted]

[Pankeyev] You don't accept the idea that those whom you have described as having blatantly changed sides, suddenly had a sincere change of heart? After all, sticking to opinions in which you have become disillusioned simply because you once held them is also immoral.

[Kozhinov] Morality is a one thing, but what has vastly more social significance is the other side of the matter. It is impossible to imagine that a person who for decades believed in what is referred to as the ideology of the stagnant period, now has suddenly begun to understand everything. If a person changes so radically in a short period of time, it is difficult to rely on his opinions and decisions. This can only be a superficial change, and in essence he has remained as he was and is merely repeating the mirror image of what he said before—after all, in the mirror right becomes left. For your ideas to have a fruitful basis, you must have an understanding that was developed through years of living and suffering. The authority of our democrats is undermined by the fact that those who are most visible among them are people of the "mirror image" type. And secondly there is the fact that while preaching democracy, that is freedom for everyone, they in truth are very despotically inclined people.

[Pankeyev] For example?

[Kozhinov] Well think of the television program "Vzglyad" [View]. Those who run it talk about pluralism all

the time, but there isn't a whiff of pluralism there. I remember once we had an evening devoted to the journal NASH SOVREMENNİK in the House of Film and some Vzglyad correspondents came over to us to get an interview and asked me what I thought of their program. I answered succinctly that "this is truly a paradoxical program, since it constantly preaches pluralism and in actuality is the least pluralistic of all. And I am convinced that what I am now saying will never be heard on the air." And it never was.

And so, this is extreme anti-democratism accompanied by constant preaching of democracy. And at the same time it is they who have the most favorable position among the mass media, especially in television, and in the same LITERATURNAYA GAZETA that recently did not want to publish an already completed interview with I. R. Shafarevich. And yet Solzhenitsyn in his book, "The Calf Butted the Oak," has referred to Shafarevich as a the most remarkable person he knew, and, for example, in the American papers, eminent political scientists and sociologists speak of his "Russophobia" with respect.

[Pankeyev] Alas, the patriotic movement for the time being has a much smaller circulation. And although there are instances known where a Galileo or Bruno were right and thousands of others were temporarily misled, nevertheless for more than 70 years our people have lived in an environment of slogans, so that the seeds sown by the democratic publications with their printings of many millions fall on soil prepared for decades. And LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA for example, judging from what our readers tell us, is intercepted and frequently doesn't even reach its subscribers.

[Kozhinov] It is a great pity that the Russian is ready to go along with such instant about-faces. I believe it is Turgenev's novel "Smoke" that contains the lines: "I burned everything that I had paid homage to, and paid homage to everything that I burned." Unfortunately, this is a rather typical phenomenon, but it has sad consequences. And if the slogan "Onward to capitalism!" (or "Back to capitalism!") becomes a reality, it will have the same consequence as "Forward to socialism!" Not because it in itself is destructive. No, I am convinced that some amount of restoration of capitalism will inevitably occur. It is simply that in itself the idea of progress in itself is a superficial idea.

[Pankeyev] Excuse me I don't quite understand.

[Kozhinov] Yes, since the time of Plato, there has never been a single truly great thinker who espoused the idea of progress in the sense of believing that people's lives will get better and better, or who at least did not express the gravest doubts in that viewpoint. This was true of both Dostoyevskiy and Tolstoy... Only the philosophers of the "belles lettres" school, such as Voltaire believed that we are moving toward the reign of universal happiness. It is not the idea of socialism that is false, but the faith that socialism will create a heaven on Earth.

[Pankeyev] You are undoubtedly right, especially since the people, it seems, as was true long ago, are silent, if we are speaking not merely about being disturbed, but rather about true influence on and participation in politics..

[Kozhinov] And more of those who take part in politics are inclined to believe the democrats and liberalism, rather than the patriots and conservatives of the right—the issue is not terms but facts. But at the same time, for example, the Moscow writers' organization in the main does not favor the positions of the left. It is their control of the mass media that allows the members of "Aprel" assert that they are in the majority. Perhaps this is true—among people who are not fully capable of independent thought, but not among the writers of Moscow. If by nothing else, this has been demonstrated by the elections for the editorial council of the publishing house "Stolitza" and the journal MOSKOVSKIY VESTNIK. The members of Aprel at these completely democratic elections were totally defeated. I acknowledge that Aprel may have an influence among the provincial writers' circles (provincial not on the basis of where they live, but in their souls) due to the fact that these are people who do not have sufficient information and it may seem to them that Aprel is leading them in the direction of "bright ideals." It is true that those who are truly capable of understanding the words of the activists in this movement are not likely to believe in the ideals. Take for example Tatyana Tolstaya. In my view she is not without talent, although she is completely inhuman; however such literature also has the right to exist. But her recent speech on television was monstrous because it amounted to vituperation of All-Union Agency For Authors' Rights for not paying her enough money.. Such a thing has never happened before in Russian—or even in Russian language—literature—where a writer publicly, in front of the entire world, demands money, money, money! Such lack of respect for oneself, naturally, presupposes complete lack of respect to all other people.

[Pankeyev] But after all such traits as unselfishness, love of money, and enmity are characteristics more of individuals than of movements.

[Kozhinov] I would not like to be taken for a person who only espouses the inflexible patriotic line. I am convinced that nations cannot develop without deep and merciless self-criticism. But no matter how much I wish to say something nice, the democrats' aspirations (and there are no concrete works or deeds there to be judged) cannot withstand elementary examination either from the standpoint of productivity or from the moral point of view. The democrats are striving to establish tyranny, not political, but economic and that is even more terrible. In the West, they publish Russian journals with patriotic leanings and they just barely eke out a living because they are persecuted by economic means. I know this because I have met the people who publish them.

[Pankeyev] And, regardless of membership in a camp, where are you inclined to invest literary hopes for the

near future? I am asking this because in the past you have rarely been mistaken in your predictions..

[Kozhinov] I could have answered that question very clearly if you had asked me 20 years ago. Now prophecies don't interest me. It is not a matter of fear that they won't come true—I see a whole series of young writers who are worthy to continue our literature, and I have even named them in a few articles. But I am not interested in making a list. The only thing I want to say (and that only because he has not yet been published) is that recently the works of the writer and thinker, Dmitriy Galkovskiy, have made an enormous impression on me. He is not yet 30, and for 3 years he worked on a book about Russia, about the world, and about himself, which he called "Eternal Blind Alley." His book is so bold and free that even now it is hard to get it published. But I do not doubt that its appearance will be an event not only in our country, but in world literature and philosophic thought.

[Pankeyev] I think that you have intrigued not only the readers, but the publishers as well. I, at least, have not heard an opinion like this for a long time and that is also no accident. After all, roughly speaking, the concept of culture per se here is growing increasingly more narrow and low to the ground, in spite of all the "returns."

[Kozhinov] Unfortunately you are right. We are only just beginning to open up Russian thought and, as is always

true in such cases, the most profound elements are not the ones that first take the spotlight.

[Pankeyev] Our interview is drawing to a close, so let me ask one last question. Much as been written about you as a critic. Anatoliy Lanshchikov, in 1970 even spoke of the "banners of Kozhinov." But they didn't praise you openly that much. Or, perhaps, I don't remember?

[Kozhinov] Well that depends on what you mean by praise. Chuprinin, wanting to get at me, wrote during the time of "stagnation" that Kozhinov is an "autocratic critic" and makes freer judgments about literature than any of his colleagues. And yet, if you think about it, this is the highest praise. What is an autocratic critic? He who doesn't rely on anything except himself—his own words, his own thoughts. And after all I did not occupy any positions or posts that conferred power on me. Thus, my "autocracy" rested only on my own capacities. I think that I did not fully deserve such high praise, but I cannot conceal that it was pleasant to read it.

[Pankeyev] I never thought that I would have to agree with Chuprinin in his evaluations, but given this interpretation, allow me to wish you further autocracy. And at the same time let me express the appreciation of our readers, who have already sent in letters inspired by your book, "The Fate of Russia", and let me wish you many more books.